The Gulen Movement’s Collision Course With The Turkish State

Since Turkey’s failed July 15 coup, the Turkish authorities have accused U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen of being behind the attempted takeover of power. It is an explanation that is widely accepted across Turkey. A brief look at the history of Gulen’s movement helps explain why.

What Does The Movement Want?

Gulen was originally a supporter of Said Nursi, an Ottoman-Kurdish scholar from the Hanefi school of Sunni Islam. But in the 1970s, Gulen formed a sect of his own that people later called “Gulen Camaati” (Gulen community or movement).

Like any other Islamic sect under the strictly secular and pro-military Turkish governments, Gulen’s community was banned and operated largely underground until 1983. But, unlike other religious communities, which were mainly teaching the Koran and performing private religious prayers, Gulen’s group became increasingly politicized. Businessmen began to donate money and the movement became a political player among conservative and religious groups in Turkey.

“[Gulen] wrote at that time that he wanted to train ‘courageous, selfless men’ for society,” says Rusen Cakir, a leading expert on Turkish Islamic groups. “It was about them training and planting young people in different important layers of the government: the police, the justice system, the Interior Ministry, and even the army.”

But, unlike more transparent political parties, Gulen’s sect kept everything secret. It was never clear how many members the group had, who they were, and what exactly they were seeking to do politically. It was widely rumored that his movement, and all its related “foundations” and businesses, were getting wealthier and more and more people were joining his community, but there was little categorical evidence to support this.

How Big Is The Movement?

It is almost impossible to quantify the size of the Gulen movement’s membership or its wealth. By many estimates, over the course of some 40 years, the movement has gathered tens of thousands of supporters.

Gulen has repeatedly denied having a “network.” He has said that people may sympathize with him in any government institution even without an organized network, as is the case with other political parties. But analyst Cakir says that directing school graduates to choose positions selected by “community guides” — members of the Gulen movement who counsel younger members — was not something any other political party was doing.

Why Did The Movement Clash With The Turkish State?

In the 1970s, the government, army, and security services tried to clean up their ranks and remove those they perceived to be Gulenist “implants.” And in the 1980s, secular parties and magazines (like Nokta from 1986, which is pictured below) were warning against secret “Fethullahists” in the army.

Working up the ladder in the army and civil service, Gulen supporters helped other members of the movement join their ranks. In 2010, prior to a national exam for entrance into government agencies, exam questions were reportedly communicated among Gulen movement members to ensure their passing the exam.

While Gulen was gathering and guiding supporters, his schools both in Turkey and abroad were bringing him fame and popularity. Critics say that running those successful schools was a “cover” for his “infiltration” of the government, although raising the level of Turkey’s education and culture was always one of Gulen’s stated goals.

In 1999, secret recordings of Gulen’s speeches were played on state television. In them, he called on his supporters to “silently and patiently” infiltrate government agencies and wait for “the moment” of change. “If you act too soon, you’ll have Turkish state institutions on your back,” he said.

Under increasing pressure from secular media and government, Gulen emigrated to the United States in 1999. His movement, though, kept growing.

Why Did The Relationship With Erdogan Turn Sour?

In the 2000s, Gulen already had scores of loyal supporters at high levels of the police, justice system, media, educational institutions, and even the army. He was also a close ally of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who became prime minister in 2003. Gulen and Erdogan came from the same Islamic background, although they held different interpretations on how an Islamic movement should operate within a secular state.

Once Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won parliamentary elections in 2002 and built a one-party government, it was actively supported by the Gulen movement. In return, the movement and its activities were tolerated by the AKP government until 2010.

It was then that Erdogan started taking measures against the Gulen sympathizers. He began to clean up the police and his “foundation schools,” but stopped short with the military. In 2013, Erdogan completely broke with Gulen, after a series of secret audio and video recordings emerged about corruption cases in the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle, which he suspected were leaked by the movement.

Why Were The Gulen Supporters Detained So Quickly?

Less than 48 hours after the coup attempt began, police, security, and army forces loyal to the government detained around 7,000 suspected supporters of the Gulen movement. Over the next seven days, this number rose to more than 50,000, although some of them were later released. Media, businesses, and even schools were closed or their management taken over.

In the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, dozens of alleged members of the Gulen movement have admitted getting their instructions from higher ranks in the Gulen community, usually verbally or via messaging. Even a colonel did not shy away from giving instructions to his supervising general.

The immediate question for many, especially in foreign countries, was how could they identify so many of the pro-Gulen people so fast. It has been suggested, including by the EU enlargement commissioner, Johannes Hahn, that the government had prepared lists of names and institutions well before the coup attempt. Some commentators went further and suggested that the coup attempt was staged.

Given that the Gulen group has been active in Turkish political life for the last 40 years, and given Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies, it is quite possible that the government had lists of Gulen supporters within the civil service, education system, and businesses. And it is of little doubt that they were under surveillance by security and military agencies.

According to Erdogan’s advisers, the Turkish president was planning to clean up the army in August of this year. That may have led the plotters to strike before they were ready. In his disputed secret speeches 17 years earlier, Gulen warned about the foolhardiness of striking too soon, or “you’ll have Turkish state institutions on your back.” Regardless of whether Gulen’s organization was responsible for the coup, his words were prescient.

In Turkey, Tear Gas Instead Of Dialogue

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (center), accompanied by deputies Bulent Arinc (left) and Bekir Bozdag, speaks during a news conference at Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul on June 3.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (center), accompanied by deputies Bulent Arinc (left) and Bekir Bozdag, speaks during a news conference at Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul on June 3.

By Abbas Djavadi – It started all too typically, with a rather minor event. Last week, a few thousand people protested against plans to allow construction of a shopping mall in a park near Istanbul’s central Taksim Square. An unexpectedly harsh crackdown by police armed with tear gas provoked tens of thousands more to pour into the area. Soon the protests spread to other districts of Istanbul and on to the major Turkish cities of Ankara and Izmir.

By the second and third days of unrest, the protests began to focus more on the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and less on the plans to raze the park near Istanbul’s Taksim Square. The protests, though largely limited to Turkey’s three largest cities, seemed to have united young and old, secular and conservative-religious, and rich and poor.

Right after the first crackdown, the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party’s leading figures — such as Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc and Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbas — were conciliatory and apologetic. “Protesting is the people’s right,” said Arinc. “We should have convinced the people instead of using tear gas.”

But his boss, Prime Minister Erdogan, took the tough approach, as he increasingly has during his decade-long tenure. He called the protesters a “bunch of hooligans” being used by the opposition. “We won’t yield to a few looters coming to that square and provoking our people,” Erdogan said.

Many people, including leading political scientists in Turkey, have noted that Erdogan’s personal style has grown alarmingly authoritarian since the AK party came to power in 2003. Comfortably ruling with a majority of 40- to 50-plus percent of the nation’s votes — an exception to crisis-driven governments of recent decades — the AK party has undertaken economic and political reforms that no other party has been able to pull off. Turkey is now the 16th-largest economy in the world, boasting high single-digit growth that might be envied in many developed countries.

WHAT’S REALLY Fueling The Turkish Protests?

Amid the outpouring of comments from Turks found on social networks and mass media in recent days, not many expressed concern about the economy. “Thank you for the flourishing economy, Sir!” read a tweet addressing Erdogan from an angry protester in Ankara. “But we have enough of your strong-arm way of treating people like slaves.” And one very short commentary by Gulse Birsel, one of Turkey’s most prominent writers and artists, quickly went viral. She summarized the feeling of the protesters in one striking title: “Ohhhh! Enough is enough!”

Istanbul protests June 1, 2013
Istanbul protests June 1, 2013

In the last 10 years, the AK party and Erdogan — overconfident of the success of their political and economic reforms, as well as the rising share of national votes that has let them rule without any need to be in coalition with other parties — have generally ignored concerns and criticisms of their policies towards the military, the new constitution, and Ankara’s foreign policy toward Syria.

Many political scientists, such as Martin Lipset and Giovani Sartori, note that the longer a government rules, the more its rulers tend to use its powers in an authoritarian way. Incidentally, Kemal Dervis, a former Turkish economy minister and a former director of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in a recent interview with CNN Turk warned the government that too much self-confidence and disregard for public opinion and criticism could provoke a dangerous political crisis even in good economic times.

It seems that Turkish developments over the next weeks and months will depend largely on Erdogan’s decision to be cohesive or not. He might listen to those who are critical of him and his government’s policies. Or he might simply continue following a confrontational policy, as he did in the first days of the recent unrest by referring to protesters as “extremist elements.”

On the fourth day of demonstrations, Kadir Gursel, a prominent commentator, wrote in the “Milliyet” daily: “Nobody should misunderstand occasional calls in the demonstration for the government to resign. It’s about discontent and protest, not about overthrowing a government that has received 50 percent of the popular vote. In the next few days we will see if the message has been received.”

Meanwhile, the conservative “Zaman” daily quoted President Abdullah Gul — also from the ruling AK party but rumored to be a more cohesive personality than the prime minister — calling for calm and saying “the messages of goodwill have been received.”
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First published on RFE/RL website.