برچسب: coup

How To Win Turks’ Hearts

Prominent Turkish satirist and comedian Gulse Birsel was just in Europe — this time for five days. She writes how “bored” she was, and how she couldn’t wait to return to her beloved Istanbul.

“Enough Parisian croissants and European monotony, we are addicted to adrenaline,” she writes in the daily Hurriyet. “How can Europe make us feel happy? Within seconds following an argument, she says of Turks, “we hug and kiss each other, cry out of happiness.

“Then we start discussing politics, and fight and insult each other again.”

She’s right. Forget about Turkey’s EU-accession talks, which are on hold anyway. Forget about Turkey’s membership in NATO, boasting the second-largest army in the alliance. Things in Turkey are not so cut and dry as to take cooperation as a sign of future unity.

As satirist Birsel describes Turkey, from the top down many of its people can be seen as emotional, unpredictable, and not so reasonable and calculated, at least not in the Western sense (and much like Italians or Greeks might have been perceived 50 years ago). This characterization seems to fit whether you are talking about the president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is well-known, respected (in Turkey), and feared (abroad) for being “autocratic,” or the lowly grocer around the corner.

Let’s not look away and pretend we were not aware of this. The average Turk is now suspicious of the West, especially of the United States. Many think Washington was behind the terrible, bloody coup attempt in July. Don’t ask why. They feel they have tons of proof that U.S.-based Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen is the mastermind of the coup. And the United States’ purported reluctance to immediately hand him over to Ankara as requested, and following of protocol that passes the case to American courts — which could take years — means the Turks are angry at their Western and NATO friends.

Many Turks are concerned about the territorial integrity of their country because they see it as being threatened by Kurdish insurgency both within Turkey and across the border — in Iraq, but especially in Syria. And they are angry because they think the United States and Europe are not doing anything to counter it. On the contrary, they believe, the United States is even helping the Kurdish “terrorists” in northern Syria. Turks generally have no objections to the Kurds fighting in northern Syria as long as they stick to defeating Islamic State (IS) extremists. But many believe this is not the case, that the Kurds are fighting to expand their territory, and that Kurdish involvement is bad for Turkey because the Kurds fighting in Syria are an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — which is banned in Turkey and which many Western states consider to be a terrorist organization.

On August 7, hundreds of thousands of people attended a huge Democracy And Martyrs rally in Istanbul to promote unity among political parties and to honor those killed during the failed coup attempt.

It was not only Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that mobilized people to attend the rally. A majority of the other political parties, NGOs, and nonpoliticians showed up to show their opposition to the coup and their support for parliamentary democracy — even those critical to Edogan.

Again, let’s not look away, assuming that Erdogan is just appealing to the masses in an attempt to strengthen his power base. Yes, he is. But this time around it is clear that the masses are with him — he is not alone, or backed only by supporters within his own party, but by many Turks from across the political spectrum.

Ask around 50 people in Turkey, as I did in the last week, and this reality becomes obvious. And it is not only the average person — this is what I am seeing in the Turkish media, and in the words of political and public personalities.

To win the hearts of an old friend — in this case, Turkey — one would have to address their needs. For Turks this means extraditing Gulen from Pennsylvania to Turkey to stand trial as the mastermind of a coup that brought Turkey to the edge of complete collapse, and actively helping Turkey reduce the danger posed by Kurdish insurgency, especially in northern Syria, which is seen as an existential threat.

I know this is easier said than done, and involves a litany of legal issues over Gulen’s extradition, strategic issues with Syria, IS, etc., etc. But let’s not forget Turkish satirist Birsel’s brilliant description of how her countrymen fight and/or agree with foes and friends.

I am afraid the West’s adrenaline-addicted friends in Turkey will not wait too long for their demands to be met.

In the aftermath of the huge show of power and support exhibited in Istanbul on August 7, Erdogan is set to leave for St. Petersburg, where he will meet a friend-turned-enemy-turned-friend-again — Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Turkish president will likely be doing some comparison shopping as he seeks foreign backing. And Putin can be expected to be more open to agreement with Erdogan — with fewer caveats — at the moment than the West.

But the Russian president won’t have much to offer his newly regained Turkish friend in terms of immediate help, either.

The Turkish Coup Attempt, Russia, And The West

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan travels to St. Petersburg on August 9 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. They will focus on improving cooperation in two main areas: the effort to find a shared and joint solution to the Syria crisis, and in business and energy, including a full resumption of tourism from Russia to Turkey, trade, and construction projects that were halted during a monthslong spat between the two nations.

Both sides, it appears, are using the recent Turkish coup attempt to mend their relations.

This is Erdogan’s first visit to a foreign country since the July 15 effort to overthrow his government. The coup attempt was rebuffed by a majority of Turks and clamped down by security forces. It was followed by the detention, arrest, and dismissal of tens of thousands of people accused of being members or sympathizing with Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher who has been in self-imposed exile in the United States since 1999. He is accused by the Turkish government of building a secret network infiltrating the army, the justice, education, and media sectors, and the business world.

The St. Petersburg visit will also be the first meeting between the Turkish and Russian presidents since Turkey downed a Russian attack aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border in November. Erdogan strongly defended the action at the time, saying that the Russian aircraft — which was participating in Russia’s bombing campaign in Syria — had violated Turkish airspace.

In the Syrian conflict, Turkey started in the early 2010s to support armed rebel groups, including extremist Islamists, against the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad. Russia took sides with the Assad government and actively entered the war in September, 2015. This created a regional confrontation between Russia and Turkey, who had to that point enjoyed good relations.

Following the incident, relations between the two countries reached a historic low. Putin called the downing of the Russian aircraft — which led to the killing of its Russian pilot after he parachuted to the ground in Syria — a “war crime” and demanded an apology by Erdogan. Russia also initiated a number of punitive measures against Turkey — including ones preventing Russian tourists from traveling to Turkey, and a ban on Turkish food imports — that strained Turkey’s economy.

Then, in an about-face, Russia announced in June that Erdogan had sent a letter of condolence to Putin over the downing of the Russian jet and the two sides agreed to resolve their issues, find common ground in the effort to end the Syrian crisis, and improve their relations.

Formidable sticking points remain, however, particularly when it comes to Syria and the future of Assad.

Speaking about Erdogan’s upcoming visit, Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesman for the Turkish president, said that Turkey wants “to work together with Russia to find a political transition [of power] for Syria, a democratic and pluralist political structure acceptable to all Syrians.” However, he added, “such a solution, that is in the interest of both Russia and Turkey, will be not possible with Assad remaining in power.”

It seems the resumption of better economic and energy relations is already in progress. The delivery of Russian natural gas to Turkey was never interrupted in the first place, so not much ground was lost. The resumption of Russian tourism to Turkey is trickier, in part due to the deadly terrorist attack against the Istanbul airport in June as well as the recent coup — both of which badly damaged Turkish tourism during high season.

Foreign policy seems to be at the top of the upcoming Erdogan-Putin meeting. Obviously, Syria policy is to be a main part of the two leaders’ discussions. A “goodwill coordination of positions” on Syria would seem to be a potential rebuff to U.S. efforts in support of armed groups and Kurdish rebels in Syria against Assad, a scenario that would be complicated by Russia’s own support for the Kurds.

But Russia also appears to be using two issues related to the recent coup attempt to deepen the current Turkish-U.S. and generally Turkish-Western atmosphere of accusatory distrust, and bring Turkey closer to Russian foreign policy coordinates.

From the beginning of the coup attempt, Turkish officials and media have maintained that the West — notably the United States, a NATO ally — has been slow and reluctant in condemning the coup attempt. Erdogan and many other Turkish politicians and media have not shied from public claims that the West, notably the United States, was behind the coup attempt. Secondly, the Turkish government has been insisting on the extradition of Gulen — who is considered to be a terrorist by Ankara and who Turkey accuses of being the mastermind of the coup attempt — from the United States to Turkey. Washington, while dismissing accusations that it had any role in the coup attempt, has asked for “concrete evidence of Gulen’s personal involvement in the attempt” and said that the government will act on the extradition request based on the final legal assessment — a process that can take years.

Meanwhile, Moscow is presenting itself to Turkey as a good “friend” who condemned the coup attempt from the beginning and offered Erdogan its full support. Russian lawmakers have claimed that the “U.S. will never extradite Gulen because the CIA was behind him and his coup attempt,” and bombastic politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky went so far as to say that “Gulen and the U.S. are Turkey’s enemies.”

Despite Erdogan’s initial defense of the downing of the Russian jet, since the coup attempt Turkey has tried to blame the incident on pilots who are alleged to have been Gulen sympathizers. Even more, just on the eve of the Erdogan-Putin meeting, rumor-based “reports” are making waves in Turkish media that the Gulen movement was trying to provoke a “Russian-Turkish war” and that this alleged “CIA-MI6-Mossad plan” was hatched to distance NATO-member Turkey from establishing close relations with Russia. A French newspaper report is frequently quoted as a “reliable Western source,” claiming that on the night of the coup attempt “U.S.-supported jet fighters tried to bomb Erdogan’s hotel, where he was on vacation, while Putin ordered his Russian jet fighters to defend Erdogan.”

It seems that apart from the effort to develop a common Turkish-Russian position on Syria, the meeting will be cause for celebration — with Erdogan thanking Putin for his support following the failed coup attempt, and Putin assuring the Turkish leader of future Russian support.

Analyst and columnist Kadri Gursel summarized it this way, “In order to frighten the West, Erdogan will show that Turkey is getting increasingly closer to Russia.”

In reality, however, Russia does not have much to offer to Ankara in terms of investment, technology, defense, and trade. Turkey has a deep and interdependent relationship with the West. A Turkey decoupled from the West is bad for NATO and bad for the West, but much worse for Turkey itself.

Turkey Still Traumatized Two Weeks After Failed Coup

Ihave been watching Turkey 24/7 since July 15, the day that a coup attempt shattered the country for about 20 hours, failed, and dragged the entire Turkish nation through a trauma that is still continuing in various ways.

Close to 300 people were killed, mostly while resisting the coup attempt, but plotting officers — or soldiers under their command who were unaware what was going on — also lost their lives.

The U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen was immediately declared by the government as themastermind of the coup attempt.

In the first 48 hours, around 7,000 people were detained, arrested, or dismissed from their jobs. That number has been rising constantly, reaching around66,000 people from all layers of society, but consisting mostly of government employees.

Add to that the family members of those arrested and dismissed and you will reach a number of 250,000-300,000 potential new opponents, most of whom were not involved with the “other” side or had no direct links with it. The memory of the killings, the hatred, and violence, the split in the army and government agencies about who was on which side — all of this is truly traumatic for the Turkish nation.

Many people from different political parties and media joined forces with the government, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to defend democracy against the coup.

The detentions and dismissals have not stopped. But two weeks after the coup attempt, the Gulen movement with all its real or suspected supporters, and sympathizing soldiers and security men, government employees, teachers and journalists or businessmen can generally be considered to have been “cleansed” in its entirety.

Nonetheless, the air of crisis, division, political hostility, alarmism, rumors, the race to declare allegiance with the government, and blaming enemies is overwhelming.

I will try to summarize for you my personal impressions about how I perceive the Turkish public’s mood and feeling now — two weeks after the “worst national conflict” since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923:

— A large majority, including supporters and opponents of the government, seems to be convinced that coups, regardless of who is behind them, are a disaster and must be rejected and prevented by the government, even through the use of force. The idea that elections should be the only way to change the government is something that even the fiercest political adversaries of Erdogan believe.

— Many people, regardless of their political inclination, think that Erdogan needed to be defended from the coup plotters.

— Still, it seems that the fear generated by the overwhelming government and media campaign against the Gulen movement prevents people from expressing their opinion freely in public. Most media outlets compete in bashing the Gulen movement. Occasionally, this campaign and media reporting on public shaming go far beyond ethical standards. The state agency for religious affairs has denied the dead coup plotters the usual religious burial rites. A university professor was fired because she didn’t want to use the term “martyr” for the dead on the government side.

— A majority of people and media seem convinced that Gulen is the main and primary mastermind of the coup attempt. It is not clear how much of this is genuine or simply being said out of fear.

— Yes, Erdogan has even strengthened his popular base and support by uniting the people against the coup and crushing it.

— A race has begun to fill the tens of thousands of job vacancies caused by the dismissals and arrests, mainly in the army, the justice system, the department of education, and other state agencies. There are not enough qualified people to replace those who have lost their jobs. These positions will have to be filled by people who are less educated or who even have no training whatsoever. A similar situation was reportedly caused by Gulenist prosecutors, judges, and other higher government employees in the years leading up to 2010. They initiated the firing of thousands of military personnel, government employees, and military commanders. These people were then apparently replaced by their own supporters who were less prepared for the new jobs. At least half of the coup officers were reportedly promoted at that time by Gulenist conspiracies. This was tolerated by the Erdogan government since Gulen and Erdogan were then allies against the secular Turkish establishment and pro-republican army and justice system.

— Most media and political figures, including the opposition, and obviously the government believe that the West has left them alone. A prominent liberal columnist, Murat Yetkin, said: “What would happen in the West if the U.S. Congress or the German Bundestag were bombed, the White House bombed, the Brooklyn Bridge and Champs-Elysees blocked, civilians there shot dead, and attempts made to kill the presidents, prime ministers and chiefs of staff?” 

— Unlike the West, where there are mixed views on Gulen, in today’s Turkey it seems that the majority is on the same anticoup, anti-Gulen side. Most of his supporters have now switched sides (mostly to the government), or they have been arrested or gone on the run.

— The request of the Turkish government to the United States to extradite the Pennsylvania-based Gulen has turned into the main point of contention between Ankara and Washington, as if everything depends on that decision by the Obama administration. The Turks believe that Washington can do it, but is reluctant to do so for political reasons, while Washington says they would consider it after reviewing the evidence of Gulen’s alleged masterminding of the coup and other legal considerations.

— The overwhelming feeling I observe is that the West did not demonstrate any empathy, let alone sympathy, with Turkey in those dramatic days. Everybody was rather focused on how authoritarian Erdogan is and they were even mulling the scenario of the coup’s success and thinking “Actually, why not?”

— On top of this, some rather radical and Islamist-minded political and media figures have been circulating or even creating rumors or rumor-based claims that the United States (“the Americans”), and primarily the CIA or Pentagon, were behind the coup; that they granted Gulen a visa back in 1999 and they helped him organize the coup. For example, Abdurrahman Dilipak of the Yeni Akit daily says that the insurrection was conducted by the United States and was not limited to Turkey, but directed against Islam in general. At the same time, the Vatican, Britain, France, Germany, and “obviously Israel” had their own interests in this scenario.

— So far, I have seen no solid evidence supporting these claims and rumors — just murky reports without sourcing or statements and writings by a selected group of a few former CIA or State Department officials discussing the Gulen movement from different perspectives. Interestingly enough, Turkish government officials have not been reacting to these unsubstantiated accusations against their NATO ally.

— The “black PR” against the West and specifically the United States is so persistent that even statements and comments by U.S. officials, including President Barack Obama, the State Department spokesmen, or the U.S. ambassador in Ankara have not succeeded in setting things right. They have repeatedly stated that they condemn the coup attempt, that accusations of U.S. involvement in it are “absurd,” and that they are ready to look into Turkish requests for Gulen’s extradition.

— Meanwhile, the Russian media, including Sputnik, is campaigning with rumors that Gulen “will not be extradited by the U.S. because he is a CIA agent.” Many people in Turkey seem to have bought into this. Also, in Iran, a Revolutionary Guard commander has said that the coup attempt in Turkey “could not be crushed without a foreign country’s assistance.” That Iran offered immediate and strong support for Erdogan’s government in thwarting the coup attempt seems to have been welcomed in Turkey.

Four Inconvenient Questions About The Turkish Coup Attempt

Shortly after the failed coup attempt in Turkey, which has left nearly 300 people dead, some 6,000 suspects were arrested, most of them judges, prosecutors, and army officers. Many of the arrests happened in the first 24 hours — the rest took place the next day.

No doubt, there will be more to come. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said as much: “From members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors to those in the Constitutional Court, people are being dismissed and arrested. Is that enough? No, it is not. This had to happen, but it is not enough.”

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While it is inevitable that retribution and punishment will occur, the challenge for Turkey is to make sure it is handled with restraint. And the ongoing reckoning will raise some uncomfortable questions.

1. What Was The Aim Of The Coup? 

A military coup usually targets the government, but that doesn’t seem to necessarily be the case in Turkey. When the first shots were fired on July 15, the president was on vacation. None of the key ministers, governors, or police chiefs were arrested. The coup plotters took some of their own army commanders hostage and occupied the headquarters of the chief of command as well as an air base in Ankara. It looked more like a move against the army itself rather than against the government.

2. Why Was The Parliament Bombed?

After Turkey’s parliament was hit by a bomb on July 15, all political parties, including the opposition, were united in defending parliament and democracy. Despite the attacks, deputies returned to the parliament building to demonstrate their support. Many observers immediately asked what was the purpose of bombing parliament, even if they had managed to completely destroy the building.

The damage, however, was minimal — and the parliament is still functioning The satellite connection of many TV channels, including state TV, was damaged, although a few independent TV channels, notably CNN Turk, remained untouched. (Ironically, the latter became a tribune of protest against the coup attempt.)

The plotters also sent young conscripts to occupy some government agencies and a few media headquarters. But those soldiers were ineffective, didn’t seem to be aware of their mission, and quickly surrendered. Some were brutally killed by angry mobs.

3. How Do You Find 6,000 Suspects In Two Days?

Turkish Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag has said that “6,000 suspects were arrested” and that the arrests would continue. But how is it technically and humanly possible that Turkish authorities would be able to collect legitimate evidence on 6,000 citizens in such a short time? In absence of concrete evidence, it is possible that government authorities were working from watch lists of individuals considered a threat, which were drawn up from before the coup. A large proportion of the arrests — around 2,500 people — worked in the justice system. If the coup was just a “small group” within the army, as Erdogan has stated, why were so many judges and prosecutors involved?

4. Where Is The Evidence Of Fethullah Gulen’s Role?

The authorities were quick to lay the blame for the coup at the door of U.S.-based cleric Fetullah Gulen. Gulen has denied being involved and Ankara has not yet offered any clear evidence about the cleric’s role. Erdogan has called for U.S. officials to extradite Gulen, who has lived in the United States since 1999. (U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has said that the Obama administration would consider an extradition request for Gulen but would only comply if Washington was shown proof of the cleric’s guilt.)

Whether or not any evidence transpires, the coup has provided a good opportunity to crack down on Gulen’s movement, which is designated a terrorist organization in Turkey. Many officials and media outlets have amplified the claims’s about Gulen’s involvement, creating a climate where few will dare to question the accusations.

Turkey’s Short-Lived Coup

It was a “classically Turkish” coup attempt: staged by one faction of the army in isolation from the general population.

Gradually, though, government supporters started to come out onto the streets and strategic points in large cities — though not in huge numbers — while few demonstrated support on the streets for the mutiny.

From Friday evening on, leaders of the three biggest political parties represented in the parliament rushed to condemn any coup attempt, referring to the “bitter experience” of the past three army coups and said that “the government has been elected by the people and can only be changed by an election — and not a coup.”

Even leading government allies-turned-critics, such as former President Abdullah Gul and former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, came out in support of the “constitutional and elected” government.

Generally, it appeared that the police and other security agencies such as the Interior Ministry’s rapid-reaction force were leading the pro-government effort against the army.

In many cases, the coup attempt’s foot soldiers, often very young and seemingly unaware of why they were being deployed, were observed being disarmed and taken away by police officers after occasional shoot-outs.

Deputies also started to gather overnight in the parliament building in Ankara that was strafed with air strikes by the coup plotters, like many other government buildings and strategic points such as Turkish Telecom and the State Radio and TV Center.

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Radio and TV channels went off air, but members of the government made it through to those still broadcasting – most memorably, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, appearing on CNN Turk via mobile-phone video link — to encourage the population not to give in.

Arrests soon followed. By Saturday morning, around 1,500 members of the military and security forces suspected of involvement in the coup, including five army generals and 29 colonels, had been detained.

Erdogan, on returning to Istanbul, vowed to restore order as soon as possible and to punish the “traitors.”

The reopening of Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport and the gradual resumption of flights was a sign of a new day on Saturday.

From the beginning, Erdogan and other officials blamed a small mutinous group inside the army, saying they were supporters of exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen.

The government calls Gulen’s supporters a “terrorist group” that has long plotted to overthrow the country’s elected government.

Gulen’s supporters have been getting positions in Turkey’s army, police, education, and justice system for the last two decades. They supported Erdogan in the early 2000s and helped him later come to power and get reelected. But in 2011, Erdogan’s government moved to purge them from top government, media, and business positions.

It seems that the July 15 coup attempt was an effort of the “Gulen group” without visible support from the Turkish opposition.

And by Saturday morning — less than 12 hours after it launched — it was clear it would not succeed.