Nothing Simple About Disbanding Iranian Rebel Camp in Iraq

By Abbas Djavadi – Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who has found himself sandwiched between the demands of an influential neighbor, Iran, and the presence of a large occupation force of mostly U.S. soldiers, assured Iranian leaders during a recent visit to Tehran that a “solution acceptable to all parties” was imminent to the contentious issue of an Iranian rebel camp on Iraqi soil.

Camp Ashraf, located north of Baghdad and close to the Iranian border, houses some 3,500 rebels belonging to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), an Iranian opposition group.

ادامه خواندن “Nothing Simple About Disbanding Iranian Rebel Camp in Iraq”

Armenia-Turkey: Do Killings Constitute A Genocide?

By Abbas Djavadi – Few in Turkey would deny that Armenians were killed in 1915 during the course of World War I. Opinions vary, however, on how the deportations and killings of Armenians came about; and whether the killings can be labeled a ‘genocide’ in a similar vein to the Holocaust.

While only a few extreme nationalists dispute the mass killings of Armenians, some liberals have recognized it as a ‘genocide.’ Most Turkish intellectuals, political analysts, and historians believe that local Armenians, with the help of Russia, were trying to create an independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia.

Despite the ensuing chaos, they maintain the Turkish state acted accordingly to save mainland Turkey from being swallowed up by the victors in the war, Russia, Britain, and France.

ادامه خواندن “Armenia-Turkey: Do Killings Constitute A Genocide?”

Nowrooz Holiday Celebrates Life

(By Abbas Djavadi and Bruce Pannier)

nowrNowrooz is the new year holiday in Iran, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, parts of India and among the Kurds. The word itself literally means “new day” in Persian, and the festival marks the beginning of the solar year and new year on the Iranian calendar, as well as among several other nationalities.

ادامه خواندن “Nowrooz Holiday Celebrates Life”

Russia Turns Up Pressure on Turkey

By Abbas Djavadi – Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is scheduled to arrive in Ankara on September 1, where bilateral discussions will focus on the presence in the Black Sea of U.S. warships transporting humanitarian aid to Georgia.

The deputy chief of the Russian armed forces General Staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said last week that according to a 1936 agreement, ships belonging to nonlittoral countries may not remain in the Black Sea for longer than 21 days. Turkish media quoted Nogovitsyn as warning that Russia will wait until that deadline expires, after which it will “hold Turkey responsible for the situation.”

Lavrov will also be talking to the Turks about Ankara’s proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact that would encompass Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Details of this platform have not been disclosed, but Turkish media quoted government officials as saying that it aims at strengthening peace, stability, mutual respect, and trade in the region.

Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia on August 29 in the wake of the August 8 incursion of Russian forces into Georgia and the formal recognition by Russia on August 26 of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Armenian forces still occupy several districts of Azerbaijan contiguous to the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Turkey currently has no diplomatic relations with Armenia. Its preconditions for establishing such ties are a settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the definitive recognition by the Armenian government of the current border between the two countries, and an end to lobbying by Armenia for recognition that the mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide. Those fundamental differences militate against a formal pact.

Living with the bear

Turkey heavily depends on Russian gas and trade. Although it was not targeted during the recent hostilities, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that transports Caspian oil to Turkey and Europe is vulnerable to attack, especially in the event that Moscow succeeds in replacing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili with a leader willing to accommodate Russian interests.

Bulent Aliriza of the Washington-based think tank CSIS tells RFE/RL that Turkey, sandwiched between Russia and the West, has no illusions about the immediate success of the Caucasus Pact. The Turkish objective is rather to facilitate talks between the five countries that would reduce tensions and ultimately strengthen stability and support regional relations and trade.

Concerned by the increasing Russian influence in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Turkey is desperately looking for calmer waters. Much like Germany, it cannot afford to take sides with either Georgia or Russia because although Turks traditionally sympathize with Georgia, it needs Russia. On the other hand, despite its strained relations with Armenia, Turkey wants to preach stability, although on its own conditions. Thus, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has not accepted an invitation from his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match in Yerevan on September 6. Such soccer diplomacy appears unlikely, even though it would be a nice cosmetic move.

Russia and Armenia look favorably on the Turkish proposal. And why shouldn’t they? Unconditional normalization of relations would legitimize the status quo. By contrast, Azerbaijan and Georgia have not committed themselves, and have little reason to do so, as talking business as if no territorial disputes existed would cement their losses.

A Turkish proverb says, “Don’t name a still unborn baby.” Asked if the proposed Caucasus Stability Pact is such a stillborn infant, Aliriza said, “that would be going too far. It’s about talks, defusing tension, and opening the door to more stability in the region.” In view of the conflicts between the five countries, it would be premature in the case of the Caucasus Stability Pact even to presume a pregnancy, let alone a stillbirth.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appealed to the European Union on August 29 to act “independently” rather than follow the “foreign-policy interests” of the United States. That is precisely what Lavrov hopes to achieve during his visit to Turkey: that even if it does not express support for the Russian intervention in Georgia, Ankara should remain “neutral” and let Moscow pursue its agenda in the “Near Abroad.” If the EU is split on this issue, it can be no surprise that Turkey, dependant on Russian gas and desperate for regional stability and trade, is trying not to provoke the neighboring bear that has woken hungry from hibernation.

(First published Sep 1, 2008 on RFE/RL website, GlobalSecurity, quoted in: Jamestown.com)

Azerbaijan: Elections Make No Diffrence

 

By Abbas Djavadi – Some were hoping that, with these elections, Azerbaijani politics would open up. However, preliminary results show that nothing like that is expected any time soon.

The majority of seats in the new legislature will go to the ruling YAP, a big chunk to the so-called independent candidates or to those from other political parties supporting President Ilham Aliyev, and a few seats to the opposition. There will likely be little change to the distribution of seats in the outgoing parliament.

All leading members of the ruling party, as well as some relatives of the president, have been reelected. However, not a single leader from the main opposition Azadlig (Freedom) bloc seems to have made it into the new parliament.

There have been numerous reports of rigging, pressure, and other electoral abuses from the country’s 5,000-plus polling stations. International observers will talk later today and possibly issue their findings.

It is true that the election was not as farcical as those held in Soviet Azerbaijan, or indeed in today’s Uzbekistan. But the run-up to the poll – especially the last six or so months — with all the intimidation, pressure, and limitations on freedom of assembly, made holding a free and fair election very difficult.

Weak parliament

In Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet presidential system, the parliament has only a small role to play. Many have argued it is merely a rubber stamp for the president. It cannot impeach the country’s leader or dismiss a member of the government.

The president, however, has the power to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. President Aliyev and his late father, the former President Heydar Aliyev, have established a system based on the patronage of a small band of relatives and supporters — all of whom have a disproportionate share in the country’s vast wealth.

One important indicator from yesterday’s poll was the unexpectedly low turnout of 46 percent. Certainly, the rain and cold weather played a part. But the low figure also perhaps reveals that many have little faith in the electoral process — in particular the ability to change the government by going to the polls.

It is also clear from the turnout that the opposition (or at least its current leaders are) clearly lack popular support.

A European observer recently said that Azerbaijan plus democracy would equal Norway, while Azerbaijan minus democracy would end up in another Nigeria. After yesterday’s elections, it is clear Azerbaijan will certainly not develop Scandinavian characteristics in the next few years. But it is still no Nigeria.
Azerbaijan won’t be worse or better off than it was yesterday. Its ruling system will remain the same: an authoritarian regime unwilling to embrace democracy with a corrupt and oil-rich elite reluctant to share its wealth with the population.

(First published Nov 7, 2005, immediately after parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, on RFE/RL’s website. Amazing similarities with presidential election in 2008 and what is expected as parliamentary election in 2009)

Germany’s ‘Green Obama’ Breaks New Ground For Minorities

By Abbas Djavadi – On November 15, Germany’s Green Party elected a new co-chairperson: Cem Ozdemir, a 42-year-old EU parliamentarian and the son of Turkish immigrants.

The Green Party, formerly part of the coalition governments with the Social Democrats (SPD) under Gerhard Schroeder and Joschka Fischer, is the smallest party represented in the German Bundestag, with 51 of the body’s 612 mandates. But the Greens might nevertheless play an important coalition role after parliamentary elections next September.

In any case, Ozdemir’s election to co-chair was hailed as a groundbreaking event in Turkey, where the jubilant media were quick to compare it to another election across the Atlantic: Barack Obama’s victory in the U.S. presidential vote on November 4. “A Historic Day” was the headline of the popular Turkish daily “Hurriyet,” and the liberal “Taraf” called Ozdemir “Germany’s Green Obama.” Ozdemir’s own supporters had waged an Internet campaign under the slogan “Yes, We Cem,” nodding to the Obama campaign’s “Yes, We Can.”

Ozdemir is known inside the party as a pragmatic realist rather than a strict environmentalist. The Green Party’s other co-chairperson, Claudia Roth, called the election a demonstration that her party is the first to fully integrate Germany’s ethnic minorities, saying that immigrants have to be better incorporated into Germany’s political and social hierarchy. Some 20 percent of Germany’s more than 82 million people are non-German immigrants and their descendants.

A valid comparison?

Ozdemir’s election as the first German party chief with a Turkish background is certainly a clear sign of maturity for a country that has long refused to embrace and integrate immigrants, especially from Turkey, into mainstream society.

At the same time, however, Germany is not the United States, the Green Party is not the U.S. Democratic Party, and Ozdemir is not Barack Obama.

The result of the U.S. election, which was treated with suspicion in many countries of Europe and Asia until the final results were in, has created a global wave of optimism. It has also triggered expectations in many countries that other governments will also open up to qualified people who are working within a democratic framework but are not members of the traditional majorities that have dominated those countries’ establishments for centuries.

In Turkey, for example, those applauding the election of an ethnic Turk as the head of a German party should ask themselves whether a member of one of their country’s minorities — say, a Kurd, or a non-Muslim  –could ever be elected Turkish president or prime minister. After all, some 7 million to 14 million of Turkey’s 70 million people are Kurds, a Sunni Muslim community with ethnic brethren in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Because of fears of separatism and the ongoing conflict with the terrorist PKK, Turkish governments have resisted EU pressure to grant more rights to the Kurds, including Kurdish-language education and local self-government.

Although the election of Obama — whose father was an African Muslim — was a great leap for the United States, it is by no means the end of the story. Obama himself is a Christian and has had to defend himself vigorously against innuendo that he is secretly Muslim or even Arab. It is highly doubtful that a non-Christian could be elected president of the United States in the foreseeable future.

Change takes time. The United States has moved forward toward greater tolerance. Germany’s Green Party has also taken a step. Perhaps Turkey will be next. Change takes time, but it comes in the end.

(First published on RFE/RL website, Nov 18, 2008)

Turkish Troops In Northern Iraq? Yes, No, Perhaps

By Abbas Djavadi – Turkish central command denied reports on 22 March that more than 1,000 Turkish troops had entered northern Iraq.

 

But Turkish officials appear determined to legitimize the presence of their troops in the region. In a nationwide televised address, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said yesterday that Turkey and the United States have agreed to a “low-profile” deployment of Turkish troops to a narrow “buffer zone” along the Turkey-Iraq border.

A U.S. official has denied that such an agreement had been made. But Erdogan said the presence of Turkish troops in the 20-kilometer (12-mile) buffer zone is meant to help any refugees from the U.S.-led war in Iraq and will “prevent various provocations against our security” — a likely reference to Kurdish militia groups and rebels:

“The military regulation that we will undertake beyond the Iraqi border in a limited zone is aimed at controlling a possible wave of refugees into Turkey, to prevent certain provocations against our security, and to protect our borders.”

Erdogan did not comment on whether Turkish troops had already crossed the border to northern Iraq. But the media and other observers in the Turkish capital Ankara say the reports of the incursion are true, and that Washington has agreed to a “quiet” deployment in an effort to satisfy both Turks and Kurds.

On 22 March, Turkish TV showed tank and military vehicles carrying troops from the Turkish border town of Silopi into northern Iraq. That same day, journalists were blocked from entering Cukurca, a Turkish town in the triangle of Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian borders that was said to be the troops’ transfer point.

NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson — after speaking with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul — issued a statement on 22 March saying he had been assured that no Turkish forces had crossed into Iraq.

But regardless of whether Turkish troops have already entered Iraq, Turkish officials appear united in the belief that they have the right to be there, despite official U.S. opposition. Yesterday, Gul reiterated Ankara’s justification of a possible incursion: “First, we don’t want to see waves of refugees crossing into Turkey. Everybody knows this. We are talking about this to Europeans and Americans and everybody respects this. Second, we don’t want this region to become a safe haven for any terrorist activities.”

Turkey says it does not want to see a repeat of the consequences of the first Gulf War in 1991, when tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled northern Iraq for Turkey and the rebels from the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) used the power vacuum in northern Iraq to intensify operations inside Turkey.

Turkey, with its own large Kurdish minority, is concerned about the possible creation of an independent or even autonomous Kurdish administration in northern Iraq that might provoke nationalist tendencies among Turkey’s Kurds.

It is being reported that in the 1990s, hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed in northern Iraq to combat PKK rebels who had fled Turkey into Iraq. Turkey was assisted in this effort by both of the main Kurdish groups of the anti-Hussein coalition, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

In their meeting in Ankara last 19 March, however, Iraq’s opposition forces, including the Kurdish groups, failed to reach agreement on the deployment of a limited Turkish contingent in northern Iraq. Turkish officials and U.S. President George W. Bush’s special envoy to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, also attended the meeting.

Commenting on the reports about the recent incursion, KDP spokesman Khoshyar Zabari described the long-term Turkish troops as “guests,” but said a deployment of new Turkish troops would provoke “clashes.”

The U.S. has made clear its opposition to a Turkish deployment, with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld saying it would be “notably unhelpful if [Turkish troops] went into the north in large numbers.”

Yesterday, Bush said he had made it “very clear” to Turkey that its troops should not unilaterally enter northern Iraq. “We’re making it very clear to the Turks that we expect them not to come in to northern Iraq. We’re in constant touch with the Turkish military as well as Turkish politicians. They know our policy,” Bush said. He added: “And they know we’re working with the Kurds to make sure there’s not an incident that would cause there to be an excuse to go in.”

Turkish sources, meanwhile, say Khalilzad is expected in Ankara today to finalize the framework of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq.
(First published on RFERL website, Mar 24, 2003, EurasiaNet)

The Iraqi Equation — Did Ankara Miss The Train?

By Abbas Djavadi – The Turkish parliament’s approval yesterday of a motion to allow the U.S. military to use its airspace in the Iraq war — and to permit Turkish soldiers to enter northern Iraq — has not fully succeeded in reassuring the public that the government is doing everything possible to address Turkish concerns about the Iraq crisis.

Ankara, 21 March 2003 (RFE/RL) — Hours after U.S.-led troops began to bomb Iraq, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer expressed concern about the conflict and reiterated his previous statement that the U.S. action is “unilateral” and lacks UN legitimacy.

Following that statement, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to answer a question about whether Washington had informed his government about the start of military action against Baghdad.

These developments have increased public concern that Ankara, which considers itself a major player in the region, has become an inactive observer of developments expected to have broad consequences for the entire Middle East, including Turkey.

The motion passed yesterday by the Turkish parliament allows the U.S. only to use Turkish airspace. This is in contrast to the first motion, rejected earlier month by parliament, which would have allowed the deployment of some 62,000 U.S. troops on Turkish soil and the use of Turkish military bases. In return, the U.S. had reportedly promised Turkey some $30 billion in grants and loan guarantees.

The rejection of the first motion killed the aid option. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said yesterday: “Previously, there had been discussion of a package of aid for Turkey that was contingent on Turkey’s acceptance of a total cooperation package. That did not develop and that package is not on the table and that package will not be on the table.”

The news dampened hopes in Turkey that closer cooperation with the U.S. would boost the country’s indebted economy and allow Ankara to play a more active role in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.

“How could we mess up like this?” asked the Turkish “Daily News,” which quoted U.S. sources as saying that Turkey “would not get a penny from Washington” for passing only the watered-down second motion.

Turkish political scientist Husein Bagci of the Middle Eastern Technical University told RFE/RL: “Turkey has, in fact, become the losing side in this campaign because it couldn’t foresee this war obviously approaching and because it couldn’t take a resolved position. Now what Turkey has to do in its relations with the U.S. is, based on the logics of damage control, to take part in the international coalition.”

The motion passed yesterday by parliament also allows Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq, but American sources quoted in Ankara say the U.S. will not tolerate Turkish combat troops on Iraqi soil.

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul noted yesterday, however, that Washington has agreed that Turkish troops in northern Iraq may play a humanitarian role in the crisis.

Turkey — which has its own restive Kurdish minority — is concerned about possible Kurdish military activities in northern Iraq and an influx of Kurdish refugees.

In addition to the squandered U.S. aid and the lost opportunity for a more active role for Turkey in the region, analysts here fear damage to the traditionally strong ties between Washington and Ankara.

In rallying votes for the second motion, Prime Minister Erdogan, referring to the importance of maintaining friendly ties with the U.S., called deputies of his ruling Justice and Development Party to act “as if it would be a vote of confidence” in the government.

Analysts say the Iraq crisis has, indeed, strained U.S.-Turkish relations. But Gunduz Aktan, a former Turkish ambassador to the UN and a prominent political analyst, said relations are strong enough to survive. “I hope that with the approval of the new motion, these negative effects will swiftly diminish as far as possible. If the two sides have lost trust [in one another], I hope they will restore it easily because politicians may have lost their trust, but the militaries, being the main elements of the alliance, know each other for a long time and much better [than the politicians],” Aktan said.

With the new motion, Ankara hopes to satisfy both its NATO ally Washington and the Turkish public, without antagonizing either. Critics, however, fear this policy will be considered half-hearted by both sides and will fall short of maintaining the government’s strong public support and continuing, let alone improving, its relations with Washington.
(First published on RFE/RL website, Mar 21, 2003)

Turkey: Ocalan’s Apology Wins Little Sympathy

By Abbas Djavadi – As the trial of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan enters its third day, the Turkish press and public continues to expect that Ocalan will be found guilty and given the death penalty.

The trial, on the prison island of Imrali, began Monday with a surprise apology from Ocalan. Addressing the court and its gallery filled with relatives of Turkish soldiers killed in the PKK’s 15-year armed struggle in Turkey’s southeast, he expressed regret over their deaths.

He also said he wanted to cooperate with Turkish authorities to disarm the PKK and end the armed struggle. The remarks were carried by Turkey’s semi-official Anatolia news agency.

However, his apology seems to have won him little sympathy in the press or among most citizens of Turkey. The comments were largely interpreted as an empty gesture, and as an attempt by Ocalan to escape the death penalty. Ocalan’s call to disarm the PKK also went largely unnoticed by the media and public.

The reaction of Ugur Dundar, a commentator of the A-TV channel, was typical: “He [Ocalan] is not sincere,” Dundar pronounced. Dundar then went on to say he could still remember how Ocalan’s PKK rebels killed a baby in the southeast just a few years ago.

The reaction in the press to Ocalan’s statements might not be simply an expression of widespread Turkish public attitudes. Any pro-PKK or pro-Kurdish pronouncements in the media are banned. Newspapers or broadcasters carrying anything that could be interpreted as favoring the PKK’s position can be charged with advocating separatism or supporting terrorism.

The one segment of the population that does not share the widespread hostility toward Ocalan is the country’s large minority of ethnic Kurds. Ahmet, a Kurdish waiter in the town of Mudanya where reporters have gathered to cover the trial, says he feels sorry for Ocalan. He says he too would have apologized to “save his skin.”

Prosecutors are basing their case against Ocalan on the claim that he and his PKK are responsible for the deaths of more than 30,000 people since 1984. Prosecutors also say Ocalan tried to establish a separate Kurdish state and used terrorism to achieve that goal.

Ocalan has denied that he advocated separatism and has said he favors a democratic solution within the boundaries of Turkey. But he admits he may have been responsible for some bloodshed in clashes between Turkish forces and the PKK.

The charges against Ocalan carry the death penalty, but Turkey has not executed anyone since the mid-1980s. Death sentences must first be approved by parliament, and the president can grant a reprieve.

While most of the Turkish public seems focused on Ocalan’s role as a terrorist and the pain of relatives of dead soldiers, it has largely ignored the issue of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Some 10 million to 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, mostly in the country’s southeast. But the Kurdish language is banned in Turkish media and schools.

Foreign governments and observers say they’re hoping Ocalan’s capture will shed light on the plight of the Kurds and force the Turkish government to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem.

In a sign of possible progress, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel today appealed to Kurdish rebels to lay down their arms and surrender to Turkish justice. He made the appeal in the mass circulation daily Sabah.

The PKK has said it may support Ocalan’s call for an end to armed conflict. But the group has not said explicitly if or when it would lay down its arms.

Most analysts, though, are not optimistic that the Kurdish problem will be solved anytime soon. Akin Birdal, the head of the Turkish Association for Human Rights, says a new coalition government, which includes a hardline nationalist party, may make it more difficult to start a dialogue with the Kurds.

“Such a possibility is not visible. On the contrary, it seems this will become even more difficult. This is a human rights and democracy issue. But the program of the new government has no word on this issue. And I don’t know what the future political climate will bring about.”

Professor Hasan Koeni of Ankara University adds that granting any cultural rights to Kurds could lead to further demands that threaten the country’s territorial integrity. He says other countries hold the same view toward their own minorities. “That’s why,” he says, “countries, such as Iran with its large Azeri minority, do not intend to grant minorities language or other cultural rights.”
(First published on RFE/RL website June 9, 1999)

Turkey: Media Shows Bias Ahead Of Ocalan Trial

By Abbas Djavadi – A few days before the treason trial of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan begins on the prison island of Imrali, Turkish media continue to reflect only one side of the story, that of Turkish authorities.

The general public remains basically unaware of the defense or of Ocalan’s or the PKK’s arguments.

Ocalan, for years Turkey’s most-wanted man, was captured in Kenya in February by Turkish commandos. Earlier, he’d been expelled from hiding in Syria and later he attempted to seek asylum in Italy. The dramatic story has dominated Turkish media for months.

Ocalan is charged with ordering the murder of innocent people and attempting to establish a separate Kurdish state. He faces the death penalty if convicted. Turkish law does not ban capital punishment, although there has not been an execution since the mid-1980s.

Ocalan’s lawyers argue that for the past two years the PKK leader has advocated a peaceful solution to solving the Kurdish problem within Turkey’s existing borders. Some 10-15 million Kurds live in the country, mostly in the southeast. Turkey refuses to recognize the Kurds as a minority and the Kurdish language is banned in Turkey’s schools and media.

The lawyers also say Ocalan cannot and should not be tried as a murderer. Though thousands of Turks and Kurds have died in a 14-year conflict between security forces and the PKK, Ocalan’s lawyers say this is war, not murder.

Turkish newspapers and TV channels routinely ignore these arguments and instead refer to the PKK as “a separatist organization” trying to dismember Turkey. Ocalan is frequently labeled Turkey’s “chief terrorist” or even a “baby killer.” Press conferences of Ocalan’s lawyers are not reported and few newspapers dare to publish interviews with them.

At recent court hearings in Ankara, which Ocalan is banned from attending for security reasons, Ocalan’s lawyers have been subject to verbal abuse by family members of police and soldiers allegedly killed by the PKK. Ocalan’s lawyers have also complained about the behavior of Turkish news photographers and television cameramen who crowd around them as if they were Ocalan themselves.

Last week Oral Calislar, editor of the newspaper “Cumhuriyet,” was sentenced to 13 months in prison for running two interviews conducted in 1993 with Ocalan and another Kurdish activist living abroad. Turkeys “state security court” later ruled that the interviews undermined Turkeys territorial integrity.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Calislar said he was only doing his job as a journalist. He says that dealing with the Kurdish problem openly is the only answer. Calislar:

“Turkey faces a Kurdish problem. We have to solve this problem through discussion. We have to inform the citizens about the opinions of the other side too. How do you want to decide, to reach a verdict on individuals and organizations, when you have no contact with them and don’t know what they are saying?”

In the otherwise colorful Turkish media, political and social discussions are usually conducted in a free and even sensational manner. However, in covering sensitive national or security issues, censors and self-censorship appear to rule what gets printed. The conflict with Kurdish rebels is at the top of the “black list.” But Elvan Ozkaya from Turkish NTV television tells RFE/RL that she respects the Turkish public’s outraged reaction to Ocalan. She says the media coverage is not only the result of censorship, but reflects the feelings of the population:

“Since the person is Abdullah Ocalan, who has been wanted for years and [is the cause of death of] many people, we shouldn’t see this only as an issue of hatred. Finally, somebody has been captured. This is a reaction to this situation. Besides a directive from above [government], we have this reaction and I think it is quite normal.”

Last week, Semdin Sakik, a former Ocalan deputy who was captured last year in northern Iraq, was sentenced to death by Turkish courts. Observers are expecting the same verdict for Ocalan. The public seems to be prepared for a death sentence. It might be said though that the media — in harmony with the state and the army — leave no room for any other expectation. (Rod Shahidi of the Persian Service and Jolyon Naegele of RFE/RL also contributed to this feature.)
Fisr published on RFE/RLwebsite May 9, 1999, later on B-Info Bulgaria))

Turkey: Fairness Discussion May Postpone Ocalan Trial

By Abbas Djavadi – Turkey’s top officials have hinted that the treason trial of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan might be postponed until the country’s new parliament changes legislation governing the state security courts where Ocalan will be tried.

The hints have come from both President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.

Earlier, the European Union and human rights organizations demanded that Ocalan be given a fair and open trial. The EU is especially objecting to the structure of Turkey’s state security courts, where a military judge chairs the court along with two civilian judges.

In a televised speech, President Demirel said this week that Turkey should consider any criticism directed against the way the Ocalan trial is being conducted, otherwise, Turkey might face difficulties in its bid to enter the EU.

“And a problem the country faces is the [Ocalan] trial. It should be done in a manner that nobody is able to criticize. Nobody can object to the court’s verdict, but if there are any justifiable criticisms, we would not be able to insist on being included in Europe if we dont answer those criticisms.”

After such comments by both president and prime minister, Ocalan’s lawyers requested postponement of the trial, to “clear the way for a fair trial.” Ecevit also indicated that the court might accept the request and the trial might be postponed so that the incoming parliament can change the legislation on the state security courts.

The idea of postponing the trial was sharply opposed by the ultra-right Party of Nationalist Action (MHP), which is due to become the junior partner in a new coalition government with Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Liberal Motherland Party of former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz. Ecevit’s Justice Minister, Selcuk Oeztek, took a step back by saying that the Prime Minister was “misinterpreted.” Oeztek said “the decision to postpone the trial will have to be taken by the state security court itself.

Cevdet Volkan, chief prosecutor of the state security court in Ankara, said that the trial will “certainly” start on May 31, but changes in legislation “might affect the Ocalan case.” An attorney with the Turkish Association of Lawyers here in Istanbul, who asked not to be named, said that he expects the trial to start on Monday and be postponed later until legislation on the state security courts is changed.

Ocalan’s lawyers have protested what they describe as harsh treatment and restrictions on their defense activities. Some of his lawyers claim to have been beaten by police, and threatened in an effort to get them to withdraw from the case. Ahmet Zeki Okcouglu, head of the 104-member team of lawyers that is defending Ocalan, said that he would not attend the trial to protest the lack of fair conditions for the defense work. Niyazi Bulgan, another of Ocalan’s defense attorneys, told RFE/RL that pressure and unfair conditions are mounting.

“Since the beginning of this process we have informed the media very clearly about illegal actions and obstacles to defense activities as well as attacks on us. Since the very beginning we have frequently said that the indicted (Ocalan) and we as his lawyers are missing conditions to prepare for a fair trial, and do the defense work.

In early May, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging Turkey to allow international observers to attend the trial. Turkey in the beginning refused foreign observers at the court as “interference” with its internal affairs. However, Turkish media this week announced that observers from parliaments of EU countries, along with reporters from major Western newspapers, agencies and TV stations, will be allowed to attend the trial.
(First published on RFE/RL website, 31 May 1999)

Turkey: Preparations Under Way For Trial Against PKK’s Ocalan

By Abbas Djavadi – “He will be hanged, with or without a trial.” That’s the view of a young lottery vendor on Istanbul’s Taksim square. It’s indicative of public expectations in Turkey as the country prepares for the high-profile trial of Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Meanwhile, Turkey’s TV channels regularly show interviews with angry relatives of victims of the war with Kurdish rebels. One handicapped former commando says he wants to see Ocalan suffer, adding “a fast execution” would be too good for him.

While the treason trial against Ocalan is due to open Monday on the prison island of Imrali off Istanbul, almost everybody seems to be sure about the verdict.

After failing to find a refuge, Ocalan was captured last February by Turkish commandos in Kenya and brought to Turkey. As public enemy number one, he is being charged for attempting to split Turkey and establish a separate Kurdish state. He is also being held responsible for the death of thousands of people during the guerilla war he has been leading since 1984. Ankara claims that some 30,000 have been killed in the last 14 years. Most of them are said to be Kurdish rebels.

Speaking to a selected group of the Turkish society’s elite in Istanbul, President Suleyman Demirel said that Turkey would not allow PKK fighters based in northern Iraq to enter into Turkey and kill civilians and government troops. Demirel gave his view of the PKK:

“Is this a liberation movement? It is not possible to conduct a liberation movement through terror. Besides, this is no liberation movement. This is a blunt and open crime.”

The PKK, for its part, claims that the Turkish army has burnt to the ground hundreds of Kurdish villages in the southeast of the country and killed or forcibly deported thousands of Kurds suspected of supporting the PKK. Mehmet Balci of the Amsterdam-based ERGK, the PKK’s political arm, spoke recently with RFE/RL. He said that the conflict with Turkish authorities and troops started 14 years ago because Kurds were forced to take arms to “defend themselves” against Ankaras denial of Kurdish rights.

Balci says: “The PKK and Ocalan are today no more terrorists than [Nelson] Mandela and [Yassir] Arafat were terrorists in the past. How can one talk of murder if there are 30,000 dead? In fact, this is a war. The PKK is not the source, but the result of the war. The Kurdish problem remained unresolved, it was denied and the Kurds were discriminated against. As a result, the awareness of the Kurds developed and they were forced to take arms because all other ways were closed.” Turkey has a large Kurdish minority of some 10-15 million people, but the Kurdish language is banned in Turkey’s schools and media. Turkey considers itself as a strictly unitarian state and refuses minority rights as a potential threat to the countrys territorial integrity.

Since Ocalan’s capture in February, many bombings and other terrorist attacks have taken place in Istanbul and other Turkish cities to protest his trial. Dozens of people have also been killed in recent clashes between PKK rebels and security forces in southeast Turkey. Security forces have been put on high alert and it is feared that next Monday, as the trial opens, terrorist actions will reach a peak.

On Thursday, tabloid newspapers reported on a suspected bomb attack in the small town of Mudanya, the closest port to Imrali island. Participants at the court and reporters have to come first to Mudanya to wait to be brought to Imrali by special police boats, if allowed.

Until now, the number and size of terrorist attacks have been relatively limited. With Ocalan standing trial for treason, Ankara seems confident that it is about to eliminate the PKK as the main threat to its territorial integrity.

Niyazi Bulgan, one of the 104-member group of lawyers to defend Ocalan, tells RFE/RL that the charges are based on article 125 of the Turkish penal code on separatism. But Bulgan says that Ocalan himself has repeatedly advocated a “peaceful solution” of the Kurdish issue within the boundaries of Turkey. Bulgan says: “He (Ocalan) himself will answer accusations about separatism and we will evaluate them separately. It is very clear from our talks [with Ocalan] that he is not in favor of dividing Turkey. He favors a free coexistence in a common motherland. He said that especially since 1993 as the unilateral ceasefire offers were made, he frequently repeated that he does not have any plans to split Turkey.”

Turkey has categorically refused to consider any talks with the PKK, which it considers as a terrorist organization.
(First published on RFE/RL website May 31, 1999)

Tajikistan: UNESCO Moves To Defuse Tajik-Uzbek Tension

By Abbas Djavadi – A commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, UNESCO, has taken steps to defuse a potentially damaging row between Central Asian neighbours Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The row can be said to have its origins more than a thousand years ago, in that it concerns the two countries’ different views of the ancient Samanides dynasty. The Samanides line of rulers was founded in the year 899, and held sway for a century over what is now Central Asia, Afghanistan and eastern Iran.

The UNESCO panel took the immediate heat out of the conflict last week by suggesting, as a compromise, that a seminar be held next year in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, to discuss exactly what the Samanides had contributed to the region’s culture and science. The decision whether to go ahead with the seminar will be taken next week by the general conference of UNESCO, which is now meeting in Paris.

The Tajik-Uzbek tension was sparked by the Tajik government’s request for UNESCO support for its plan to celebrate the 1100th anniversary of the Samanides in 1999. The Tajiks consider the Samanides as one of their first successful national dynasties following the Arab conquest of the old Sassanide Empire in the seventh century. The Samanides’ rule coincided with the Turkic tribal movements from Central Asia towards the south and the west. In 999, the Samanides were defeated by the Turkic Ghaznavides.

After declaring independence in 1991, Tajikistan saw in the Samanides a proud example of national survival in a surrounding environment of Turkic peoples.

The Uzbeks are Turkic, but this is not the main reason for Uzbekistan’s concern over the Tajik anniversary plan. The Samanide capital was the city of Bukhara, located in today’s Uzbekistan. Bukhara, along with Samarkand, are two major Uzbek cities with largely ethnic Tajik population.

In a recent letter to UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor, Uzbek President Islam Karimov is reported to have protested against Tajikistan’s plan to celebrate the anniversary of the Samanides in 1999. Karimov apparently fears that the festivity could incite Tajik nationalist feelings and probably separatist feelings in Bukhara and Samarkand.

A similarly disputed anniversary occured last year as the Uzbeks celebrated the 660th birth anniversary of Tamerlane, a Turkic-Mongol emperor of the 14th century whom the Uzbeks consider their ancestor and the founder of united Turkestan. The Tajiks, for their part, see in Tamerlane an aggressor with a record of massacres.

Media and journalists in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are already campaiging in favor of the Samanides celebration, or against it. And, in Paris, the issue has become a hot dispute between the Tajik and Uzbek delegations to the UNESCO General Conference.

Aziz Khujaev, vice premier of Uzbekistan, told the UNESCO commission that the issue would provoke “inter-ethnic conflict” if it would be about celebrating the “Tajik Samanides dynasty with Bukhara as its capital.”

In an interview with RFE/RL, Tajik poet Mumin Kanoat warned against translating cultural events and historical anniversaries into actual political disputes.

“We respect today’s borders and the territorial integrity of our neighbors,” he said, “but it is the right of the Tajiks to honor the creation of their great dynasty (of the Samanides) although the capital of this empire, Bukhara, is now in today’s Uzbekistan.”

Independent observers were concerned that the dispute could inflame an unexpected emotionalism between Tajiks and Uzbeks while both neighboring countries need peace and stability to boost economic and democratic reforms.

“Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both Tajik and Uzbek authorities have demonstrated enough care and wisdom regarding any territorial issues,” said Guissou Jeannot-Jahangiri, an independent journalist based in Paris. “The planned celebration has become a stick for top-level politicians and does not seem to arouse any popular concerns.”

The consensus reached in Paris seems to satisfy both sides. The Tajiks reportedly gave in by dropping clauses such as the “Tajik Samanides dynasty” or emphasizing that the capital of the dynasty was Bukhara. And the Uzbeks conceded that the Samanides’ rule is a historical reality deserving attention. All five Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, approved the compromise suggestion at the meeting last Friday.

Irene Iskinder-Mochiri, a Central Asian analyst with UNESCO, told RFE/RL that the issue had become geopolitical rather than cultural. The two sides realized that it was too hot to deal with in political, inter-ethnic terms, she said. Thus “UNESCO received approval for its policy of pursuing peace and stability with its activities,” as she put it.  (First published on RFE/RL website 31 Oct 1997)

Tajikistan: Government, Opposition Launch Experiment In Cooperation

By Abbas Djavadi – Tajikistan’s government and its Islamic Tajik opposition have embarked on an unprecedented experiment. Two previously hostile groups are joining to form a government and a unified army. One group, the Moscow-backed national administration, consists of former communists and apparatchiks. The other group is driven by an Islamic ideology.

A startling symbolic event took place today. About two-hundred armed fighters of the Islamic Tajik opposition entered the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, and were welcomed by the Moscow-backed government of President Imomali Rakhmonov. Soon, more than 200 additional troops will arrive from Afghanistan, where they have been based since 1992.

These formerly rebel fighters will take responsibility for the security of the joint government-opposition Reconciliation Commission, set to arrive in Dushanbe on September 8.

A day later, Tajikistan will celebrate the sixth anniversary of its independence from the Soviet Union. The commission is to form a coalition government and prepare new parliamentary elections for next year.

In tired and troubled Tajikistan, peace may have overcome war at last.

The government and the Islamic opposition signed a UN-brokered National Accord in Moscow on June 27, interrupting or ending five years of civil war. The war claimed perhaps 100,000 lives, and turned ten times that number into refugees.

Some Western analysts maintain that the peace accord did not result primarily from the will of the warring sides. Instead, its proximate cause was improved Russia-Iran cooperation aimed at halting pressure from the purist Afghan Islamic Taliban. Authorities in both Moscow and Tehran suspect the Taliban of serving Pakistani and U.S. interests. A united Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, would weaken Russian and Iranian influence in oil-and-gas-rich Central Asia.

Russia now has strengthened its position in Tajikistan. It may have emerged as Moscow’s main stronghold in Central Asia. Other countries of the region resist dancing to the Kremlin’s tune.

Moscow sees in President Rakhmonov’s government an instrument to pursue its policies in the region. Russian troops comprise the backbone of a 25,000-member force of border guards and CIS peacekeepers along the 2,000-kilometer Tajik border with Afghanistan. Moscow is also Tajikistan’s main creditor.

A remarkable Tajik army success last month strengthened the central government and the prospects for implementing the National Accord. One of the strongest supporters of the government, Colonel Mahmud Khudaberdiyev, commander of the First Brigade of the Tajik army, stationed in the southern city of Kurgonteppa, took control of the southern province’s entire economy and challenged the peace agreement. The army reacted with unaccustomed determination, suppressed the revolt, and re-established central control over this part of the country.

Still, the rebellion also demonstrated how fragile the peace accord is. Other armed hostilities still may occur between groups within the government who have conflicting interests. The Tajik opposition, now preparing to share power with the government, has a similar situation within its own ranks. Violence may erupt there also.

Whether the National Accord will succeed in leading the country into peace and democracy will depend in part on foreign players, primarily Russia and Iran. Also the United States, which the people of Tajikistan tend to admire, but which in actuality has been mostly aloof from events there.

All the elements for peace and war, stability and fragmentation, self-determination and subjugation remain volatile in Tajikistan. A positive outcome would open up vast opportunities for those involved.  (First published on RFE/RL website Sep 5, 1997)

Tajikstan: Dushanbe, Opposition Agree On Coalition Government

By Abbas Djavadi – Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov and Tajik opposition leader Abdulloh Nuri met in Mashhad in northeastern Iran today and agreed on the formation of a coalition government and the composition of a reconciliation commission.

The government will grant the opposition 30 percent of the cabinet seats in the central government and in local governments.

The Reconciliation Commission will consist of 26 members, 13 from the government and 13 from the opposition. The commission will be headed by an opposition member, whose deputy will be from the government.

No agreement was reached on the participation of a “third force” in the commission. But it is being reported that the government agreed that the opposition could share its portion of seats with other groups.

The agreements will be signed later today in Mashhad in a ceremony attended by Rahmonov, Nuri, as well as Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati. Other details of the conciliation between the two sides are expected to be finalized in the next round of talks between the experts of the two sides due to start Wednesday in Moscow.  (First published on RFE/RL website Feb 21, 1997)

Germany’s ‘Green Obama’ Breaks New Ground For Minorities

Turkish-German parliamentarian Cem Ozdemir’s election as German Green Party’s co-chairman is most welcome in Turkey. But would Turks themselves elect a non-Turk or a non-Muslim as their president, or prime minister, or a party chairperson?

By Abbas Djavadi – On November 15, Germany’s Green Party elected a new co-chairperson: Cem Ozdemir, a 42-year-old EU parliamentarian and the son of Turkish immigrants.

The Green Party, formerly part of the coalition governments with the Social Democrats (SPD) under Gerhard Schroeder and Joschka Fischer, is the smallest party represented in the German Bundestag, with 51 of the body’s 612 mandates. But the Greens might nevertheless play an important coalition role after parliamentary elections next September.

In any case, Ozdemir’s election to co-chair was hailed as a groundbreaking event in Turkey, where the jubilant media were quick to compare it to another election across the Atlantic: Barack Obama’s victory in the U.S. presidential vote on November 4. “A Historic Day” was the headline of the popular Turkish daily “Hurriyet,” and the liberal “Taraf” called Ozdemir “Germany’s Green Obama.” Ozdemir’s own supporters had waged an Internet campaign under the slogan “Yes, We Cem,” nodding to the Obama campaign’s “Yes, We Can.”

Ozdemir is known inside the party as a pragmatic realist rather than a strict environmentalist. The Green Party’s other co-chairperson, Claudia Roth, called the election a demonstration that her party is the first to fully integrate Germany’s ethnic minorities, saying that immigrants have to be better incorporated into Germany’s political and social hierarchy. Some 20 percent of Germany’s more than 82 million people are non-German immigrants and their descendants.

A Valid Comparison?

Ozdemir’s election as the first German party chief with a Turkish background is certainly a clear sign of maturity for a country that has long refused to embrace and integrate immigrants, especially from Turkey, into mainstream society.

At the same time, however, Germany is not the United States, the Green Party is not the U.S. Democratic Party, and Ozdemir is not Barack Obama.

The result of the U.S. election, which was treated with suspicion in many countries of Europe and Asia until the final results were in, has created a global wave of optimism. It has also triggered expectations in many countries that other governments will also open up to qualified people who are working within a democratic framework but are not members of the traditional majorities that have dominated those countries’ establishments for centuries.

In Turkey, for example, those applauding the election of an ethnic Turk as the head of a German party should ask themselves whether a member of one of their country’s minorities — say, a Kurd, or a non-Muslim  –could ever be elected Turkish president or prime minister. After all, some 7 million to 14 million of Turkey’s 70 million people are Kurds, a Sunni Muslim community with ethnic brethren in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Because of fears of separatism and the ongoing conflict with the terrorist PKK, Turkish governments have resisted EU pressure to grant more rights to the Kurds, including Kurdish-language education and local self-government.

Although the election of Obama — whose father was an African Muslim — was a great leap for the United States, it is by no means the end of the story. Obama himself is a Christian and has had to defend himself vigorously against innuendo that he is secretly Muslim or even Arab. It is highly doubtful that a non-Christian could be elected president of the United States in the foreseeable future.

Change takes time. The United States has moved forward toward greater tolerance. Germany’s Green Party has also taken a step. Perhaps Turkey will be next. Change takes time, but it comes in the end.

 

 

 

 

Iran Watches As Iraq Negotiates Security Pact With U.S.

 

By Abbas Djavadi – Iraq’s parliament is nearing a vote on a long-awaited security agreement with the United States. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s cabinet backed the agreement on November 16 and lawmakers are expected to vote on it by November 26. The pact provides a legal basis for U.S. forces in Iraq after the current UN mandate on the international presence there expires on December 31; it sets a deadline for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities by July 2009 and from the entire country by the end of 2011.

ادامه خواندن “Iran Watches As Iraq Negotiates Security Pact With U.S.”

Tajikistan, An Open Country?

By Abbas Djavadi – In his analysis of Central Asia published in Foreign Affairs, Charles William Maynes, President of the Eurasia Foundation, wrote that Tajikistan is “more open” than all other Central Asian countries. Other sources describe this mainly mountainous, small country of six million people as a “limited pluralism” with “low-level instability.”

After all, exceptional to other Central Asian countries, the Tajik government of President Emomali Rahmonov signed a peace agreement with the country’s Islamists in 1997 and included some of them, though reluctantly and less than what he promised, in his government. Since then, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan is a legally recognized party with a newspaper published in the capital Dushanbe. The same happened to the Tajikistan Democratic Party, another group previously aligned with the Islamists, that received a smaller share of government positions given to Mr. Rahmonov’s former foes.

ادامه خواندن “Tajikistan, An Open Country?”

Russia Turns Up Pressure on Turkey

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is scheduled to arrive in Ankara on September 1, where bilateral discussions will focus on the presence in the Black Sea of U.S. warships transporting humanitarian aid to Georgia.

The deputy chief of the Russian armed forces General Staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said last week that according to a 1936 agreement, ships belonging to nonlittoral countries may not remain in the Black Sea for longer than 21 days. Turkish media quoted Nogovitsyn as warning that Russia will wait until that deadline expires, after which it will “hold Turkey responsible for the situation.”

Lavrov will also be talking to the Turks about Ankara’s proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact that would encompass Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Details of this platform have not been disclosed, but Turkish media quoted government officials as saying that it aims at strengthening peace, stability, mutual respect, and trade in the region.

Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia on August 29 in the wake of the August 8 incursion of Russian forces into Georgia and the formal recognition by Russia on August 26 of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Armenian forces still occupy several districts of Azerbaijan contiguous to the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Turkey currently has no diplomatic relations with Armenia. Its preconditions for establishing such ties are a settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the definitive recognition by the Armenian government of the current border between the two countries, and an end to lobbying by Armenia for recognition that the mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide. Those fundamental differences militate against a formal pact.

Living With The Bear

Turkey heavily depends on Russian gas and trade. Although it was not targeted during the recent hostilities, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that transports Caspian oil to Turkey and Europe is vulnerable to attack, especially in the event that Moscow succeeds in replacing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili with a leader willing to accommodate Russian interests.

Bulent Aliriza of the Washington-based think tank CSIS tells RFE/RL that Turkey, sandwiched between Russia and the West, has no illusions about the immediate success of the Caucasus Pact. The Turkish objective is rather to facilitate talks between the five countries that would reduce tensions and ultimately strengthen stability and support regional relations and trade.

Concerned by the increasing Russian influence in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Turkey is desperately looking for calmer waters. Much like Germany, it cannot afford to take sides with either Georgia or Russia because although Turks traditionally sympathize with Georgia, it needs Russia. On the other hand, despite its strained relations with Armenia, Turkey wants to preach stability, although on its own conditions. Thus, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has not accepted an invitation from his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match in Yerevan on September 6. Such soccer diplomacy appears unlikely, even though it would be a nice cosmetic move.

Russia and Armenia look favorably on the Turkish proposal. And why shouldn’t they? Unconditional normalization of relations would legitimize the status quo. By contrast, Azerbaijan and Georgia have not committed themselves, and have little reason to do so, as talking business as if no territorial disputes existed would cement their losses.

A Turkish proverb says, “Don’t name a still unborn baby.” Asked if the proposed Caucasus Stability Pact is such a stillborn infant, Aliriza said, “that would be going too far. It’s about talks, defusing tension, and opening the door to more stability in the region.” In view of the conflicts between the five countries, it would be premature in the case of the Caucasus Stability Pact even to presume a pregnancy, let alone a stillbirth.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appealed to the European Union on August 29 to act “independently” rather than follow the “foreign-policy interests” of the United States. That is precisely what Lavrov hopes to achieve during his visit to Turkey: that even if it does not express support for the Russian intervention in Georgia, Ankara should remain “neutral” and let Moscow pursue its agenda in the “Near Abroad.” If the EU is split on this issue, it can be no surprise that Turkey, dependant on Russian gas and desperate for regional stability and trade, is trying not to provoke the neighboring bear that has woken hungry from hibernation.

(First published on RFE/RL website)

The Iraqi Equation — Did Ankara Miss The Train?

The Turkish parliament’s approval yesterday of a motion to allow the U.S. military to use its airspace in the Iraq war — and to permit Turkish soldiers to enter northern Iraq — has not fully succeeded in reassuring the public that the government is doing everything possible to address Turkish concerns about the Iraq crisis.

Ankara, 21 March 2003 (RFE/RL) — Hours after U.S.-led troops began to bomb Iraq, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer expressed concern about the conflict and reiterated his previous statement that the U.S. action is “unilateral” and lacks UN legitimacy.

Following that statement, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to answer a question about whether Washington had informed his government about the start of military action against Baghdad.

These developments have increased public concern that Ankara, which considers itself a major player in the region, has become an inactive observer of developments expected to have broad consequences for the entire Middle East, including Turkey.

The motion passed yesterday by the Turkish parliament allows the U.S. only to use Turkish airspace. This is in contrast to the first motion, rejected earlier month by parliament, which would have allowed the deployment of some 62,000 U.S. troops on Turkish soil and the use of Turkish military bases. In return, the U.S. had reportedly promised Turkey some $30 billion in grants and loan guarantees.

The rejection of the first motion killed the aid option. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said yesterday: “Previously, there had been discussion of a package of aid for Turkey that was contingent on Turkey’s acceptance of a total cooperation package. That did not develop and that package is not on the table and that package will not be on the table.”

The news dampened hopes in Turkey that closer cooperation with the U.S. would boost the country’s indebted economy and allow Ankara to play a more active role in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.

“How could we mess up like this?” asked the Turkish “Daily News,” which quoted U.S. sources as saying that Turkey “would not get a penny from Washington” for passing only the watered-down second motion.

Turkish political scientist Husein Bagci of the Middle Eastern Technical University told RFE/RL: “Turkey has, in fact, become the losing side in this campaign because it couldn’t foresee this war obviously approaching and because it couldn’t take a resolved position. Now what Turkey has to do in its relations with the U.S. is, based on the logics of damage control, to take part in the international coalition.”

The motion passed yesterday by parliament also allows Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq, but American sources quoted in Ankara say the U.S. will not tolerate Turkish combat troops on Iraqi soil.

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul noted yesterday, however, that Washington has agreed that Turkish troops in northern Iraq may play a humanitarian role in the crisis.

Turkey — which has its own restive Kurdish minority — is concerned about possible Kurdish military activities in northern Iraq and an influx of Kurdish refugees.

In addition to the squandered U.S. aid and the lost opportunity for a more active role for Turkey in the region, analysts here fear damage to the traditionally strong ties between Washington and Ankara.

In rallying votes for the second motion, Prime Minister Erdogan, referring to the importance of maintaining friendly ties with the U.S., called deputies of his ruling Justice and Development Party to act “as if it would be a vote of confidence” in the government.

Analysts say the Iraq crisis has, indeed, strained U.S.-Turkish relations. But Gunduz Aktan, a former Turkish ambassador to the UN and a prominent political analyst, said relations are strong enough to survive. “I hope that with the approval of the new motion, these negative effects will swiftly diminish as far as possible. If the two sides have lost trust [in one another], I hope they will restore it easily because politicians may have lost their trust, but the militaries, being the main elements of the alliance, know each other for a long time and much better [than the politicians],” Aktan said.

With the new motion, Ankara hopes to satisfy both its NATO ally Washington and the Turkish public, without antagonizing either. Critics, however, fear this policy will be considered half-hearted by both sides and will fall short of maintaining the government’s strong public support and continuing, let alone improving, its relations with Washington.
(First published on RFE/RL website)

Turkey: Fairness Discussion May Postpone Ocalan Trial

By Abbas Djavadi – Turkey’s top officials have hinted that the treason trial of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan might be postponed until the country’s new parliament changes legislation governing the state security courts where Ocalan will be tried.

The hints have come from both President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.

Earlier, the European Union and human rights organizations demanded that Ocalan be given a fair and open trial. The EU is especially objecting to the structure of Turkey’s state security courts, where a military judge chairs the court along with two civilian judges.

In a televised speech, President Demirel said this week that Turkey should consider any criticism directed against the way the Ocalan trial is being conducted, otherwise, Turkey might face difficulties in its bid to enter the EU.

“And a problem the country faces is the [Ocalan] trial. It should be done in a manner that nobody is able to criticize. Nobody can object to the court’s verdict, but if there are any justifiable criticisms, we would not be able to insist on being included in Europe if we dont answer those criticisms.”

After such comments by both president and prime minister, Ocalan’s lawyers requested postponement of the trial, to “clear the way for a fair trial.” Ecevit also indicated that the court might accept the request and the trial might be postponed so that the incoming parliament can change the legislation on the state security courts.

The idea of postponing the trial was sharply opposed by the ultra-right Party of Nationalist Action (MHP), which is due to become the junior partner in a new coalition government with Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Liberal Motherland Party of former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz. Ecevit’s Justice Minister, Selcuk Oeztek, took a step back by saying that the Prime Minister was “misinterpreted.” Oeztek said “the decision to postpone the trial will have to be taken by the state security court itself.

Cevdet Volkan, chief prosecutor of the state security court in Ankara, said that the trial will “certainly” start on May 31, but changes in legislation “might affect the Ocalan case.” An attorney with the Turkish Association of Lawyers here in Istanbul, who asked not to be named, said that he expects the trial to start on Monday and be postponed later until legislation on the state security courts is changed.

Ocalan’s lawyers have protested what they describe as harsh treatment and restrictions on their defense activities. Some of his lawyers claim to have been beaten by police, and threatened in an effort to get them to withdraw from the case. Ahmet Zeki Okcouglu, head of the 104-member team of lawyers that is defending Ocalan, said that he would not attend the trial to protest the lack of fair conditions for the defense work. Niyazi Bulgan, another of Ocalan’s defense attorneys, told RFE/RL that pressure and unfair conditions are mounting.

“Since the beginning of this process we have informed the media very clearly about illegal actions and obstacles to defense activities as well as attacks on us. Since the very beginning we have frequently said that the indicted (Ocalan) and we as his lawyers are missing conditions to prepare for a fair trial, and do the defense work.

In early May, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging Turkey to allow international observers to attend the trial. Turkey in the beginning refused foreign observers at the court as “interference” with its internal affairs. However, Turkish media this week announced that observers from parliaments of EU countries, along with reporters from major Western newspapers, agencies and TV stations, will be allowed to attend the trial.
(First published on RFE/RL website, 31 May 1999)

Turkish Troops In Northern Iraq? Yes, No, Perhaps

Turkish central command denied reports on 22 March that more than 1,000 Turkish troops had entered northern Iraq.

But Turkish officials appear determined to legitimize the presence of their troops in the region. In a nationwide televised address, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said yesterday that Turkey and the United States have agreed to a “low-profile” deployment of Turkish troops to a narrow “buffer zone” along the Turkey-Iraq border.

A U.S. official has denied that such an agreement had been made. But Erdogan said the presence of Turkish troops in the 20-kilometer (12-mile) buffer zone is meant to help any refugees from the U.S.-led war in Iraq and will “prevent various provocations against our security” — a likely reference to Kurdish militia groups and rebels:

“The military regulation that we will undertake beyond the Iraqi border in a limited zone is aimed at controlling a possible wave of refugees into Turkey, to prevent certain provocations against our security, and to protect our borders.”

Erdogan did not comment on whether Turkish troops had already crossed the border to northern Iraq. But the media and other observers in the Turkish capital Ankara say the reports of the incursion are true, and that Washington has agreed to a “quiet” deployment in an effort to satisfy both Turks and Kurds.

On 22 March, Turkish TV showed tank and military vehicles carrying troops from the Turkish border town of Silopi into northern Iraq. That same day, journalists were blocked from entering Cukurca, a Turkish town in the triangle of Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian borders that was said to be the troops’ transfer point.

NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson — after speaking with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul — issued a statement on 22 March saying he had been assured that no Turkish forces had crossed into Iraq.

But regardless of whether Turkish troops have already entered Iraq, Turkish officials appear united in the belief that they have the right to be there, despite official U.S. opposition. Yesterday, Gul reiterated Ankara’s justification of a possible incursion: “First, we don’t want to see waves of refugees crossing into Turkey. Everybody knows this. We are talking about this to Europeans and Americans and everybody respects this. Second, we don’t want this region to become a safe haven for any terrorist activities.”

Turkey says it does not want to see a repeat of the consequences of the first Gulf War in 1991, when tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled northern Iraq for Turkey and the rebels from the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) used the power vacuum in northern Iraq to intensify operations inside Turkey.

Turkey, with its own large Kurdish minority, is concerned about the possible creation of an independent or even autonomous Kurdish administration in northern Iraq that might provoke nationalist tendencies among Turkey’s Kurds.

It is being reported that in the 1990s, hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed in northern Iraq to combat PKK rebels who had fled Turkey into Iraq. Turkey was assisted in this effort by both of the main Kurdish groups of the anti-Hussein coalition, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

In their meeting in Ankara last 19 March, however, Iraq’s opposition forces, including the Kurdish groups, failed to reach agreement on the deployment of a limited Turkish contingent in northern Iraq. Turkish officials and U.S. President George W. Bush’s special envoy to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, also attended the meeting.

Commenting on the reports about the recent incursion, KDP spokesman Khoshyar Zabari described the long-term Turkish troops as “guests,” but said a deployment of new Turkish troops would provoke “clashes.”

The U.S. has made clear its opposition to a Turkish deployment, with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld saying it would be “notably unhelpful if [Turkish troops] went into the north in large numbers.”

Yesterday, Bush said he had made it “very clear” to Turkey that its troops should not unilaterally enter northern Iraq. “We’re making it very clear to the Turks that we expect them not to come in to northern Iraq. We’re in constant touch with the Turkish military as well as Turkish politicians. They know our policy,” Bush said. He added: “And they know we’re working with the Kurds to make sure there’s not an incident that would cause there to be an excuse to go in.”

Turkish sources, meanwhile, say Khalilzad is expected in Ankara today to finalize the framework of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq.
(First published on RFERL website)

Turkey: Ocalan’s Apology Wins Little Sympathy

As the trial of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan enters its third day, the Turkish press and public continues to expect that Ocalan will be found guilty and given the death penalty.

The trial, on the prison island of Imrali, began Monday with a surprise apology from Ocalan. Addressing the court and its gallery filled with relatives of Turkish soldiers killed in the PKK’s 15-year armed struggle in Turkey’s southeast, he expressed regret over their deaths.

He also said he wanted to cooperate with Turkish authorities to disarm the PKK and end the armed struggle. The remarks were carried by Turkey’s semi-official Anatolia news agency.

However, his apology seems to have won him little sympathy in the press or among most citizens of Turkey. The comments were largely interpreted as an empty gesture, and as an attempt by Ocalan to escape the death penalty. Ocalan’s call to disarm the PKK also went largely unnoticed by the media and public.

The reaction of Ugur Dundar, a commentator of the A-TV channel, was typical: “He [Ocalan] is not sincere,” Dundar pronounced. Dundar then went on to say he could still remember how Ocalan’s PKK rebels killed a baby in the southeast just a few years ago.

The reaction in the press to Ocalan’s statements might not be simply an expression of widespread Turkish public attitudes. Any pro-PKK or pro-Kurdish pronouncements in the media are banned. Newspapers or broadcasters carrying anything that could be interpreted as favoring the PKK’s position can be charged with advocating separatism or supporting terrorism.

The one segment of the population that does not share the widespread hostility toward Ocalan is the country’s large minority of ethnic Kurds. Ahmet, a Kurdish waiter in the town of Mudanya where reporters have gathered to cover the trial, says he feels sorry for Ocalan. He says he too would have apologized to “save his skin.”

Prosecutors are basing their case against Ocalan on the claim that he and his PKK are responsible for the deaths of more than 30,000 people since 1984. Prosecutors also say Ocalan tried to establish a separate Kurdish state and used terrorism to achieve that goal.

Ocalan has denied that he advocated separatism and has said he favors a democratic solution within the boundaries of Turkey. But he admits he may have been responsible for some bloodshed in clashes between Turkish forces and the PKK.

The charges against Ocalan carry the death penalty, but Turkey has not executed anyone since the mid-1980s. Death sentences must first be approved by parliament, and the president can grant a reprieve.

While most of the Turkish public seems focused on Ocalan’s role as a terrorist and the pain of relatives of dead soldiers, it has largely ignored the issue of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Some 10 million to 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, mostly in the country’s southeast. But the Kurdish language is banned in Turkish media and schools.

Foreign governments and observers say they’re hoping Ocalan’s capture will shed light on the plight of the Kurds and force the Turkish government to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem.

In a sign of possible progress, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel today appealed to Kurdish rebels to lay down their arms and surrender to Turkish justice. He made the appeal in the mass circulation daily Sabah.

The PKK has said it may support Ocalan’s call for an end to armed conflict. But the group has not said explicitly if or when it would lay down its arms.

Most analysts, though, are not optimistic that the Kurdish problem will be solved anytime soon. Akin Birdal, the head of the Turkish Association for Human Rights, says a new coalition government, which includes a hardline nationalist party, may make it more difficult to start a dialogue with the Kurds.

“Such a possibility is not visible. On the contrary, it seems this will become even more difficult. This is a human rights and democracy issue. But the program of the new government has no word on this issue. And I don’t know what the future political climate will bring about.”

Professor Hasan Koeni of Ankara University adds that granting any cultural rights to Kurds could lead to further demands that threaten the country’s territorial integrity. He says other countries hold the same view toward their own minorities. “That’s why,” he says, “countries, such as Iran with its large Azeri minority, do not intend to grant minorities language or other cultural rights.”
(First published on RFE/RL website June 9, 1999)

Turkey: Media Shows Bias Ahead Of Ocalan Trial

A few days before the treason trial of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan begins on the prison island of Imrali, Turkish media continue to reflect only one side of the story, that of Turkish authorities.

The general public remains basically unaware of the defense or of Ocalan’s or the PKK’s arguments.

Ocalan, for years Turkey’s most-wanted man, was captured in Kenya in February by Turkish commandos. Earlier, he’d been expelled from hiding in Syria and later he attempted to seek asylum in Italy. The dramatic story has dominated Turkish media for months.

Ocalan is charged with ordering the murder of innocent people and attempting to establish a separate Kurdish state. He faces the death penalty if convicted. Turkish law does not ban capital punishment, although there has not been an execution since the mid-1980s.

Ocalan’s lawyers argue that for the past two years the PKK leader has advocated a peaceful solution to solving the Kurdish problem within Turkey’s existing borders. Some 10-15 million Kurds live in the country, mostly in the southeast. Turkey refuses to recognize the Kurds as a minority and the Kurdish language is banned in Turkey’s schools and media.

The lawyers also say Ocalan cannot and should not be tried as a murderer. Though thousands of Turks and Kurds have died in a 14-year conflict between security forces and the PKK, Ocalan’s lawyers say this is war, not murder.

Turkish newspapers and TV channels routinely ignore these arguments and instead refer to the PKK as “a separatist organization” trying to dismember Turkey. Ocalan is frequently labeled Turkey’s “chief terrorist” or even a “baby killer.” Press conferences of Ocalan’s lawyers are not reported and few newspapers dare to publish interviews with them.

At recent court hearings in Ankara, which Ocalan is banned from attending for security reasons, Ocalan’s lawyers have been subject to verbal abuse by family members of police and soldiers allegedly killed by the PKK. Ocalan’s lawyers have also complained about the behavior of Turkish news photographers and television cameramen who crowd around them as if they were Ocalan themselves.

Last week Oral Calislar, editor of the newspaper “Cumhuriyet,” was sentenced to 13 months in prison for running two interviews conducted in 1993 with Ocalan and another Kurdish activist living abroad. Turkeys “state security court” later ruled that the interviews undermined Turkeys territorial integrity.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Calislar said he was only doing his job as a journalist. He says that dealing with the Kurdish problem openly is the only answer. Calislar:

“Turkey faces a Kurdish problem. We have to solve this problem through discussion. We have to inform the citizens about the opinions of the other side too. How do you want to decide, to reach a verdict on individuals and organizations, when you have no contact with them and don’t know what they are saying?”

In the otherwise colorful Turkish media, political and social discussions are usually conducted in a free and even sensational manner. However, in covering sensitive national or security issues, censors and self-censorship appear to rule what gets printed. The conflict with Kurdish rebels is at the top of the “black list.” But Elvan Ozkaya from Turkish NTV television tells RFE/RL that she respects the Turkish public’s outraged reaction to Ocalan. She says the media coverage is not only the result of censorship, but reflects the feelings of the population:

“Since the person is Abdullah Ocalan, who has been wanted for years and [is the cause of death of] many people, we shouldn’t see this only as an issue of hatred. Finally, somebody has been captured. This is a reaction to this situation. Besides a directive from above [government], we have this reaction and I think it is quite normal.”

Last week, Semdin Sakik, a former Ocalan deputy who was captured last year in northern Iraq, was sentenced to death by Turkish courts. Observers are expecting the same verdict for Ocalan. The public seems to be prepared for a death sentence. It might be said though that the media — in harmony with the state and the army — leave no room for any other expectation.
(First published on RFE/RLwebsite May 9, 1999)

Turkey: Preparations Under Way For Trial Against PKK’s Ocalan

“He will be hanged, with or without a trial.” That’s the view of a young lottery vendor on Istanbul’s Taksim square. It’s indicative of public expectations in Turkey as the country prepares for the high-profile trial of Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Meanwhile, Turkey’s TV channels regularly show interviews with angry relatives of victims of the war with Kurdish rebels. One handicapped former commando says he wants to see Ocalan suffer, adding “a fast execution” would be too good for him.

While the treason trial against Ocalan is due to open Monday on the prison island of Imrali off Istanbul, almost everybody seems to be sure about the verdict.

After failing to find a refuge, Ocalan was captured last February by Turkish commandos in Kenya and brought to Turkey. As public enemy number one, he is being charged for attempting to split Turkey and establish a separate Kurdish state. He is also being held responsible for the death of thousands of people during the guerilla war he has been leading since 1984. Ankara claims that some 30,000 have been killed in the last 14 years. Most of them are said to be Kurdish rebels.

Speaking to a selected group of the Turkish society’s elite in Istanbul, President Suleyman Demirel said that Turkey would not allow PKK fighters based in northern Iraq to enter into Turkey and kill civilians and government troops. Demirel gave his view of the PKK:

“Is this a liberation movement? It is not possible to conduct a liberation movement through terror. Besides, this is no liberation movement. This is a blunt and open crime.”

The PKK, for its part, claims that the Turkish army has burnt to the ground hundreds of Kurdish villages in the southeast of the country and killed or forcibly deported thousands of Kurds suspected of supporting the PKK. Mehmet Balci of the Amsterdam-based ERGK, the PKK’s political arm, spoke recently with RFE/RL. He said that the conflict with Turkish authorities and troops started 14 years ago because Kurds were forced to take arms to “defend themselves” against Ankaras denial of Kurdish rights.

Balci says: “The PKK and Ocalan are today no more terrorists than [Nelson] Mandela and [Yassir] Arafat were terrorists in the past. How can one talk of murder if there are 30,000 dead? In fact, this is a war. The PKK is not the source, but the result of the war. The Kurdish problem remained unresolved, it was denied and the Kurds were discriminated against. As a result, the awareness of the Kurds developed and they were forced to take arms because all other ways were closed.” Turkey has a large Kurdish minority of some 10-15 million people, but the Kurdish language is banned in Turkey’s schools and media. Turkey considers itself as a strictly unitarian state and refuses minority rights as a potential threat to the countrys territorial integrity.

Since Ocalan’s capture in February, many bombings and other terrorist attacks have taken place in Istanbul and other Turkish cities to protest his trial. Dozens of people have also been killed in recent clashes between PKK rebels and security forces in southeast Turkey. Security forces have been put on high alert and it is feared that next Monday, as the trial opens, terrorist actions will reach a peak.

On Thursday, tabloid newspapers reported on a suspected bomb attack in the small town of Mudanya, the closest port to Imrali island. Participants at the court and reporters have to come first to Mudanya to wait to be brought to Imrali by special police boats, if allowed.

Until now, the number and size of terrorist attacks have been relatively limited. With Ocalan standing trial for treason, Ankara seems confident that it is about to eliminate the PKK as the main threat to its territorial integrity.

Niyazi Bulgan, one of the 104-member group of lawyers to defend Ocalan, tells RFE/RL that the charges are based on article 125 of the Turkish penal code on separatism. But Bulgan says that Ocalan himself has repeatedly advocated a “peaceful solution” of the Kurdish issue within the boundaries of Turkey. Bulgan says: “He (Ocalan) himself will answer accusations about separatism and we will evaluate them separately. It is very clear from our talks [with Ocalan] that he is not in favor of dividing Turkey. He favors a free coexistence in a common motherland. He said that especially since 1993 as the unilateral ceasefire offers were made, he frequently repeated that he does not have any plans to split Turkey.”

Turkey has categorically refused to consider any talks with the PKK, which it considers as a terrorist organization.
(First published on RFE/RL website May 31, 1999)

واقعیت رنگارنگ تر از فقط سیاه و سفید است

مصاحبه با روزنامه «جوانان تاجیکستان» از ژوئن 1997 بزبان تاجیکی و الفبای سیریلیک

The Truth Is Colorful. Interview with Dushanbe-based “Javononi Tojikiston” from June 1997
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Javononi Tojikiston

آذربایجانجانین سس قورولوشو و فونولوژیک یازی

An article from 1990, published in London-based Savalan on the sound structure of Azeri Turkish and its phonological script — in Azeri Turkish (Arabic-Persian script).
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Ses Qurulushu

شماللی لارین ئوز تاریخلری ایله چتینلیکلری

Problems of Northern Azeris With their History. In Azeri Turkish. Published in Aydinliq (May-June 1989).

مشکلات آذربایجانیان شمالی با تاریخ خود. مجله آیدینلیق. مه-ژوئن 1989 بزبان ترکی آذری و الفبای فارسی
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North AZ History

Irans Aseri und Persische Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts

این تقدی است که در سال 1993 در مورد کتاب سکینه برنجیان: آثار ادبی آذری وفارسی آذربایجان ایران در قرن بیستم (1988) در مجله «دنیای اسلام»

Die Welt des Islams, Brill, Leiden, the Netherlands

نوشته و کوشش کرده بودم به این بهانه کلا نگاه بسیار کوتاهی به تاریخچه آثار ادبی کرده باشم. نقد به آلمانی است.

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Berenjiyan

Azerbaycan Türkcesinin Adlandırılması

عباس جوادی – این مقاله را در سال 1987 به ترکی ترکیه نوشته با تیتر

Azerbaycan Türkçesinin Adlandırılması Hakkında Bazı Notlar

در نشریه:

Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi (Haziran 1987)

منتشر کرده بودم.

لطفا اینجا را کلیک کنید:

AZ Turkcesi