برچسب: Gulen

Turkey’s Anti-Gulen Clampdown Rages Out Of Control

On August 17, the Turkish prime minister issued a ” special decree” announcing the release of 38,000 prisoners, not including any sentenced for murder, sexual abuse, or rape. This includes financial crimes.

Tukey’s overcrowded prisons and slow court processes have forced all governments to issue some sort of amnesty every year to make room for new prisoners. But the unprecedented scope of the clampdown on suspected supporters of U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, who has been accused of masterminding the July 15 coup attempt, seems to have played a major part in inducing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to move quickly and include as many inmates as possible in the amnesty.

Thousands of prisoners suspected of actively or verbally supporting Gulen are awaiting court in big detention halls across the country. They need places in a regular prison.

“Are we releasing thieves and criminals to make room for coup plotters?” is a question widely discussed in Turkish media these days.

There’s no question — the answer is yes.

Today I took a look, as usual, at top news from Turkey. Let me give you a summary of the detentions, arrests, and suspensions of the last 24 hours related to the coup attempt. I will also include separate terrorist attacks related to the Kurdish insurgency:

— 24 detained journalists of the newspaper Ozgur Gundem sent to prosecutor’s office;

— In a terrorist attack in a village close to the southeastern city of Bitlis, four security officers were killed;

— No trace of detained teacher Demirtas;

— Per “special decree,” 187 businessmen to be detained;

— Bomb attack on the police center in Van, eastern Turkey: three dead, 73 wounded;

— Anti-Gulen operation against Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbas’s son-in-law;

— National Radio and TV Committee bans reporting on the bomb attack on the police center in Elazig, eastern Turkey;

— Colonel detained in Gulen-related case tries to defend himself;

— Governor of Elazig in eastern Turkey says three policemen killed, 146 people wounded, 14 of them seriously;

— A “special decree” on the dismissal of 2,360 people from police department and 112 people from armed forces personnel;

— Detention of 86 judges and prosecutors planned.

All that in just one day.

To be sure, “special decrees” by the president or the prime minister play the role of laws in the current state of emergency.

I think the list is not complete. Let’s for one moment forget about the terrible terror attacks mostly related to the Kurdish insurgency.

How can you follow the daily detentions and dismissals that have been continuing since July 15 without any break? You can’t. Nobody but the security agencies can. Journalists try to keep up, though, with statistics.

According to some estimates, since the coup attempt 77,000 public servants have been suspended, 5,000 fired, 19,000 detained, and more than 11,000 people arrested.

The same sources estimate that the number of 77,000 suspensions will soon rise to 100,000.

The president has warned that the “viruses,” as he calls Gulen supporters, “are everywhere.” He has called on everyone to report them to prosecutors and security agencies “even if they are your friends.”

With the “special decree” issued on August 17, 2,360 police staff and 112 employees of the Turkish armed forces were fired.

Obviously, it is virtually impossible that 77,000, let alone 100,000, people were armed or active supporters of the abortive coup.

Anybody suspected of having even talked positively about Gulen in the past is being reported and eventually suspended or detained. Some have reported that occasionally even friends of Gulen supporters were detained. There are also claims that some people spy on others and report them as “Gulenists” to the security services just to take their jobs or businesses.

A clarification of these tens of thousands of allegations and cases in open and fair trials may take years — if it comes to a transparent court process at all.

Meanwhile, the accused have lost their jobs and financial security. Together with their families, they will probably amount to around half a million people -– or more.

How To Win Turks’ Hearts

Prominent Turkish satirist and comedian Gulse Birsel was just in Europe — this time for five days. She writes how “bored” she was, and how she couldn’t wait to return to her beloved Istanbul.

“Enough Parisian croissants and European monotony, we are addicted to adrenaline,” she writes in the daily Hurriyet. “How can Europe make us feel happy? Within seconds following an argument, she says of Turks, “we hug and kiss each other, cry out of happiness.

“Then we start discussing politics, and fight and insult each other again.”

She’s right. Forget about Turkey’s EU-accession talks, which are on hold anyway. Forget about Turkey’s membership in NATO, boasting the second-largest army in the alliance. Things in Turkey are not so cut and dry as to take cooperation as a sign of future unity.

As satirist Birsel describes Turkey, from the top down many of its people can be seen as emotional, unpredictable, and not so reasonable and calculated, at least not in the Western sense (and much like Italians or Greeks might have been perceived 50 years ago). This characterization seems to fit whether you are talking about the president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is well-known, respected (in Turkey), and feared (abroad) for being “autocratic,” or the lowly grocer around the corner.

Let’s not look away and pretend we were not aware of this. The average Turk is now suspicious of the West, especially of the United States. Many think Washington was behind the terrible, bloody coup attempt in July. Don’t ask why. They feel they have tons of proof that U.S.-based Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen is the mastermind of the coup. And the United States’ purported reluctance to immediately hand him over to Ankara as requested, and following of protocol that passes the case to American courts — which could take years — means the Turks are angry at their Western and NATO friends.

Many Turks are concerned about the territorial integrity of their country because they see it as being threatened by Kurdish insurgency both within Turkey and across the border — in Iraq, but especially in Syria. And they are angry because they think the United States and Europe are not doing anything to counter it. On the contrary, they believe, the United States is even helping the Kurdish “terrorists” in northern Syria. Turks generally have no objections to the Kurds fighting in northern Syria as long as they stick to defeating Islamic State (IS) extremists. But many believe this is not the case, that the Kurds are fighting to expand their territory, and that Kurdish involvement is bad for Turkey because the Kurds fighting in Syria are an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — which is banned in Turkey and which many Western states consider to be a terrorist organization.

On August 7, hundreds of thousands of people attended a huge Democracy And Martyrs rally in Istanbul to promote unity among political parties and to honor those killed during the failed coup attempt.

It was not only Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that mobilized people to attend the rally. A majority of the other political parties, NGOs, and nonpoliticians showed up to show their opposition to the coup and their support for parliamentary democracy — even those critical to Edogan.

Again, let’s not look away, assuming that Erdogan is just appealing to the masses in an attempt to strengthen his power base. Yes, he is. But this time around it is clear that the masses are with him — he is not alone, or backed only by supporters within his own party, but by many Turks from across the political spectrum.

Ask around 50 people in Turkey, as I did in the last week, and this reality becomes obvious. And it is not only the average person — this is what I am seeing in the Turkish media, and in the words of political and public personalities.

To win the hearts of an old friend — in this case, Turkey — one would have to address their needs. For Turks this means extraditing Gulen from Pennsylvania to Turkey to stand trial as the mastermind of a coup that brought Turkey to the edge of complete collapse, and actively helping Turkey reduce the danger posed by Kurdish insurgency, especially in northern Syria, which is seen as an existential threat.

I know this is easier said than done, and involves a litany of legal issues over Gulen’s extradition, strategic issues with Syria, IS, etc., etc. But let’s not forget Turkish satirist Birsel’s brilliant description of how her countrymen fight and/or agree with foes and friends.

I am afraid the West’s adrenaline-addicted friends in Turkey will not wait too long for their demands to be met.

In the aftermath of the huge show of power and support exhibited in Istanbul on August 7, Erdogan is set to leave for St. Petersburg, where he will meet a friend-turned-enemy-turned-friend-again — Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Turkish president will likely be doing some comparison shopping as he seeks foreign backing. And Putin can be expected to be more open to agreement with Erdogan — with fewer caveats — at the moment than the West.

But the Russian president won’t have much to offer his newly regained Turkish friend in terms of immediate help, either.

Turkey Still Traumatized Two Weeks After Failed Coup

Ihave been watching Turkey 24/7 since July 15, the day that a coup attempt shattered the country for about 20 hours, failed, and dragged the entire Turkish nation through a trauma that is still continuing in various ways.

Close to 300 people were killed, mostly while resisting the coup attempt, but plotting officers — or soldiers under their command who were unaware what was going on — also lost their lives.

The U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen was immediately declared by the government as themastermind of the coup attempt.

In the first 48 hours, around 7,000 people were detained, arrested, or dismissed from their jobs. That number has been rising constantly, reaching around66,000 people from all layers of society, but consisting mostly of government employees.

Add to that the family members of those arrested and dismissed and you will reach a number of 250,000-300,000 potential new opponents, most of whom were not involved with the “other” side or had no direct links with it. The memory of the killings, the hatred, and violence, the split in the army and government agencies about who was on which side — all of this is truly traumatic for the Turkish nation.

Many people from different political parties and media joined forces with the government, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to defend democracy against the coup.

The detentions and dismissals have not stopped. But two weeks after the coup attempt, the Gulen movement with all its real or suspected supporters, and sympathizing soldiers and security men, government employees, teachers and journalists or businessmen can generally be considered to have been “cleansed” in its entirety.

Nonetheless, the air of crisis, division, political hostility, alarmism, rumors, the race to declare allegiance with the government, and blaming enemies is overwhelming.

I will try to summarize for you my personal impressions about how I perceive the Turkish public’s mood and feeling now — two weeks after the “worst national conflict” since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923:

— A large majority, including supporters and opponents of the government, seems to be convinced that coups, regardless of who is behind them, are a disaster and must be rejected and prevented by the government, even through the use of force. The idea that elections should be the only way to change the government is something that even the fiercest political adversaries of Erdogan believe.

— Many people, regardless of their political inclination, think that Erdogan needed to be defended from the coup plotters.

— Still, it seems that the fear generated by the overwhelming government and media campaign against the Gulen movement prevents people from expressing their opinion freely in public. Most media outlets compete in bashing the Gulen movement. Occasionally, this campaign and media reporting on public shaming go far beyond ethical standards. The state agency for religious affairs has denied the dead coup plotters the usual religious burial rites. A university professor was fired because she didn’t want to use the term “martyr” for the dead on the government side.

— A majority of people and media seem convinced that Gulen is the main and primary mastermind of the coup attempt. It is not clear how much of this is genuine or simply being said out of fear.

— Yes, Erdogan has even strengthened his popular base and support by uniting the people against the coup and crushing it.

— A race has begun to fill the tens of thousands of job vacancies caused by the dismissals and arrests, mainly in the army, the justice system, the department of education, and other state agencies. There are not enough qualified people to replace those who have lost their jobs. These positions will have to be filled by people who are less educated or who even have no training whatsoever. A similar situation was reportedly caused by Gulenist prosecutors, judges, and other higher government employees in the years leading up to 2010. They initiated the firing of thousands of military personnel, government employees, and military commanders. These people were then apparently replaced by their own supporters who were less prepared for the new jobs. At least half of the coup officers were reportedly promoted at that time by Gulenist conspiracies. This was tolerated by the Erdogan government since Gulen and Erdogan were then allies against the secular Turkish establishment and pro-republican army and justice system.

— Most media and political figures, including the opposition, and obviously the government believe that the West has left them alone. A prominent liberal columnist, Murat Yetkin, said: “What would happen in the West if the U.S. Congress or the German Bundestag were bombed, the White House bombed, the Brooklyn Bridge and Champs-Elysees blocked, civilians there shot dead, and attempts made to kill the presidents, prime ministers and chiefs of staff?” 

— Unlike the West, where there are mixed views on Gulen, in today’s Turkey it seems that the majority is on the same anticoup, anti-Gulen side. Most of his supporters have now switched sides (mostly to the government), or they have been arrested or gone on the run.

— The request of the Turkish government to the United States to extradite the Pennsylvania-based Gulen has turned into the main point of contention between Ankara and Washington, as if everything depends on that decision by the Obama administration. The Turks believe that Washington can do it, but is reluctant to do so for political reasons, while Washington says they would consider it after reviewing the evidence of Gulen’s alleged masterminding of the coup and other legal considerations.

— The overwhelming feeling I observe is that the West did not demonstrate any empathy, let alone sympathy, with Turkey in those dramatic days. Everybody was rather focused on how authoritarian Erdogan is and they were even mulling the scenario of the coup’s success and thinking “Actually, why not?”

— On top of this, some rather radical and Islamist-minded political and media figures have been circulating or even creating rumors or rumor-based claims that the United States (“the Americans”), and primarily the CIA or Pentagon, were behind the coup; that they granted Gulen a visa back in 1999 and they helped him organize the coup. For example, Abdurrahman Dilipak of the Yeni Akit daily says that the insurrection was conducted by the United States and was not limited to Turkey, but directed against Islam in general. At the same time, the Vatican, Britain, France, Germany, and “obviously Israel” had their own interests in this scenario.

— So far, I have seen no solid evidence supporting these claims and rumors — just murky reports without sourcing or statements and writings by a selected group of a few former CIA or State Department officials discussing the Gulen movement from different perspectives. Interestingly enough, Turkish government officials have not been reacting to these unsubstantiated accusations against their NATO ally.

— The “black PR” against the West and specifically the United States is so persistent that even statements and comments by U.S. officials, including President Barack Obama, the State Department spokesmen, or the U.S. ambassador in Ankara have not succeeded in setting things right. They have repeatedly stated that they condemn the coup attempt, that accusations of U.S. involvement in it are “absurd,” and that they are ready to look into Turkish requests for Gulen’s extradition.

— Meanwhile, the Russian media, including Sputnik, is campaigning with rumors that Gulen “will not be extradited by the U.S. because he is a CIA agent.” Many people in Turkey seem to have bought into this. Also, in Iran, a Revolutionary Guard commander has said that the coup attempt in Turkey “could not be crushed without a foreign country’s assistance.” That Iran offered immediate and strong support for Erdogan’s government in thwarting the coup attempt seems to have been welcomed in Turkey.

The Gulen Movement’s Collision Course With The Turkish State

Since Turkey’s failed July 15 coup, the Turkish authorities have accused U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen of being behind the attempted takeover of power. It is an explanation that is widely accepted across Turkey. A brief look at the history of Gulen’s movement helps explain why.

What Does The Movement Want?

Gulen was originally a supporter of Said Nursi, an Ottoman-Kurdish scholar from the Hanefi school of Sunni Islam. But in the 1970s, Gulen formed a sect of his own that people later called “Gulen Camaati” (Gulen community or movement).

Like any other Islamic sect under the strictly secular and pro-military Turkish governments, Gulen’s community was banned and operated largely underground until 1983. But, unlike other religious communities, which were mainly teaching the Koran and performing private religious prayers, Gulen’s group became increasingly politicized. Businessmen began to donate money and the movement became a political player among conservative and religious groups in Turkey.

“[Gulen] wrote at that time that he wanted to train ‘courageous, selfless men’ for society,” says Rusen Cakir, a leading expert on Turkish Islamic groups. “It was about them training and planting young people in different important layers of the government: the police, the justice system, the Interior Ministry, and even the army.”

But, unlike more transparent political parties, Gulen’s sect kept everything secret. It was never clear how many members the group had, who they were, and what exactly they were seeking to do politically. It was widely rumored that his movement, and all its related “foundations” and businesses, were getting wealthier and more and more people were joining his community, but there was little categorical evidence to support this.

How Big Is The Movement?

It is almost impossible to quantify the size of the Gulen movement’s membership or its wealth. By many estimates, over the course of some 40 years, the movement has gathered tens of thousands of supporters.

Gulen has repeatedly denied having a “network.” He has said that people may sympathize with him in any government institution even without an organized network, as is the case with other political parties. But analyst Cakir says that directing school graduates to choose positions selected by “community guides” — members of the Gulen movement who counsel younger members — was not something any other political party was doing.

Why Did The Movement Clash With The Turkish State?

In the 1970s, the government, army, and security services tried to clean up their ranks and remove those they perceived to be Gulenist “implants.” And in the 1980s, secular parties and magazines (like Nokta from 1986, which is pictured below) were warning against secret “Fethullahists” in the army.

Working up the ladder in the army and civil service, Gulen supporters helped other members of the movement join their ranks. In 2010, prior to a national exam for entrance into government agencies, exam questions were reportedly communicated among Gulen movement members to ensure their passing the exam.

While Gulen was gathering and guiding supporters, his schools both in Turkey and abroad were bringing him fame and popularity. Critics say that running those successful schools was a “cover” for his “infiltration” of the government, although raising the level of Turkey’s education and culture was always one of Gulen’s stated goals.

In 1999, secret recordings of Gulen’s speeches were played on state television. In them, he called on his supporters to “silently and patiently” infiltrate government agencies and wait for “the moment” of change. “If you act too soon, you’ll have Turkish state institutions on your back,” he said.

Under increasing pressure from secular media and government, Gulen emigrated to the United States in 1999. His movement, though, kept growing.

Why Did The Relationship With Erdogan Turn Sour?

In the 2000s, Gulen already had scores of loyal supporters at high levels of the police, justice system, media, educational institutions, and even the army. He was also a close ally of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who became prime minister in 2003. Gulen and Erdogan came from the same Islamic background, although they held different interpretations on how an Islamic movement should operate within a secular state.

Once Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won parliamentary elections in 2002 and built a one-party government, it was actively supported by the Gulen movement. In return, the movement and its activities were tolerated by the AKP government until 2010.

It was then that Erdogan started taking measures against the Gulen sympathizers. He began to clean up the police and his “foundation schools,” but stopped short with the military. In 2013, Erdogan completely broke with Gulen, after a series of secret audio and video recordings emerged about corruption cases in the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle, which he suspected were leaked by the movement.

Why Were The Gulen Supporters Detained So Quickly?

Less than 48 hours after the coup attempt began, police, security, and army forces loyal to the government detained around 7,000 suspected supporters of the Gulen movement. Over the next seven days, this number rose to more than 50,000, although some of them were later released. Media, businesses, and even schools were closed or their management taken over.

In the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, dozens of alleged members of the Gulen movement have admitted getting their instructions from higher ranks in the Gulen community, usually verbally or via messaging. Even a colonel did not shy away from giving instructions to his supervising general.

The immediate question for many, especially in foreign countries, was how could they identify so many of the pro-Gulen people so fast. It has been suggested, including by the EU enlargement commissioner, Johannes Hahn, that the government had prepared lists of names and institutions well before the coup attempt. Some commentators went further and suggested that the coup attempt was staged.

Given that the Gulen group has been active in Turkish political life for the last 40 years, and given Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies, it is quite possible that the government had lists of Gulen supporters within the civil service, education system, and businesses. And it is of little doubt that they were under surveillance by security and military agencies.

According to Erdogan’s advisers, the Turkish president was planning to clean up the army in August of this year. That may have led the plotters to strike before they were ready. In his disputed secret speeches 17 years earlier, Gulen warned about the foolhardiness of striking too soon, or “you’ll have Turkish state institutions on your back.” Regardless of whether Gulen’s organization was responsible for the coup, his words were prescient.