

way upon Iran in the matter; Iran should decide for itself, in view of all the circumstances, whether it would be advantageous to it to bring the matter before the United Nations.

I told the Ambassador that he had stated what I understood to be the position of this Government and that I was sure that this Government continued to adhere to this position. I said that it was important he should give his government to understand that the Government of the United States was not encouraging Iran to present the case to UNO. The American Government would, of course, be glad if the matter could be settled outside of UNO and UNO would be spared facing a problem of this kind at its inception. Nevertheless, the United States Government was of the opinion that Iran should decide for itself what it should do.²¹

891.00/1-846 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 8, 1946.

[Received January 8—3:22 p. m.]

73. Tass article from Tabriz published Soviet Press January 8 reports meeting in Tabriz between Pishevari²² and American Consul Rossow, at which latter is said to have stated that he was glad to make acquaintance of Premier in whose person he welcomed National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan. Article states further that upon being asked by Rossow about further plans of government Pishevari observed that these plans were set forth in program. He expressed wish that this program might be realized without bloodshed. Rossow advised that way be left open for negotiations with Tehran to which Pishevari replied that Tehran itself keeps way closed. Rossow inquired how Pishevari would proceed if Shah acknowledged autonomy. Pishevari replied that recognition alone was small matter, guarantee was required that autonomy would be preserved. Article states that

²¹ In telegram 87, January 18, 1946, 8 p. m., to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius), at London, Acting Secretary of State Acheson stated: "Iranian Ambassador in call today requested assurance that American delegation to UNO will adopt a friendly and sympathetic attitude toward Iranian case when it is presented to UNO. He was again informed that while we would regret presentation of matters of this kind until UNO is well established, we adhere to our position that members of UNO should be entirely free to bring their problems to that organization. He was assured that American Delegation will treat the question if presented in a fair and impartial manner but that we can give no assurance in advance of attitude we will adopt in any hypothetical case." (501.BB/1-1846)

²² Jafar Pishevari (or Peshavari), "Prime Minister of the National Government of Azerbaijan" and Chairman of the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan.

Rossow in conclusion "promised to render all support to National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan".²³

Sent Department 73, repeated Tehran 3 and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

891.00/1-946 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, January 9, 1946—noon.

[Received January 11—11:18 p. m.]

3. Aside from stopping of Iranian troops and the well evidenced supplying of arms to rebel democrats, the most flagrant Soviet subversive intervention Azerbaijan is through the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan". Organized recently upon the return of its leaders from visit to Baku as guests of Soviet Union, its ostensible aims are the fostering of nationalities between the two Azerbaijanians. In recent days its drive for memberships assumed large and significant proportions.

Although the social and economic reforms are not entirely unpopular among the people here, they are assuredly opposed in the majority to Soviet domination, and only fear and intimidation lead them to endorse movements of this sort. However, the omnipresence of heavily armed Soviet troops, the general awareness of Soviet manipulation of recent revolt, and widespread fear of the ruthlessness of Soviet agents, have given rise to a deeply ingrained terrorism, such that a mere invitation to join such a society is tantamount to duress. The reality of this terror cannot be doubted since it pervades even the most casual contact with natives.

[Here follows discussion of specific cases of intimidation.]

Soviet sponsorship is openly indicated by fact that both the Soviet Consul General and the Soviet military commander have personally approached [several prominent Tabriz merchants to]²⁴ urge them to join.

As to real aim of society, Muhammad Beriya, local Minister of Education, founder and behind the scenes leader of the society, in

²³ In telegram 18, January 9, 1946, 7 p. m., the Department informed Tehran that "Press here has reported Tass despatch Jan. 8 from Tabriz to effect that Rossow in interview with Peshvari promised 'all kinds of aid' to National Govt Azerbaijan. Dept. spokesman in press statement Jan. 8 denied these allegations. He states that while Rossow did talk to Peshvari he merely listened and gave no assurances of any kind." (891.00/12-2945)

In a letter of January 9 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), the Iranian Ambassador, then in New York, stated that the Tass report had made a bad impression and caused great surprise (891.00/1-946).

²⁴ Bracketed insertions in this telegram based on copy in Tabriz Consulate files.