۲۱ آذر: آفتاب آمد، دلیل آفتاب

عباس جوادی – آیا تاسیس حکومت فرقه دمکرات در ۲۱ آذر ۱۳۲۴  چیزی «خودجوش» و نتیجه «خواست» و «مبارزه» مردم آذربایجان بود و یا اینکه این حکومت توسط  شوروی طرح ریزی و سازماندهی شد و با تکیه بر ارتش شوروی که شمال ایران را در شرایط جنگ جهانی دوم اشغال کرده بود تاسیس یافت و یک سال بعد بدنبال تخلیه ایران از سوی ارتش شوروی، حکومت فرقه نیز سقوط کرد؟

جواب این سوال تا بیست سال پیش اغلب با تفسیر و گمانه زنی همراه بود. اما امروزه با بررسی اسناد سابقا سرّی اتحاد شوروی جای شک و شبهه ای نمیماند. دیگر جای بحثی باقی نمانده است.

بیشک بدون درک اوضاع جنگ و اشغال صفحات شمالی ایران از سوی ارتش سرخ شوروی در زمان جنگ دوم جهانی، بررسی جریان پیشه وری در آذربایجان (و قاضی محمد در کردستان) چیزی جز گمراهی به بار نخواهد آورد.

اسنادی که  ۷۰ سال با مُهر «فوق العاده سرّی» در صندوق های حزب کمونیست و وزارت خارجه شوروی در مسکو و باکو خاک میخوردند، بدنبال فروپاشی اتحاد شوروی و انحلال حزب کمونیست در دسترس مطالعه عموم قرار گرفتند. صد ها سند مربوط به فرقه و حکومت یکساله پیشه وری هم در میان همین اسناد  بود.

با تکیه بر همین اسناد، امروزه با اطمینان میتوان گفت: بله میدانیم که چه شد و چگونه شد. میدانیم که فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان  و حکومت آن با برنامه ریزی، مدیریت و بودجه حزب کمونیست شوروی بوجود آمد، با تکیه به آن و ارتش شوروی در آذربایجان ایران یکسال حکومت کرد و بدنبال فشار آمریکا و بریتانیا به شوروی برای تخلیه ایران و ثانیا توافق تهران و مسکو برای قرارداد مشروط نفت شمال، قوای شوروی از ایران خارج شدند، حکومت فرقه فروریخت و رهبران و کادر های آن به شوروی پناه بردند. این دیگر ادعا نیست. واقعیتی ثابت شده است.

حالا دیگر میتوان اینها را از زبان رهبری حزب کمونیست و خود استالین هم شنید.

از میان صد ها سند مربوط به روابط ایران و شوروی در زمان جنگ جهانی دوم، اشغال ایران و  و حکومت یکساله فرقه دمکرات در آذربایجان، سه سند به روسی و یک سند به ترکی آذری احتمالا مهمتر  و گویا تر از دیگران هستند.

اسناد روسی عبارتند از: (۱) فرمان دفتر سیاسی کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست شوروی یعنی رهبری عالی شوروی (ششم ژوئیه ۱۹۴۵)، (۲) دستور جلسه همان دفتر سیاسی از شش ماه بعد (۲۹ دسامبر ۱۹۴۵) و (۳) نامه تاریخی استالین به پیشه وری بعد از عقد قرارداد معروف قوام-سادچیکوف در تهران که  تخلیه  آذربایجان از سوی ارتش شوروی در مقابل امتیاز مشروط نفت آذربایجان ایران به مسکو را تائید میکرد (هشتم مه ۱۹۴۵).

سند چهارم که روسی نیست، عبارت از نامه سید جعفر پیشه وری رئیس فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان و «نخست وزیر» حکومت یکساله فرقه و برخی رهبران دیگر فرقه به استالین و رهبری شوروی است که از رهبر شوروی کسب تکلیف میکند و در واقع شکوائیه ای است همراه با درخواست اسلحه و حتی طرح اینکه فرقه میتواند استقلال آذربایجان از ایران را اعلام کند.

فرمان استالین در باره ۲۱ آذر

متن زیر بخشی از قرار «فوق العاده سرّی» دفتر سیاسی کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست اتحاد شوروی به دبیر اول حزب کمونیست جمهوری شوروی سوسیالیستی آذربایجان میر جعفر باقروف با تیتر «دربارهٔ اقدام به تشکیل یک حرکت تجزیه طلبانه در آذربایجان جنوبی و دیگر استان‌های ایران شمالی» (۶ ژوئیه ۱۹۴۵) است که در پایان از سوی استالین امضاء شده است (۱).

این فرمان در دو نسخه اصلی تهیه و صادر شده است:

نسخه اصلی یکم («نسخه مسکو»)  به مولوتوف، بریا، باقروف فرستاده شده و صورت آن به بولگانین، میکویان، یودین، کروتیکوف و زوروف (همگی از اعضای کمیته مرکزی حزب) ارسال گشته است. این نامه در آرشیو حزب کمونیست در مسکو مانده و بعد از انقراض شوروی به «آرشیودولتی تاریخ اجتماعی و سیاسی روسیه»
RGASPI
شامل شده که همه اسناد حزب کمونیست و سازمان جوانان حزب کمونیست یعنی کمسومول را در بر می‌گیرد. مشخصات این سند در این مرکز چنین است:
RGASPI F.17, o. 162, d. 37, 1.147-148

نسخه دوم («نسخه باکو») مستقیماً و فقط به میر جعفر باقروف دبیر اول حزب کمونیست جمهوری شوروی آذربایجان فرستاده شده است. محل نگهداری کنونی این سند «آرشیو دولتی تاریخ احزاب سیاسی و سازمان های اجتماعی آذربایجان» در باکو
Azerbaijan State Archive of Political Parties and Social Movements , GAPPOD
و شماره و مشخصات این سند در آنجا این است:
GAPPOD AzR, f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 4-5
همین سند است که از سوی گاری گلدبرگ برای «مرکز مطالعات جنگ سرد مؤسسه وودرو ویلسون» (واشنگتن) به انگلیسی و توسط عباس جوادی (با کسب اجازه از «مرکز ویلسون») از انگلیسی (با مقایسه با روسی) به فارسی ترجمه شده است که ملاحظه می‌کنید.

هر دو نسخه را پژوهشگران دیگر از جمله فرناند شاید راینه نیز مستقلا مشاهده و بررسی کرده اند. بدنه اصلی هر دو سند یکی است اما متن مختصر پیش از تیتر و نام‌های توزیع در دوسند تا حدی فرق دارند.

و اما بخش هائی از این سند:

«دربارهٔ اقدام به تشکیل یک حرکت تجزیه طلبانه در آذربایجان جنوبی و دیگر استان‌های ایران شمالی»

فوق‌العاده سرّی
به: رفیق باقروف
اقدام به تشکیل یک حرکت تجزیه طلبانه در آذربایجان جنوبی و دیگر استان‌های ایران شمالی

۱. در نظر بگیرید که توصیه می‌شود به کارهای مقدماتی برای تشکیل یک ولایت («اوبلاست») خودمختار ملی آذربایجان در چارچوب دولت ایران شروع شود که صاحب اختیارات وسیع باشد. در عین حال در استان‌های گیلان، مازندران، گرگان و خراسان هم یک جنبش تجزیه طلبانه سازماندهی شود.

۲. در آذربایجان جنوبی فرقه‌ای دمکرات با نام «فرقه («حزب») دمکرات آذربایجان» با هدف رهبری جنبش تجزیه طلبانه ایجاد شود. ایجاد فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان جنوبی باید همزمان با تجدید سازماندهی شاخه آذربایجان حزب توده ایران باشد و طرفداران جنبش تجزیه طلبانه از تمام طبقات مردم را به آن جلب کند.

۳. فعالیت مناسب بین کُردهای شمال ایران برای جلب آنان به جنبش جدائی طلبانه و ایجاد یک ولایت خود مختار ملی کُرد انجام شود.

۴. درتبریز گروهی از کارگران مسئول برای رهبری جنبش تجزیه طلبانه را تشکیل داده به آنها وظیفه هماهنگ کردن («برقراری تماس») کارشان با سرکنسولگری اتحاد شوروی در تبریز را بدهید. سرپرستی عمومی این گروه به عهده باقروف و یعقوبوف است.

۵. طرح ریزی کار مقدماتی در رابطه با برقراری انتخابات مجلس پانزدهم ایران در آذربایجان جنوبی و همچنین انتخاب نمایندگان طرفدار جنبش تجزیه طلبانه به کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست (بلشویک) (باقروف و ابراهیموف) سپرده شود. کار مزبور تحت این شعارها انجام خواهد شد:

الف – تقسیم اراضی دولت و مالکان بزرگ به دهقانان و دادن وام‌های دراز مدت به دهقانان،
ب – از بین بردن بیکاری از طریق احیا و گسترش کار در موسسات و در عین حال از طریق ساختن راه‌ها و دیگر کارهای اجتماعی،
ج – بهبود خدمات اجتماعی و تأمین آب از طریق لوله کشی،
د – بهبود بهداشت اجتماعی،
ه – استفاده حد اقل ۵۰ درصد مالیات دولتی برای نیازهای محلی،
و – حقوق برابر برای اقلیت‌های ملی و ایلات: افتتاح مدارس و نشر روزنامه و کتاب به زبان‌های آذربایجانی، کُردی، ارمنی و آسوری، برگزاری جلسات دادگاه و مکاتبات رسمی در مؤسسه‌های محلی به زبان‌های بومی، ایجاد یک مدیریت استانی از جمله ژاندارمری و پلیس که متشکل از افراد بومی محل باشد، تأسیس انجمن‌های ولایتی، ایالتی و شهری (و) موسسات خود گردان محلی،
ز – بهبود چشمگیر روابط شوروی و ایران.

(و الخ…)

ششم ژوئیه ۱۹۴۵

دفتر سیاسی حزب کمونیست (بلشویک) اتحاد شوروی

(امضاء:) استالین

میدانیم که طبق برنامه، در ۱۲ شهریور ۱۳۲۴ فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان برهبری پیشه وری در تبریز تاسیس یافت و در ۲۱ آذر همان سال باصطلاح «مجلس ملی» آذربایجان تشکیل شد و «حکومت ملی» آذربایجان برهبری پیشه وری شروع به کار کرد. استاندار حکومت مرکزی سلب وظیفه گردید و پادگان های ارتش و اندارمری از سوی «فدائیان» فرقه خلع سلاح شدند. دولت و ارتش ایران در شرایط اشغال شوروی قادر به مداخله نبود.

من در عین حال به سند دومی نیز دسترسی پیدا کرده ام که نشان می‌دهد سه تا شش ماه بعد از همین فرمان استالین مبنی بر ایجاد یک حرکت تجزیه طلبانه در آذربایجان ایران از تاریخ ششم ژوئیه ۱۹۴۵، همان مرکز رهبری حزب کمونیست شوروی باز بدستور استالین در این فرمان تغییرات «کوچکی» داده و در تاریخ هشتم اکتبر همان سال با ارسال «ضمیمه» ای به آن فرمان تأکید کرده است که از آن تاریخ به بعد «وظیفه اصلی» فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان ایران باید نه «تجزیه طلبی» بلکه «خودمختاری ملی» آذربایجان در «چارچوب دولت ایران» باشد. ترجمه بخش مورد نظر آن ضمیمه به فرمان ششم ژوئیه چنین است:

«وظیفه اصلی فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان ایران، تأسیس خودمختاری ملی آذربایجان از طریق مؤسسه‌های خود مدیریتی دمکراتیک در چارچوب دولت ایران تعیین شود. در قرارکمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست (بلشویک) اتحاد شوروی مورخه ۶ ژوئیه ۱۹۴۵ تغییرات معینی داده شود و به تصویب برسد که جنبش‌های تجزیه طلبانه در ایالت‌های آذربایجان ایران، گیلان، مازندران، گرگان، خراسان و کردستان شمالی صلاح نیست.»

در پایان این «ضمیمه» کلمات «کاتب (دبیر کل حزب، م) ژوزف استالین» با دست نوشته شده است. مشخصات این سند در مرکز نامبرده مسكو چنین است:

RGASPI F.17, o. 162, d. 37, 1.147-1 [52-183]

از همان آغاز

در واقع مشکلات فرقه از همان تشکیل حکومت فرقه در ۲۱ آذر سال ۱۳۲۴ شروع شده بود. طی دو سه ماه بعد از فرمان ژوئيه، هم حکومت ایران و هم واشنگتن و لندن دچار اضطرابی فزاینده در باره ادامه حضور قوای شوروی در آذربایجان ایران گشته  چندین بار به شوروی ها خاطر نشان کرده بودند که آن ها باید به عهدنامه متفقین از سال ۱۹۴۱ عمل کرده نیروهای خود را از ایران خارج نمایند. آنها ارتش اشغالگر همسایه را تکیه گاه اصلی فرقه دمکرات میشمردند. و لیکن مسکو بطور حیرت انگیزی ضمن رد این قبیل اتهامات مدعی میشد که «نمایندگان شوروی و مقامات نظامی شوروی در حیات سیاسی داخلی استان های شمالی (ایران) کوچکترین مداخله ای نداشته و ندارند» (۲).  این درحالی بود که هری ترومن رئیس جمهوری آمریکا در بهار سال ۱۹۴۵ به دنبال آن همه هشدارهای  غرب، در باره مسکو میگفت: «گمان نمیکنم بیش از این به بازی مصالحه ادامه داده شود… باید تا زمانی که با خواسته های ما همراهی نکرده اند از شناسائی رومانی و بلغارستان خودداری کنیم. باید مواضع خود را در قبال ایران به صورتی کاملا غیر مبهم آشکار سازیم… از این بازی کودکانه شوروی ها خسته شده ام (۳).

در آخر بهمن ماه ۱۳۲۴ سفر احمد قوام نخست وزیر ایران به مسکو برای مذاکره با استالین ابتکاری بسیار زیرکانه  و درست در زمان لازم بود. احتمالا استالین نیز درحالی که خود را بالاخره ناچار به بیرون بردن قوای شوروی از ایران حس میکرد، تصور مینمود که میتواند در مقابل خروج قوای شوروی که  به هر حال لازم الاجرا بود، اقلا امتیاز استخراج نفت شمال ایران را به دست آورد.  در مقابل مسکو قبول میکرد که قوای نظامی خود را تا ماه مه همان سال یعنی خرداد ۱۳۲۵ از ایران خارج کند. ایران نیز متعهد میشد که در رفتار با حکومت فرقه رفتاری مسالمت جویانه در پیش گیرد به شرط آن که حکومت فرقه ملغی شده  یک «انجمن ایالتی» شود و فدائیان فرقه تبدیل به یک نیروی «نگهبان» (ژاندارمری) گردند. طبیعتا این اقدامات برای شوروی منافعی در برنداشت. تنها چیزی که مسکو را دلگرم میکرد امتیاز نفت شمال ایران بود. این هم یک جنبه توافقی بود که قوام در باره اصول آن  به استالین رضایت داد. این اصول در مسکو مورد قبول قرار گرفت اما چون یک رشته جزئیات قرارداد و از جمله شرایط امتیاز نفتی هنوز مورد توافق کامل نبود، قرارداد نهائی بین دو طرف قرار بود بعد از بازگشت قوام به تهران از سوی او و سفیر شوروی در ایران امضا شود.

و چنین شد.

حتی از همان ابتدای سفر قوام به مسکو نگرانی و دلهره ای جدی رهبران فرقه دمکرات را فراگرفته بود. آیا استالین آنها و حکومت فرقه را قربانی قرارداد ایران و شوروی کرده بود؟

چند هفته با اعمال و افزایش فشار بر مسکو برای تخلیه نیروهایش و ادامه مذاکرات تهران گذشت.

زیرکی اصلی قوام در پایان این دوره نهفته بود. دولت ایران پیوسته بهانه می آورد که چون مجلس پانزدهم هنوز انتخاب نشده، ابتدا می بایست انتخابات برگزار شود تا مجلس بتواند به توافقنامه نفتی یران و شوروی رای دهد. اما برای قانونی بودن انتخابات، ایران نمیتوانست تحت اشغال باشد و بنا براین قوای خارجی باید ابتدا آذربایجان را ترک میکردند.

مسکو بالاخره این شرط را پذیرفت و توافقنامه مذکور در تهران به امضاء رسید.

شاید هم استالین خوب میدانست که امتیاز نفت شمال ایران خیالی بیش نیست. شاید او چاره دیگری جز امضای توافقنامه در پیش روی خود نمی دید و احتمال هرچند بعید امتیاز نفت، برای دیکتاتور شوروی در درجه نخست وسیله ای برای حفظ شخصیت و وزن سیاسی اش بود.

در این میان پیشه وری مرتبا به سرکنسول شوروی در تبریز و باقروف در باکو هشدار میداد که قوام به تعهداتش وفادار نخواهد بود. او در عین حال در پیام های خود به باقروف پیوسته ادعا میکرد که «تمام ایران آماده انقلاب است» و آنها، یعنی فرقه برای مقاومت در برابر تهران به اسلحه نیاز دارند.  تا آن آخرین ماه ها و حتی هفته ها، خود پیشه وری و دیگر رهبران فرقه ظاهرا از برنامه اصلی مسکو بیخبر بودند و یا نمی خواستند باور کنند که مانند بسیاری از نمونه های کلاسیک دیگر، آنها همچون یک نیرو و جریان محلی، مهره کوچکی در محاسبات کلان هستند که بعد از مصرف به دور انداخته خواهند شد.

اما استالین گوش شنوائی برای نگرانی های پیشه وری و هشدار های او درباره قوام و خواست هایش برای حمایت مسکواز «انقلابی در سرتاسر ایران» نداشت.

در هشتم خرداد ماه  ۱۳۲۵ تمام نیروهای شوروی از ایران خارج شدند.

نامه استالین به پیشه وری

مجله «تاریخ معاصر و اخیر» انستیتوی تاریخ عمومی آکادمی علوم روسیه، ش 3، مه و ژوئن 1994 که نامه استالین در آنجا چاپ شده

NE2

NE3

تاريخ نامه استالین به پیشه وری هشتم ماه مه ۱۹۴۶ (۱۳۲۵) يعنى یک روز قبل از خروج کامل قوای شوروی از ایران است.

در اين نامه، استالين علل خروج نيروهاى شوروى از ايران را به پيشه ورى توضيح ميدهد. تا آن زمان باور عمومى بر آن بود كه فرقه دمكرات زير سايه ارتش اشغالگر شوروى بر سر كار آمده بود و با خروج آنها از ايران قدرت ايستادگى را ازدست داده متلاشى شده است. این نامه مُهر تائید استالین یعنی بالاترین مرجع مطلع در باره این گمانه زنی عمومی بشمار میرود.

متن این نامه که جزو اسناد «فوق‌العاده محرمانه» حزب کمونیست بود پس از فروپاشی اتحاد شوروی در دسترس عموم قرار گرفت. متن نسخه برداری شده این نامه که اصلش به روسی است ابتدا در مجله دانشگاهی «انستیتوی تاریخ معاصر» آکادمی علوم فدراسیون روسیه درج گردید. در عین حال همین نسخه متن اصلی (نه فتوکپی اصل آن) در اختیار مرکز «مطالعات جنگ سرد» مؤسسه «وودرو ویلسون» واشنگتن قرار گرفت. همین متن از سوی ولادیسلاو م. زوبوک به انگلیسی ترجمه شد.

این متن آنگاه با کسب اجازه از همین مرکز از سوی عباس جوادی به فارسی ترجمه شد که در سال ۲۰۱۱ در تارنمای «چشم انداز» منتشر شد. مشخصات اصل روسی سند درآرشیو سیاست خارجی فدراسیون روسیه این است:

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

(AVP RF) AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 34, d. 544, ll. 8-9

 

و اما بخش هائی از نامه استالین به پیشه وری از تاریخ هشتم ماه مه ۱۹۴۶:

به رفيق پيشه ورى

بنظر ميرسد شما دربررسى وضع داخلى ايران و همچنين بُعد بين المللى مسئله دچار اشتباه شده ايد.

(…)

مطمئنا اگر قواى شوروى در ايران باقى ميماندند شما ميتوانستيد روى موفقيت در امر خواست هاى انقلابى خلق آذربايجان حساب كنيد. اما ما ديگر نميتوانستيم نيروهاى شوروى رادر ايران نگهداريم و آن هم در وهله نخست بدين سبب كه ادامه حضور آنها در ايران بنياد سياست هاى آزادسازانه ما در اروپا و آسيا را مختل ميكرد. بريتانيائى ها و آمريكائى ها به ما گفتند اگر نيروهاى شوروى ميتوانند در ايران بمانند در آنصورت چرا نيروهاى بريتانيا در مصر، سوريه، اندونزى، يونان و بهمين ترتيب نيرو هاى آمريكا در چين، ايسلند و دانمارك نتوانند بمانند. از اين جهت ما تصميم گرفتيم نيروهارا از ايران و چين بيرون ببريم تا اينكه اين بهانه را از دست بريتانيائى ها و آمريكائيها بگيريم،(…)

(…) تا مدتى كه قواى شوروى در ايران بودند شما فرصت دامن زدن به مبارزه در آذربايجان و سازماندهى يك نهضت گسترده دمكراتيك با خواست هاى همه جانبه را دارا بوديد. اما نيروهاى ما ميبايست ايران را ترك ميكردند و چنين هم كردند. آنچه در ايران ميبينيم چيست؟ ما در اينجا شاهد نزاعى بين حكومت قوام و دواير طرفدار انگليس ايران هستيم كه نماينده ارتجاعى ترين عناصر ايران هستند. قوام در گذشته هر قدر هم كه ارتجاعى بوده باشد، بايد امروزه براى حفظ خود و حكومتش بعضى اصلاحات دمكراتيك را انجام داده و حمايت نيروهاى دمكراتيك ايران را جلب كند. تاكتيك ما در چنين شرايطى چه بايد باشد؟ بنظر من ما بايد از اين نزاع استفاده كنيم تا اينكه از قوام امتياز بگيريم، از او حمايت كنيم تا نيروهاى طرفدار انگليس را منزوى نمائيم و زمينه اى براى ادامه دمكراتيزه كردن ايران را مهيا كنيم (…)

(…)

ى. استالين

نامه پیشه وری به رهبری شوروی

درست در بحبوحه آخرین روزهای حکومت فرقه، پیشه وری و چند تن از رهبران دیگر فرقه دمکرات نامه ای به «رهبری شوروی» می نویسند. این نامه که تاریخش ۱۷ آذر ۱٣۲۵ یعنی درست چهار روز پیش از ۲۱ آذر همان سال است،  پیش از سقوط حکومت پیشه وری به آقای کراسنیخ سرکنسول اتحاد شوروی در تبریز تقدیم شده است تا به اطلاع «رهبری شوروی» رسانده شود. نامه که از سوی پیشه وری، پادگان ،شبستری، سلام الله جاوید و غلام یحیی دانشیان امضاء شده در واقع  گله ای جدی و فوری اما محترمانه  از «دوست بزرگمان اتحاد شوروی» است که از حکومت فرقه خواسته بود محدود شدن اختیارات خود درمقابل دولت مرکزی ایران را قبول کند و مقاومتی از خود نشان ندهد.

از لحن نامه معلوم میشود که هنوز شوروی ها به رهبران فرقه دستور نداده اند که از ایران خارج شوند اما رهبری فرقه با احساس خطری قریب الوقوع و با زبانی نشانگر استدعا، خواهان «کمکی مختصر» و از جمله اسلحه برای مقابله با حمله ارتش مرکزی است. بعضی فراز های جالب از آن نامه:

«ما هشت ماه تمام است که برخلاف احساسات مردم ما، بر خلاف آرزوها و تمایلات اعضا و فعالان فرقه مان؛ بخاطر پیشرفت امور و حل مسالمت آمیز اختلافات؛ با در نظرداشت سیاست جهانی دوست بزرگمان اتحاد شوروی و با توجه به میانجیگری دولت شوروی، کوشیده ایم سیمای قوام را دموکراتیک و مترقی جلوه دهیم و حتی در مواقعی برخلاف فکر و اعتقاد خویش از او تعریف و تمجید نیز نموده ایم. هدف این بوده است که کار از جانب ما مختل نشود. (…)

خلق آذربایجان،‏‏ رهبر آن فرقه دموکرات و سران فرقه دو انتظار از دولت شوروی دارند:

اولا مادام که مرزهایمان باز هستند و قدرت ملی مان پابرجاست مقدار کمی به ما سلاح داده شود. زیرا اگر کار به این روال پیش رود، این کار دیگر ممکن نخواهد شد. ما براحتی قادریم این سلاحها را چنان مخفیانه بدست قوای ملی برسانیم که نیروی مخالف از آن مطلع نشود. پس از شروع و شدت درگیری انجام این کار بسیار سخت خواهد بود. ما سلاح زیادی نمی خواهیم. منظور ما اندک مقداری است تا فدائیان ناگزیر نشوند با دست خالی جلوی دشمن بروند.

ثانیا حالا که قوام جنگ را شروع کرده و به ریختن خون برادران ما پرداخته است، اجازه داده شود ما نیز از هر سو او را در تنگنا قرار دهیم، تا از این طریق امکان قیام آزادیخواهان همه جای ایران را فراهم کرده، نهضت بزرگی در سراسر ایران آغاز نماییم و با سرنگون ساختن حکومت ارتجاعی تهران، حکومتی دموکراتیک بجای آن مستقر سازیم.

اگر این کار به صلاح نیست، بگذارید از  تهران کاملا قطع رابطه کنیم و حکومت ملی خویش را بوجود آوریم.( [مردم ما] به راه حل اخیر بیشتر تمایل دارد.) سیاست شوروی هر کدام از این دو راه را که انتخاب کند، ما می توانیم آنرا شرافتمندانه اجرا کنیم و موفق گردیم.

(…) مسئله نفت مسئله بسیار نسیه ای است که دولت شوروی بدون داشتن طرفدارانی در مجلس و جامعه موفق به دستیابی به آن نخواهد شد.« حسن نیت» قوام السلطنه نیز نمی تواند تضمین محکمی بحساب آید. زیرا او در مسئله آذربایجان نشان داد که حسن نیت چیست. (…)

مسئله نفت هنگامی می تواند بسود اتحاد شوروی حل شود که نیروهای اجتماعی پشت آن باشند. همین نیروها اکنون در نقاط دیگر ایران بشکل فوق العاده ای در حال سرکوب شدن و از بین رفتن اند. ولی [هنوز] کاملا از بین نرفته اند. نیروی ما در آذربایجان، نیروی مهمی است. ما دارای امکانات جدی برای وارد آوردن فشار به حکومت تهران هستیم. (…)

چشم امید همه خلق ، فرقه و رهبران آن به [یاری کشور شماست] و نجات را در [کمک آن] می بینند آنچه شما باید بکنید تنها دادن مقدار کمی سلاح [ به ماست].»

این نامه را که اصلش به ترکی آذری است سیروس مددی به فارسی ترجمه و در تارنمای «اخبار روز» (۴) منتشر کرده است. به گفته آقای مددی، اصل سند با این مشخصات در «آرشیو سیاست خارجی فدراسیون روسیه» نگهداری میشود:
АВПРФ, ф.
۰۹۴, оп.٣٨ , п.٣۶۴A, д.۴۹, л.۱-۷
Федерации Архив внешней политики Российской

مورخ و سیاستمدار جمهوری آذربایجان جمیل حسنلی که خود پژوهشی در باره حکومت فرقه کرده و به چاپ رسانیده است (۵)  میگوید نسخه دومی از همین نامه با مشخصات زیر در «آرشیو دولتی جمهور آذربایجان درباره سازمان های سیاسی و جنبش های اجتماعی» (مخزن۱ فهرست ٨۹ پوشه۱۱۴ صفحه ۲۱٨- ۲٣۰) وجود دارد:
AR SPIHMDA
f.۱,s.٨۹,i.۱۱۴,v.۲۱٨-۲

پرده آخر

به دنبال خروج نیرو های شوروی در خرداد ماه  ۱۳۲۵، پیشه وری بلافاصله طبق قرارداد تهران و مسکو و تحت فشار ماموران باکو که مجری اوامر مسکو بودند، با حکومت تهران توافقنامه ای را امضاء کرد که طبق آن حکومت فرقه به یک «انجمن ایالتی» و «مجلس ملی» آذربایجان به یک «انجمن محلی» تغییر یافت که وابسته به دولت مرکزی محسوب مبشدند. نیروهای فدائی» هم می بایست بتدریج لغو و در نیروهای انتظامی ایران مستحیل شوند.

با خروج قوای شوروی، دوره احیای حاکمیت دولت مرکزی در آذربایجان شروع شده بود – چه از طریق تحویل مسالمت آمیزقدرت فدائیان و چه زد و خورد و حمله حکومت مرکزی.

دیگر معلوم میشد که برای فرقه، پرده نهائی بازی آغاز شده است.

با اینهمه، احتمالا چهار روز پیش از ٢١ آذر یعنی در تاریخ تالیف نامه پیشه وری، رهبران فرقه از آنچه که بزودی در انتظار آنها بود خبری نداشتند چرا که اگر خبری میداشتند بعید بود سه چهار روز قبل از خروج برنامه ریزی شده آنان از ایران، از مسکو تقاضای اسلحه و یا اجازه برای اعلان استقلال کنند.

حکومت فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان که در ۲۱ آذر ۱۳۲۴ رسما تاسیس یافته بود با وجود همه خبر ها و تحولات ناخوشایند برای رهبران فرقه، در نظر داشت سالگرد تاسیس این حکومت را جشن بگیرد. اما یک روز مانده به ۲۱ آذر ۱۳۲۵ نمایندگان باقروف به پیشه وری و دیگر رهبران بالای فرقه گفتند که بزودی چند ماشین می آیند تا آنها را به باکو ببرند.

پیشه وری به دوستان نزدیکش گفته بود که نمی خواست تبریز را ترک کند اما چاره دیگری برای آنها باقی نمانده بود.

روز بیستم آذر روزنامه  «آذربایجان» ارگان فرقه دمکرات آخرین شماره خود را در تبریز به چاپ رسانید که در آن پیشه وری از همه «برادران ایرانی» میخواست که «مقاومت کنند و برای آزادی و دمکراسی بجنگند». مطلب اصلی روزنامه، آخرین اعلامیه فرقه از تبریز بود که با شعار هائی میهن پرستانه مانند «زنده باد آزادی و استقلال ایران!» خاتمه می یافت. اما برای شعار های ایران دوستانه دیگر خیلی دیر شده بود و نه فقط عموما «برادران ایرانی» بلکه «برادران آذربایجانی» هم حاضر نبودند برای فرقه دمکرات بجنگند (۶).

اکثر رهبران بلند پایه فرقه به جمهوری شوروی آذربایجان گریختند. ارتش ایران به پیشروی خود که یکی دو ماه قبل از آن شروع کرده بود ادامه داد. اما به غیر از موارد اندکی، ارتش مرکزی با مقاومت چندانی روبرو نشد. در اکثر موارد مردم محلی فرقه چی ها و فدائیان را قبل از رسیدن ارتش خلع سلاح و از مراکز قدرت برکنار کرده بودند (۷).

مطبوعات فرقه دمکرات که دیگر در باکو به چاپ میرسید در باره «تلفات بیش از ده هزار نفر» سخن میگفتند اما گزارش های نیمه رسمی ایرانی حاکی از هشتصد نفر تلفات بود (۸) در حالیکه یک منبع انگلیسی، به نقل از سفارت آمریکا در تهران از «قتل ۴۲۱ نفر از دمکرات ها» خبر میداد.

به هر تقدیر، ماجرای فرقه دمکرات پایان خونینی داشت.

چند ماه بعد انتخابات مجلس پانزدهم هم برگزار گردید. دکتر محمد مصدق در مجلس قوام را متهم به دخالت در انتخابات و تغییر نتایج آن به نفع خود نمود. شاید هم این اتهام بیمورد نبود. مجلس دوره پانزدهم توافقنامه ایران و شوروی و از جمله دادن امتیاز نفت به شوروی را بررسی کرده آن را رد نمود. موضوع امتیاز نفت هم با این ترتیب منتفی گشت. گفته میشود این عینا نقشه احمد قوام بود که اجرا شد.

لازم به توضیح است که سید جعفر پیشه وری کمتر از دوسال بعد از ماجرای شکست و فرار به باکو، دریازدهم ژوئن ۱۹۴۷ در یک تصادف اتوموبیل در آذربایجان شوروی به قتل رسید. اگرچه هیچ دلیل کافی و مشخصی در باره سوء قصد بودن این حادثه در دست نیست اما بعضی ها بر آنند که دستگاه اطلاعاتی شوروی از تصادف های رانندگی بخصوص در این راه برای قتل مخالفین خود استفاده میکرده است.

قضاوت در باره اینکه اتحاد شوروی و حکومت یکساله فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان خوب و یا بد کرد،  میتواند بسته به جایگاه سیاسی و عقیدتی هر کس فرق کند. اما برخلاف بیست سال پیش، در مورد چند و چون تاسیس فرقه و حکومت یکساله آن در آذربایجان دیگر نمیتوان شک و شبهه کرد مگر اینکه از روی عناد و یا تعصبی غیر جدی، وجود و یا اعتبار ده ها و صد ها سندی را که دیگر در دسترس عموم قرار گرفته اند، مورد تردید قرار داد.

(نشر نخست در تارنمای «بی بی سی فارسی»)
————————–

زیرنویس ها

(۱) برای مطالعه متن کامل اسناد و بررسی منابع مربوطه لطفا به تارنمای «چشم انداز»، فصل «از ۲۱ آذر تا ۲۱ آذر» مراجعه کنید.
(۲) شاید راینه، فرناند: استالین و تاسیس فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان، در: گفتگو، 1386.
(۳) شاید راینه، همانجا.
(۴) مددی، سیروس: نامه رهبران جنبش ملی-دموکراتیک آذربایجان به رهبران اتحاد شوروی (یک سند نو یافته)، تارنمای «اخبار روز»
(۵) حسنلی، جمیل: فراز و فرود فرقه دمکرات آذربایجان، نشر نی، تهران 1383
(۶) اتابکی، تورج: آذربایجان در ایران معاصر، تهران 1376، ص 184
(۷) ۱۸۴-۱۸۶ اتابکی، همانجا
(۸) اتابکی، همانجا.… ادامه خواندن

Shi’a Islam Vs. The Islamic Republic

By Abbas Djavadi — Recently, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s highest Shi’ite authority, urged voters to turn out for that country’s March 7 parliamentary elections. He warned that that failure to do so would “allow some to achieve illegitimate goals.”

To be sure, Sistani is no politician, though he is not apolitical, either. He doesn’t issue political or legal orders. He doesn’t direct Iraq’s policies on ethnic issues, oil exploitation, foreign relations, political parties, media, courts, or security. He just gives advice from his home in Al-Najaf.

Still, many in Iraq’s majority Shi’ite community follow him — not because he is an official “supreme leader” like Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and not because the Iraqi government requires the people to either follow him or face punishment, as in Iran. They follow Sistani because Iraqi Shi’a respect him as a religious authority, an influential marja, or marja-i taqlid (source of emulation).

Although it is difficult for even Sunni Muslims — let alone non-Muslims — to understand it, in the Shi’ite confession it is extremely important to have and follow a marja. Marjas provide advice and even make decisions when you are in doubt on religious, social, and even political questions. Marjas are recognized and respected ayatollahs, usually grand ayatollahs, who are qualified and accepted by the public to make decisions within the framework of Islamic rules and traditions.

ادامه خواندن

Iran: No News Is Bad News On Mother Language Day

By Abbas Djavadi — After Tehran’s massive state show of power during the February 11 celebration of the anniversary of the Islamic revolution and the harsh crackdown on all protests since the disputed presidential election in June, it would require extraordinary courage to stage even a small demonstration in Iran.

But a week ago, ethnic Azeri activists in Iran issued statements both in print and on the Internet calling for a demonstration on February 21, the UN’s International Mother Language Day. The statements called for education in Azeri Turkish, the mother language of around a quarter of Iran’s population of some 70 million people. Azeri Turkish is banned in Iran’s schools, and it is not even taught in Iranian universities. Azeri Turkish, the state language in the Republic of Azerbaijan, is close to the Turkish of Turkey, but quite distinct from Persian, Iran’s state language.

Every year on this day, thousands of Azeris staged demonstrations in the cities of Iranian Azerbaijan to call for language rights. This year’s protest was planned for Shahnaz Square in Tabriz, the capital of the province Eastern Azerbaijan.

But this year nothing happened.

A history student who identified himself only as Babak pointed to the “militarized security situation” in the country. “From early afternoon, hundreds — maybe thousands — of Basiji and plainclothes militia gathered on and around the square, which is a crowded and central place of Tabriz,” he said. Mobile-phone connections from and to this location were blocked, according to Babak.… ادامه خواندن

Zahra And Millions Like Her

By Abbas Djavadi — Zahra is a nurse working at the Beheshti Hospital in the central Iranian city of Isfahan. Both Zahra and her husband, Arash, a physiotherapist, work hard, with a lot of overtime, to provide for their two children.

They complain about their relatively low income. Zahra, for example, earns 550,000 tumans a month, about $600, and says the abolition of government subsidies, as planned by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, would further reduce their real income.

But the main reason why both Zahra and Arash voted for Mir Hossein Musavi, Ahmadinejad’s main contender in the presidential election seven months ago, was not their economic situation, Zahra says.

“Financially, we are surviving, somehow. But we want to live in a moderate and free society with better perspectives for our kids,” she says. “The election proved that our votes don’t count and everyday there are new restrictions and hostilities…. It’s as though we were constantly at war with ourselves and the world.”

ادامه خواندن

A New Radio for Pakistan’s Pashtuns

By Abbas Djavadi — In the last three months, I have attended job interviews with 40 Pashtun journalists from Pakistan to work for Radio Mashaal, a new service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL, for Pakistan’s Pashtu-speaking people, especially in the regions bordering Afghanistan. For the broadcasts that start mid January, we had carefully short-listed the candidates from a long list of professional applicants. We were pleasantly surprised by the level of professionalism of these candidates and their dedication to all the high values we at RFE/RL stand for: free flow of accurate news and information ultimately helping to counter voices of extremism and intolerance and serving universal human rights and freedoms for all.

They came from different corners of Pakistan’s “Pashtu belt” — from Quetta in the south to Mardan in the north — as well as crowded multiethnic cities such as Islamabad and Karachi. They all worked for different Pakistani media outlets, both electronic and print. And everybody had a different story to tell. One had to emigrate from his native town in Balochistan to Karachi because of serious threats by the Taliban and pressure from local tribal leaders. Another had received warning letters from the Taliban hanged on the house door of her parents and a third one, a journalist and a popular singer, said he was forced to produce his new CDs with a pseudonym after receiving dozens of threatening phone calls from the extremists. Some others, obviously, had so far no noteworthy confrontation with the Taliban but felt that they could serve their professional goals better in an international and more professional media organization.

ادامه خواندن

The Ashura of My Younger Years

By Abbas Djavadi — December 27 is Ashura, the 10th day of the month Muharram of the Islamic calendar. It is commemorated to mark the day of martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, in the year 61 of Hijra (680 AD).

I grew up in a very traditional, religious Shi’ite family in Tabriz in northwestern Iran, during the shah’s rule. The predominant religious culture said that Imam Hussein, as a last, true defender and just follower of the Prophet and his cousin, Imam Hussein’s father, Imam Ali, heroically and selflessly fought with just a few dozen poorly armed, but absolutely dedicated and selfless followers against the bloodthirsty Yazid, the son of the Umayyad Caliph Muaviyeh outside of Karbala, in today’s Iraq.

Imam Hussein knew well that he couldn’t win against the well-equipped army of Yazid, himself a symbol of injustice, arrogance, and oppression. But he fought nonetheless and was brutally killed so that the idea of Shi’a, the just one, following the path of the Prophet and Islam, could survive –and win some day in future.

For teenagers like me in the 1960s, Ashura was a time of sorrow and grief, yes, but the schools were closed for a few days. We went out to see the processions: people wore black shirts, marched through the streets, sang “nohas,” poems of grief, and shouted “Ya Hussein-e Mazloom!”. “Hussein, Hussein, Ya Hussein.” Most of the marching people would strike their chests as a sign of grief. I did too, occasionally.

Some would strike their backs with chains and some – I’d heard, but never saw myself — would cut their heads with knifes so that blood streamed over their faces. It was all to say: “We are with you, Ya Hussein, and want to feel what you felt, and sacrifice our lives for the true faith, as you did.”

At that time, this whole commemoration was something traditional, ceremonial. It had nothing to do with politics. Then it was a religious and social event, the Ashura, a get-together. Remembrance and grief.

Now it is grief and politics, a lot of politics. Hate and a lot of slogans. “Down with…” or “Death to…” for political opponents — even those who are Shi’ite clerics — and moderates, and everybody and anybody who is not fully behind the current rulers of Iran.

ادامه خواندن

The Iranian Regime Would Do Anything to Survive

(In Czech language)

Pro své přežití udělá íránský režim cokoli. Nedá se mu věřit

Pohřeb ajatolláha Alího Montazerího, na němž v pondělí protestovaly desetitisíce Íránců, byl poslední ukázkou, v jak vratké situaci se letos íránský režim ocitl. Sporné volby, radikalizace politiky, skrývání jaderného zařízení u Kómu, to vše letos vyneslo zemi znovu do role globálního hříšníka. Sblížení, které žádá Barack Obama, je v nedohlednu.

“Pro Íránce to přesto nebyl ztracený rok,” říká Abbás Džavadí, rodák z íránského Tabrízu, spoluzakladatel prvního zahraničního vysílání do Íránu (rádia Ázádí), autor několika knih o politice a historii regionu.

HN: Jak se Írán změnil od červnových voleb, co do rozložení moci? Kdo zemi nyní řídí? Ajatolláh Chameneí, jeho vlivný syn Modžtaba, nebo Revoluční gardy?

Nastala silná radikalizace politické scény. Dřív jsme měli vládu, parlament, shromáždění expertů, ale i určité vlivné figury, například Hášemího Rafsandžáního a další, jež nebyly součástí vládní kliky, ale byly v jistém smyslu tolerovány. Teď už nikoli. V zemi vládne vojenský, mesianistický režim. Vše se děje pod kontrolou Revolučních gard, jimi je zřejmě ovládán i samotný ajatolláh Chameneí, je na nich závislý.

ادامه خواندن

Iran Is Likely To See A Harsher Crackdown

By Abbas Djavadi – There are fears that the Iranian regime may intensify the crackdown on the opposition in the next few weeks.

Six months after a rigged presidential election wherein Mahmud Ahmadinejad was hastily confirmed the winner, the resistance has not disappeared despite tear gas, beatings, and hundreds of detentions, torture, imprisonment, and even killings.

At every given opportunity, there are demonstrations and protest actions calling for change and even challenging the rule of Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ahmadinejad’s most powerful supporter.

There is an even deeper division among clerics, with more openly criticizing the crackdown on protesters and others calling for a dialogue to save the system of the Islamic Republic.

Now imagine the following scenario: In order to split the ongoing resistance and prevent a further weakening of the clergy’s support for Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ intelligence service plants a few agents in the student demonstrations of December 4. Those agents tear posters of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini. Other agents shoot video of them doing so, and state television shows that “processed” footage a few days later to convince the undecideds that the protesters are not only opposed to Ahmadinejad and his mentor, Khamenei, but to the Islamic republic as a system and its founder.

ادامه خواندن

تجربه یک ساله من با وبلاگ و فیس بوک

حدودیک سال پیش من وب سایت — و یا طوریکه میگویند بلاگ و یا وبلاگ — شخصی خودم را باز کردم، همین که الان باز کرده و میخوانید . این کار دو دلیل اصلی داشت. اولا از جمع کردن مقالات چاپی خودم در پرونده های کلفت و سنتی خسته شده بودم و میخواستم آنهارا بصورت الکترونیک حفظ کنم. ثانیا هم مثل اکثریت کسانی که چیزی مینویسند میخواستم آنها را در دسترس علاقمندلن قرار بدهم.

اما دیوید هندرسن، دوست خوب من که در این کار به کمک من شتافت شاید طور دیگری به مسئله نگاه میکرد. باید سریع بود، باید با حد اکثر آدمها رابطه برقرار کرد. “کامنت” ها باید بدون کنترل قبلی منتشر شوند. بعد از انتشار اگر در کامنتی و نظری توهین و تحقیر و دشنام و اینها بود باید آنرا حذف کرد اما اینرا هم باید اعلان کرد که چرا آن کامنت حذف شده است. و باید به همه کامنت ها جواب داد تا نویسندگان آنها دوباره برگردند و وبلاگ را بخوانند. بر علاوه، نمیشود فقط گهگاهی مطلب نوشت. تا میتوانی باید بنویسی که خواننده هایت از وبلاگ نروند. هر روز هم باید ببینی که چند نفر وبلاگ را میخوانند. این تعداد هر روز زیاد میشود؟ با چه سرعتی؟ اگر زیاد نمیشود علتش چیست و چطور میتوان این مشکل را حل کرد؟
برای افزایش تعداد کاربران باید مطالب را با صطلاح “شر” کرد یعنی در پلاتفورم های دیگر و بخصوص شبکه های اجتماعی مانند فیس بوک، تویتر، مای اسپیس و غیره گذاشت تا دایره وسیعتری آن مطالب را ببیند.

وای… آخر اصلا منظور من این نبود. من آنوقتها هنوز مجاال این سوالها و شبهه ها را نداشتم. بنا براین، همچون قدم نخست، به فیس بوک رفتم و در ضمن به تویتر، مای اسپیس، لینکد این، میکس، لیجیت… دیگر چی؟ باالاترین را هم نبااید فراموش کرد.… ادامه خواندن

My Personal Experience With Blogging and Facebook

(In Persian)

تجربه یک ساله من با وبلاگ و فیس بوک

.حدودیک سال پیش من وب سایت — و یا طوریکه میگویند بلاگ و یا وبلاگ — شخصی خودم را باز کردم، همین که الان باز کرده و میخوانید . این کار دو دلیل اصلی داشت. اولا از جمع کردن مقالات چاپی خودم در پرونده های کلفت و سنتی خسته شده بودم و میخواستم آنهارا بصورت الکترونیک حفظ کنم. ثانیا هم مثل اکثریت کسانی که چیزی مینویسند میخواستم آنها را در دسترس علاقمندلن قرار بدهم.

اما دیوید هندرسن، دوست خوب من که  در این کار به کمک من شتافت  شاید طور دیگری به مسئله نگاه میکرد. باید سریع بود، باید با حد اکثر آدمها رابطه برقرار کرد. “کامنت” ها باید بدون کنترل قبلی منتشر شوند. بعد از انتشار اگر در کامنتی و نظری توهین و تحقیر و دشنام و اینها بود باید آنرا حذف کرد اما اینرا هم باید اعلان کرد که چرا آن کامنت حذف شده است. و باید به همه کامنت ها جواب داد تا نویسندگان آنها دوباره برگردند و وبلاگ را بخوانند. بر علاوه، نمیشود فقط گهگاهی مطلب نوشت. تا میتوانی باید بنویسی که خواننده هایت از وبلاگ نروند. هر روز هم باید ببینی که چند نفر وبلاگ را میخوانند. این تعداد هر روز زیاد میشود؟ با چه سرعتی؟ اگر زیاد نمیشود علتش چیست و چطور میتوان این مشکل را حل کرد؟
برای افزایش تعداد کاربران باید مطالب را با صطلاح “شر” کرد یعنی در پلاتفورم های دیگر و بخصوص شبکه های اجتماعی مانند فیس بوک، تویتر، مای اسپیس و غیره گذاشت تا دایره وسیعتری آن مطالب را ببیند.… ادامه خواندن

Two More Old Poems

Two more poems I wrote back in the 1980’s in Azeri Turkish:

Kehkeşanda Alma Qurdunun Sevdası

Bir kehkeşan düşün,
Kehkeşanda bir dünya.
Dünyada bir ölke,
Ölkede bir baxça.
Baxçada bir ağaç,
Ağaçda bir alma.
Almada bir qurd,
Qurdda bir sevda:

Öz almamı keşfetdim,
İndi de ağaca çıxacağam.
Sonra da elmimle
Allahı tapacağam.

ادامه خواندن

“Turkey’s Kissinger”

During a recent televized discussion on foreign policy, six former Turkish foreign ministers recently rated Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s performance with eight out of a maximum of 10 points. The six included some harsh Social Democrat critics of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.

Even before his promotion from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s special advisor to foreign minister in April, Davutoglu was regarded as the eminence grise behind Turkish foreign policy, and was occasionally even referred to as “Turkey’s Kissinger.” The Turks love to see their personalities, cities, and performances positively compared with the world’s most famous. But Davutoglu doesn’t like this comparison. Still, the 51-year old professor of political sciences is considered the architect of the new active foreign policy that the AKP has been pursuing since coming to power in 2002: “zero problems” with the neighbors while continuing to maintain traditionally good relations with the West.

The West, Russia, and most members of the international community were pleased when Turkey and Armenia on October 10 signed accords, still to be ratified by the two countries’ parliaments, to restore diplomatic ties and open borders after almost a century of enmity. The accords were widely credited to Davutoglu’s personal planning and implementation. In 2008, he mediated similar indirect talks between Israel and Syria in an effort to take first steps towards a Middle East peace. The effort was met with skepticism by the Bush administration and produced no tangible results, for reasons beyond Ankara’s control.

Turkey’s increasingly good relations with Russia and Iran have raised some eyebrows in the West. At the same time, Prime Minister Erdogan’s occasionally outrageous criticism of the Israeli operation against Gaza last winter, as well as the exclusion of Israel from a NATO air drill in Turkish skies two weeks ago, have led conservatives in Washington and Europe to ask if Ankara is rethinking its traditionally good relations with Israel. Discussing a potential Israeli attack on Iran, U.S. analyst Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute recently affirmed boldly that “Turkey is now on Iran’s side.”

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Ankara has leaned increasingly towards the West while maintaining no more than functioning good relations with its neighbors. Davutoglu describes Turkey’s new foreign policy initiative as a Turkish version of the German Ostpolitik of the 1960s. “Turkey is a natural part of the European continent and culture,” he wrote in his book “Strategic Depth,” published 10 years ago. Echoing U.S. President Barack Obama, Davutoglu recently said that Ankara and Washington enjoy a “model partnership.” With regard to Turkey’s relations with her neighbors and regional policy, on the other hand, he said “zero problem-based relations” must be transformed into “maximum mutual interest-based ones.”

Both Davutoglu and Erdogan have their roots in Turkey’s traditional, conservative, and Islamic thinking. However, improving relations with neighboring states and playing an increasingly leading role in the region seems to be based on real political influence and economic and energy interests, rather than prestige and nostalgia for the old Ottoman Empire, as some suggest. Erdogan and Davutoglu have attracted billions of dollars in Arab investment into Turkey and plan to make the country a main oil and gas corridor between the East and Europe.

While Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors view Ankara’s balancing act with both appreciation and suspicion, many in the West suspect that Turkish efforts to promote “mutual interests” between “rogue states” such as Iran and Syria and the West will ultimately end in Turkey’s betrayal of Western values and commitments. Others, including the Turkish opposition, even suggest that the ruling AKP is tacitly pursuing that goal.

But Davutoglu denies that the axis of Turkey’s foreign policy is shifting. A region that is increasingly peaceful, with countries cooperating with one another, is good for the West and the world, he recently said. “This is an exceptional and unique role Turkey could play.”

( First published on RFE/RL’s website)… ادامه خواندن

“Turkey’s Kissinger”

DavutogluDuring a recent televized discussion on foreign policy, six former Turkish foreign ministers recently rated Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s performance with eight out of a maximum of 10 points. The six included some harsh Social Democrat critics of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.

Even before his promotion from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s special advisor to foreign minister in April, Davutoglu was regarded as the eminence grise behind Turkish foreign policy, and was occasionally even referred to as “Turkey’s Kissinger.” The Turks love to see their personalities, cities, and performances positively compared with the world’s most famous. But Davutoglu doesn’t like this comparison. Still, the 51-year old professor of political sciences is considered the architect of the new active foreign policy that the AKP has been pursuing since coming to power in 2002: “zero problems” with the neighbors while continuing to maintain traditionally good relations with the West.… ادامه خواندن

What Was That Voice?

… و الیه راجعون

Last Friday, our dear colleagues Amir Zamanifar and Rosa Ajiri were flown to Tehran (from there to Rasht) and Los Angeles, respectively, to be left to rest in peace.

On September 29, they were killed in a tragic car accident near Prague, Czech Republic, where they lived and worked for RFE/RL’s Radio Farda. A third Radio Farda journalist, Mahin Gorji, severely injured, still is in a coma, fighting for her life.

We will remember Amir and Rosa and continue to pray for Mahin’s life.

This is a translation of a poem, originally in Azeri Turkish, that I wrote back in 1987:

The Flow of Life

What was that voice?
An outcry in the morning’s freshness —
Echoless and lost.

What happened to that love, courage, faith and desire?
A white, straight line flying,
Crossing the sky’s blue pages.

Then: the fall.
Commotion and rush, and an unbearable heat of the hell.
Obedience in the rebellion,
Stillness in the tumult.
Adaptation.

And this damned, uncertain waiting for an oasis:
The evening and a moment of peace…

Ömür Geçidi

Neydi o ses?
Sübhün teravetinde teninsiz qalan, iten
Feryad.

N’oldu o eşq, cesaret, inam, heves?
Mavi sehifelerde qetolunan, natemam, yarım,
Ağ, düz bir imtidad.

Sonra süqut,
Hengame, qaç-ha-qaç ve dözülmez cehennem istisi.
İsyan içinde mütilik, xüruş içinde sükut.
Adet.
Ve qehreden, serab kimi namelum intizar:
Axşam ve bir dem-i rahet…… ادامه خواندن

Iran: The Media Can Make It

Speaking at a conference of Islamic countries’ national radio and TV networks, Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad recently said that the media are the main tool Western powers use to overthrow other governments. “Nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons are just a distraction. Today, the enemy’s main weaponry is the media,” he said.

Ahmadinejad is right in his recognition of the media’s crucial role. The heavily manipulated Iranian presidential election of June 12, in which the authorities hastily declared him the winner, could not have sparked massive nationwide protests without information and communication between those millions of people who felt that their votes had gone astray.

But Ahmadinejad’s fellow Iranian citizens will have a hard time comprehending the wisdom of blaming Western media for reporting about an election that was intended to whitewash the regime, but which ultimately shattered its legitimacy because information about the manipulation of the vote could not be suppressed as it used to be in the “good old times.” Now Ahmadinejad and his main mentor, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, primarily rely on rule by force — that of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij.

It is true that for years the Tehran regime has been jamming and blocking U.S.- or U.K.-funded radio and TV stations such as Radio Farda, Voice of America, and the BBC, and their websites. Filtering of the Internet was extended to Facebook and Twitter a few months before June 12. But how would Ahmadinejad explain the fact that well before the election, the authorities also started to ban reformist and relatively independent newspapers and to close their websites? And shortly before the election, they started disrupting the whole SMS messaging system and later almost all mobile phone systems that could enable Iranian citizens to communicate “politically dangerous” information to one another.… ادامه خواندن

Rosa and Amir

Rosa Amir

از خون جوانان وطن لاله دمیده

They were young and vibrant. Optimistic and hopeful. Open and lovely. Smiling and fun. Hard working and helpful. Educated and dedicated — to their families, friends, their country and to freedom.

In the morning of September 29, 2009, we lost Rosa Ajiri, 27, and Amir Zamani Far, 29, both staff members of Radio Farda, the Persian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, in a tragic car accident near Prague, the Czech Republic. Another Radio Farda staff member, Mahin Gorji Fard, 43, driving the car, is in a coma and on artificial sleep.

Those who know them are all in mourning for the loss of their brilliant daughter, son, sister, brother, friend, and colleague. It’s not easy for a family to raise the kind of kids they were. It’s not easy for a nation to lose passionate, devoted, patriotic, freedom-loving youths they were.

They have shown thousands of their relatives and friends and millions of their listeners and web users how different Iranian youths are from what is being forcibly imposed on them and this brave nation.

We are proud of these youths. Proud of these families. Proud of this nation.

(in Persian, with links to most recent reports by Rosa, Amir, and Mahin; in English: In Memoriam: Radio Farda Loses Respected Colleagues)… ادامه خواندن

Iranians And Jerusalem

By Abbas Djavadi – This coming Friday, September 18, is the “Day of Jerusalem” in Iran. Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in chorus with some other Islamic countries and organizations, declared the last Friday of the month of Ramadan the “Day of Jerusalem” to demonstrate support for Palestinians and their drive to impose their sovereignty over this ancient city. Not that anything important will happen on this day, either in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian lands or Lebanon or Iran. There will be demonstrations in support of the Palestinians and condemnation of Israel. But since they have become a routine, they don’t attract much attention. In Iran, though, this year’s “Day of Jerusalem” has already acquired a special importance. The reformist groups, still alive and active despite brutal suppression, have said that on that day they will launch new demonstrations against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whom they accuse of rigging the presidential elections three months ago.

The slogan “Neither Gaza, Nor Lebanon — My Life Is Devoted to Iran” is currently very popular in Iran. Posters are being produced and distributed widely via the Internet. The question that is increasingly raised and discussed is: Why has the Islamic Republic made the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one of its main foreign policy priorities? To be sure, most Iranians probably feel sympathy for the Palestinians, who have to live in camps, in occupied territories, without statehood. But why is the Iranian government going far beyond sympathy, providing millions of dollars every year in weapons and cash to terrorist and semi-terrorist Palestinian groups? Why is the Islamic Republic even, as the Persian proverb goes, “a pot hotter than its soup,” supporting extremist groups such as Hamas, but not the Palestinian Authority that is recognized by Arab countries and the international community?

There is no doubt that Jerusalem, which is 2,000 years older than Islam, has a special importance, role, and religious value in Islam and the Koran. But many argue that the Islamic Republic is using this religious or “ideological” factor as a tool for its political and strategic purposes. Why then, they ask, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is Tehran supporting not the occupied, Muslim and neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan, but the occupier, Christian Armenia?

Apparently, those attracted by the slogan “Neither Gaza, Nor Lebanon — My Life Is Devoted to Iran” are not much worried about whom Jerusalem should “belong” to, how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be resolved, or even which foreign country or organization Tehran should support. Their concern seems to be that Iranians are facing increasing unemployment and inflation. Iran is under international embargo because of its suspected efforts to develop nuclear weapons, but also because of its opposition to an Arab-Israeli peace and support for extremist groups. Consequently, 40 percent of its fuel is imported and the fear is that because of Ahmadinejad’s rejection of talks on Iran’s nuclear program, the embargo may even be tightened. Under these conditions, people ask, why are we spending millions of dollars for Hamas, Hizbollah, and other extremist foreign organizations? Why aren’t we spending those resources for Iran and Iranians themselves? Why are you persisting in a foreign policy that further isolates Iran as a country and makes individual Iranians suffer?

This year, “Jerusalem Day” in Iran is important for a different reason. Aware of the opposition’s calls for a demonstration of power on this day, Ahmadinejad and his main supporter, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, hesitated for a long time over whether to continue the traditional celebration. Khamenei’s final word in last week’s Friday prayer that the celebrations would be held as usual strengthened the opposition’s hopes that they could once again challenge what they call the “absolutist power of the Supreme Leader,” as well as their concerns that planned demonstrations may be brutally suppressed again.

Whatever happens, though, on this Friday’s “Day of Jerusalem,” two things seem unquestionable. First: three months after the presidential election and its obviously rigged results, the protest and reformist movement is under pressure, but still alive and active. And second: the slogan “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon –My Life Is Devoted to Iran” has put down deep roots in society. Even Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s main contender from the reformist movement, when asked about the Palestinian issue in an election campaign meeting last June, said that they (the reformists) surely support the Palestinians. But Iranians have other important problems to solve first.”

(Published on RFE/RL’s website, Daily Estimate, Spero News, Peyvand)… ادامه خواندن

قدس به ما چه مربوط؟

(این مقاله در سپتامبر 2009 نوشته شده بود.)

عباس جوادی – جمعه آینده در ایران «روز قدس» است.

آیت الله روح الله خمینی بنیانگذار جمهوری اسلامی در همپائی با بعضی کشور ها و سازمانهای اسلامی آخرین روز ماه رمضان را به نشانه «حمایت از فلسطینی ها» و خواست آنها مبنی بر حاکمیت (حد اقل نسبی) بر این شهر قدیمی “روز قدس” اعلام کرده بود.

نه اینکه شما تصور کنید مثلا در ایران و یا سرزمین های اشغالی فلسطین و یا سوریه و لبنان در این روز اتفاق عجیب و غریبی می افتد. تنها چیزی که می بینید (و آنقدر تکرار شده و نتیجه ای نداده که دقتی هم به آن نمی کنید) تظاهراتی است که در بعضی از شهر های کشور های مسلمان تشکیل می شود با شعار هائی بر ضد اسرائیل و به نفع یک دولت فلسطین و پایتخت آن: قدس و یا طوری که نام باستانی و عبری آن است و یهودیان میگویند: یروشالیم ، همان اورشلیم، تعبیری که قبل از انقلاب اسلامی در ایران هم رایج بود.

این روزها در ایران شعاری جا افتاده است: “نه غزه، نه لبنان، جانم فدای ایران” و پوستر هائی با این شعار و به مناسبت “روز قدس” تهیه و بخصوص در اینترنت پخش شده اند که مردم ایران را بیش از پیش به تعمق وادار می کند. چرا جمهوری اسلامی مسئله اسرائیل و فلسطین را به یکی از محور های اصلی سیاست خارجیش تبدیل کرده؟ احتمالا بسیاری از ایرانی ها با آوارگان فلسطینی احساس همدردی می کنند و می خواهند آنها هم صاحب خانه و کاشانه خود شوند و در سرزمین و دولت خود و نه زیر اشغال زندگی کنند. اما چرا دولت جمهوری اسلامی ، فرسخ ها فراتر از این همدردی، ده ها سالست که میلیونها دلار، آن هم به سازمان های تروریستی و شبه تروریستی فلسطینی کمک پول و اسلحه می کند؟ چرا تهران کاسه داغ تر از آش شده و در مقابل حکومت فلسطینی به رهبری محمود عباس که اعراب و دنیا آنرا به رسمیت می شناسد، حماس و دیگر گروه های تند رو را حمایت میکند؟

البته که شهر باستانی قدس و یا اورشلیم که دو هزار سال قبل از اسلام هم وجود داشته، در اسلام و قران مقام و منزلت و تقدس ویژه ای دارد.

و اما مسئله کسانی که شعار “نه غزه نه لبنان — جانم فدای ایران” را می دهند ویا به آن طرز تفکر تمایل دارند، ظاهرا این نیست که قدس و یا اورشلیم در واقع “مال” کیست و مشکل فلسطین و اسرائیل چطور باید حل شود و یا ایران حالا باید از کدام سرزمین و یا سازمان خارجی این قدر حمایت کند.

بنظر می رسد سوال آنها این است: مردم ایران خود دچار بیکاری و تورم فزاینده هستند. ایران بخاطر سیاست های خارجی خود و مخصوصا این تردید بین المللی که تهران می خواهد به بهانه استفاده صلح آمیز از نیروی هسته ای به سلاح اتمی دست پیدا کند و در ضمن مخالفت با صلح بین اعراب و اسرائیل و حمایت از گروه های تند رو، تحت تحریم بین المللی است و حتی تقریبا نصف بنزین خود را از خارج وارد می کند. در این شرایط اینهمه پول و سلاح به فلسطینی های حماس و گروه حزب الله لبنان دادن یعنی چه؟ آنهمه ثروت را چرا برای خود ایران و ایرانیان صرف نمی کنید؟ چرا با این سیاست خود باعث می شوید انزوای بین المللی ایران و ایرانی ادامه یابد و طوری که از برخورد منفی دولت محمود احمدی نزاد نسبت به مذاکرات هسته ای با کشور های غربی بر میاید، در آینده نزدیک حتی افزایش پیدا کند؟

امسال “روز قدس” ویزگی دیگری دارد. مخالفان آقای احمدی نزاد که او را متهم به جعل و تحریف جدی نتایج انتخابات خرداد ماه ریاست جمهوری میکنند، گفته اند که جمعه آینده را تبدیل به نمایش نیروی اصلاح طلبان خواهند کرد و حکومت مطلقه را بار دیگر به چالش خواهند کشید. دولت آقای احمدی نزاد و پشتیبانان آن از سپاه و بسیج گرفته تا ولی فقیه که حمایت خود از دولت کنونی را پنهان هم نکرده و نمی کند، مدتها در تردید بودند که امسال بخاطر احتمال رویاروئی با نیروهای مخالف اصولا برگزاری “روز قدس” به صلاحشان هست یا نه. بعد از اینکه آیت الله علی خامنه ای یرگزاری روز قدس را بالاخره تصدیق کرد، هم امید اصلاح طلبان مبنی بر بلند کردن صدای اعتراض خود و هم نگرانی ها از سرکوب دوباره تظاهرات معترضین در این روز از سوی سپاه و بسیج بیشتر شده است.

اما هر چه که شود، در دو چیز دیگر شکی نیست: سه ماه بعد از انتخابات جنبش اعتراض و اصلاح طلبی سرکوب شده، اما همچنان به هستی و فعالیت خود ادامه میدهد و ثانیا اندیشه “نه غزه، نه لبنان، جانم فدای ایران” پا گرفته و مردمی تر از قبل شده است. حتی میر حسین موسوی، نامزد ریاست جمهوری و رقیب اصلی محمود احمدی نزاد در انتخابات، در یکی از مراسم قبل از انتخابات در پاسخ به سوالی مربوط به فلسطین گفته بود که البته باید از مردم فلسطین حمایت کرد، اما خود ما در ایران مشکلات دیگر و مهمتری داریم که باید حل کنیم.… ادامه خواندن

معذرت یا تاسف؟ ترکیه کله شق نیست

همه میگفتند نمیشود. اردوغان هرگز عذرخواهی نخواهد کرد – و واقعا هم اردوعان از آن تیپ آدم ها نیست که یه سادگی عذر خواهی کند. سازش با اسرائیل و روسیه؟ هرگز! اردوغان آدمی است اسلام گرا (راستی؟) با اسرائیل کنار بیاید؟ ممکن نیست! روسیه هم، خوب، هم روسیه و هم ترکیه در سوریه آنقدر طرف فعال جنگ داخلی شده اند که  آن هم امکان ندارد.

همین دوشنبه این هفته دو تا خبر همه را غافلگیر و هاح و واج کرد: اول خبر سازش ترکیه با اسرائیل بعد هم توافق باز ترکیه با روسیه، دقیقا در یک روز، اتفاقا به فاصله ای کمتر از یکی دو ساعت!

ترکیه بعد از هفت سال روابط خودش را اسرائیل و بعد از هفت ماه روابط خودش را با روسیه عادی خواهد کرد. هفت سال پیش یک کشتی حامل کمک های بشردوستانه ترکیه به غزه در آب های بین المللی از سوی اسرائیلی ها مورد حمله قرار گرفت و ده نفر در این ماجرا کشته شد. در مورد روسیه هم که هفت ماه پیش یک هواپیمای نظامی روسیه بالای مرز ترکیه و روسیه از سوی ترکیه سرنگون شد و خلبان آن هواپیما که با چتر پائین پریده بود به ضرب گلوله کشته شد.

از بابت این دو حادثه البته جداگانه، ترکیه مصرانه میخواست اسرائیل از آن طلب معذرت کند و روسیه هم میخواست شخصا اردوغان از روسیه عذر خواهی نماید.

همه گمانه زنی میکردند که از معذرت و اینها خبری نخواهد بود.

هر دو معذرت انجام گرفت. و موثر هم واقع شد.

در ترکیه مخالفین دولت و رسانه های منتقد طبق معمول زبان به شکایت و اعتراض گشودند و یک رشته سوال هائی هم کردند که اتفاقا بی معنی نبودند. «پس آن شعار ها و فریاد های برادری با “ملت مظلوم فلسطین” که هفت سال پیش سرمیدادید چه بود؟» «پس اگر قرار بود هفت ماه بعد از زدن جنگنده روسی از روسیه عذرخواهی کنیدو با خانواده خلبان مقتول همدردی کنید، اصلا چرا آن هواپیما را زدید وخلبانش را کشتید و بعد آنهمه داد و فریاد کردید که جقدر در مقابل روس ها قهرمان هستید؟»

در اسرائیل دو عضو هیئت دولت تهدید کردند که توافق ترکیه و اسرائیل را بایکوت خواهند کرد و در روسیه که رسانه ها هفت ماه تبلیغات ضد ترکی کرده اند حالا نمیدانند چطور لحنشان را یکشبه عوض کنند.

طرفداران و مخالفین شروع به بحث و مشاجره نمودند. اردوغان در اصل نامه اش «معذرت میخواهم» گفت یا «متاسفم»؟ در اصل ترکی متن چه نوشته شده و به روسی چطور ترجمه شده؟ معذرت را از پوتین خواست یا از خانوده آن خلبان؟

حتی رفتند ویدئوی یک سخنرانی اردوغان را از دو سال پیش یعنی 2014  یافتند که در آنجا در همان دوره خود ستائی ها و بقول عوام «کُرکُری خواندن» های اردوغانی خودش  گفته است ترکیه، دیگر قوی شده است و «دیگر آن ترکیه قدیم، آن ترکیه سرافکنده، آن ترکیه ای که دیگران دستورکارش را معین میکردند و آن ترکیه ای که عذرخواهی میکرد، در گذشته ماند…»

باید اعتراف کنم که فکر میکردم اردوغان خیلی سنتی تر و «شرقی تر» از آن است که طبق مثل شرقی «حرف مرد یکی است» عمل نکند. کسانی که کمی تندگو تر بودند این مثل ترکی را میاوردند که ایشان «تف خود را نخواهند لیسید.»

اما با وجود همه این ها، دیدیم که اردوغان مشکلی با تغییر عقیده اش نداشت و از روسیه به نوعی عذر خواهی کرد. منطق بالاخره بر احساسات و شعار پیروز شد.

حالا بگذارید تحلیلگران هرچه میخواهند تحلیل کنند، روزنامه نگاران هرچه میخواهند بنویسند و مردم کوچه و بازار هر حدسی که میخواهند بزنند. شاید در حرف هرشخصی گوشه ای از واقعیت خواهد بود و شاید هم هیجکدام اصلا ربطی با واقعیت نخواهد داشت.

من در صحبت هایم با مخالفین و موافقین، این مثل ترکی را میگفتم که «آلان ممنون، وئره ن ممنون» یعنی خریدار و فروشنده، اینجا یعنی دو طرف هردو راضی هستند، شما چرا جوش میخورید؟

هر دو طرف در هر دو توافق از کاری که کرده اند خرسندند. هر دو طرف در هر دو مورد امیدوارند که برای کشورهایشان از نگاه صلح و سعادت ملت های خودشان  و منطقه،  توافق و سازش بهتر از مشاجره و دعوا و جنگ است.

امیدواریم که همین طور هم هست.… ادامه خواندن

Iran’s Khamenei On Crash Course

For the past couple of months, we thought some kind of spring was coming to our beloved Iran. We deserved it, we thought, finally, after so many years of un-freedom, state-ideological one-way-turbo-course, and international isolation and humiliation. But after the much expected speech yesterday by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it seems we are not in June or May, but still somewhere in December.

Khamenei declared incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the winner of the June 12 presidential election and warned that further mass demonstrations calling for a run-off or recount of the votes that are widely considered as rigged would be harshly punished. These actions, he said in a tone familiar from all his previous speeches, were provoked and organized by foreign countries, the United Kingdom, the United States, and their intelligence services and radio stations, in an effort to incite a “velvet revolution” against the Islamic Republic.

Changing the system through a “peaceful revolution?” Intelligence services? Foreign radios? The U.K.? The U.S.? We just had a presidential election set by you, with four candidates approved by you and your Guardians.… ادامه خواندن

An Electoral Coup in Iran

By Abbas Djavadi – It was a night of fundamental change of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was, however, not the change the overwhelming majority of the electorate indicated to be producing with their real votes yesterday, but a change in the ruling establishment of the country, an almost complete control by Revolutionary Guards, intelligence services, and the most radical forces of the regime.

Actually, everything seemed to be going fine until the polling stations closed at 10 pm Tehran time. By then, streets were green, the color of the favorite opposition candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was generally expected to win with a considerable margin, by many estimates of late Friday even in the first round. Reformist newspapers had already started to announce Mousavi’s victory and the reformist candidate himself was calling the people for a national celebration on Sunday.

Everything started after voting ended and the Interior Ministry with the government-established Election Commission started to count the votes. As the incoming first figures from villages and small towns favored incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the reformers still kept their faith: “Ahmadinejad is stronger in villages that comprise some 30% of the population,” they said. “We will definitely win the cities.” This was while even one percent of the citizens from western Iranian villages and small towns hadn’t allegedly voted for Mehdi Karroubi, the other opposition candidate who, comes from the same region and enjoys considerable popularity in Lorestan and Kurdistan provinces.

ادامه خواندن

Ahmadinejad For Four More Years?

ahmadinejad Abbas Djavadi – The uncertainty over whether or not conservative forces in Iran will throw their support behind incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s bid for a second presidential term is dissipating. On April 25, a coalition of 14 conservative and clerical parties and groups announced that they will indeed support Ahmadinejad’s candidacy in the June 12 presidential election.

Coalition secretary Habib Asgarowladi said the group has “conveyed [to Ahmadinejad] some concerns” on the part of the clergy and political personalities. “But the consensus is,” he added, “that, under current conditions, Mr. Ahmadinejad best represents the thoughts and beliefs of the Imam [the founder of the Islamic Republic, the late Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini] and the Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei].”

Under the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, the Supreme Leader has the ultimate decision-making power in all major political and strategic issues. Ahmadinejad has not yet officially registered to run for a second presidential term. Former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Moussavi has announced he will run as the candidate of the “reformist” camp.… ادامه خواندن

Ahmadinejad — An Embarrassment for Iran

By Abbas Djavadi – In a first reaction to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech at the UN conference in Geneva, Ahmad Moussavi from Iran wrote on Radio Farda’s Facebook page: “I am ashamed as an Iranian. And I don’t know what else to say.”

At the anti-racism conference on Monday, Ahmadinejad accused Israel of being “racist.” “Using the Jewish suffering and the Holocaust as an excuse […] they created a racist government in the occupied Palestinian territories,” he said, pointing to the post-World War II Western powers.

Life proved right the U.S., Germany, Canada, Australia, and some other Western countries that had boycotted the meeting, fearing that the Iranian president would repeat his previous accusations against the Jewish state. Once Ahmadinejad started his speech at the conference with anti-Israeli attacks, representatives of 25 other countries including all remaining members of the EU walked out the meeting in protest.… ادامه خواندن

The Turkish-Armenian Thaw And Azerbaijan

President Obama’s recent visit to Turkey gave it a big boost. But a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was in the works even before Obama was elected U.S. president.  Now, Baku is upset that Ankara and Yerevan are about to make a deal sidelining Azeris’ main concern: restoring sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh and its surrounding Azeri regions occupied by Armenian forces since early 1990s. Gone with the wind all those days when both Turks and Azeris used to say  they were “one nation with two states”?

Ankara and Yerevan intensified their negotiations in August 2007 when their diplomats started to regularly meet in Geneva to discuss the details of establishing “good, neighborly” relations. Once the “technical preparation” was almost complete, President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yerevan in September last year to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match and, later, the meeting between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, at the recent Economic Forum in Davos, signaled the political will of the two sides to proceed.

Diplomats have confirmed to the Turkish media that Baku was not only fully informed about the progress and details of those talks, but even “in agreement” with the way Ankara has been approaching the rapprochement issue.

Dozens of rounds of talks between the Turkish and Azerbaijani presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers preceded this climax in the Turkish-Armenian thaw. Cengiz Candar, a Turkish journalist who accompanied President Gul to Tehran on March 11, reports that Gul and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, met in the Iranian capital specifically to discuss the issue.

Turkish leaders seem to be surprised by the outrage with which President Aliyev, other Azerbaijani officials, and the Azerbaijani media have responded to the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Some Turkish analysts maintain that Baku’s “demonstrative dismay” is meant primarily for internal consumption, while others speculate that the intention is to make clear to Moscow, Yerevan’s main supporter, Baku’s readiness to include it in all political processes in the southern Caucasus.

Whatever the reason for Baku’s anger, the Turkish leadership seems to have concluded that having no diplomatic relations with one of its neighbors and keeping its border closed have not produced, and will not produce, any positive movement on three key issues that have frozen the status quo for nearly 17 years.

The first of those is Yerevan’s insistence that the mass killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be recognized as “genocide.”

The second is Ankara’s demand that Yerevan clearly recognize the current Turkish-Armenian border, and refrain in future from referring to eastern Turkey as “western Armenia.”

And the third is concluding an agreement between Baku and Yerevan on Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian forces.

Referring to serious disputes on all these three points, Turkey “acknowledged” Armenia’s independence in 1991 but declined to extend formal diplomatic recognition. And following the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces, Ankara closed its borders with Armenia in 1993.

For the past 15 or more years, Yerevan has been demanding the opening of the border and the establishment of diplomatic relations “without any precondition.” Ankara, on the other hand, has made both those demands contingent on the resolution of the three main disputed issues. Endless and exhausting talks have been held between all parties involved: Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the “Minsk Group,” consisting of Russia, the United States, and France, to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But those talks yielded no concrete results. What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough in what was long enough considered a “frozen conflict.”

With technical details reportedly worked out and political will evident in both Ankara and Yerevan, the next few weeks may bring breaking news about the beginning of a historical rapprochement between Turks and Armenians. There are also reports that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict may be “very close to a settlement,” although the players in each of these two distinct but intertwined dramas apparently don’t want to wait for the other game to be played out first.

The public, however, still doesn’t know much about what the agreements would produce, either with regard to the “genocide,” or the recognition of the Turkish-Armenian border, or how the Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial dispute will be resolved. “Having good relations with Armenia is very good,” said Tulin Kanik, a student of political sciences from Ankara. “But what will happen with their claims on eastern Turkey or with the districts of Azerbaijan still occupied by Armenian forces?”

That both Ankara and Yerevan look confident indicates that people on both sides of Mount Ararat will probably soon hear something they can not only live, but also be happy with. Both Erdogan and Sarkisian know that they have to present their respective populations with a win-win deal. And they also know that, however enthusiastic and supportive the West may be or Russia may become, their own constituencies must accept that deal if they want to survive as national leaders.

(First published on RFE/RL’s website)… ادامه خواندن

The Turkish-Armenian Thaw And Azerbaijan

gul-sarkisianBy Abbas Djavadi – President Obama’s recent visit to Turkey gave it a big boost. But a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was in the works even before Obama was elected U.S. president.  Now, Baku is upset that Ankara and Yerevan are about to make a deal sidelining Azeris’ main concern: restoring sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh and its surrounding Azeri regions occupied by Armenian forces since early 1990s. Gone with the wind all those days when both Turks and Azeris used to say  they were “one nation with two states”?

Ankara and Yerevan intensified their negotiations in August 2007 when their diplomats started to regularly meet in Geneva to discuss the details of establishing “good, neighborly” relations. Once the “technical preparation” was almost complete, President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yerevan in September last year to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match and, later, the meeting between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, at the recent Economic Forum in Davos, signaled the political will of the two sides to proceed.… ادامه خواندن

Ergenekon, AKP, And Turkey’s Local Elections

pm-erdogan1By Abbas Djavadi – On August 13, 1994, a helicopter landed in the Kurdish village of Kirkagac, near the town of Cizre in southeastern Turkey. Men in camouflage fatigues stormed houses and took away six men, leaving behind their wives, children, and parents.

The abducted men were not, however, militants of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Some of them had refused to become “korucu,” or “village protectors,” the euphemism designating collaborators with the Turkish government in the fight against the PKK. Others had incurred the enmity of the “korucu” in neighboring villages as a result of either personal or interclan disputes.

The six men disappeared without a trace and their families were unable to find out what had happened to them. There was no trial or prison sentence, nor was any information released concerning their whereabouts. Soon everyone concluded that they had been summarily killed.… ادامه خواندن

Landing In Jail for Treating Political Prisoners

dr-firoozi-a-batebi1By Abbas Djavadi – Dr. Hessam Firoozi (photo, left), a physician who has treated dozens of political prisoners in Iran including Akbar Ganji, Ahmad Batebi (photo, right), and dissident Ayatollah Borujerdi, was sentenced to one year in prison and sent to jail last week.  He was accused of “providing refuge” and of “hiding” political opponents and prisoners, including Mr. Batebi, while on leave from prison.

In an interview with Niusha Boghrati of Radio Farda, Hessam Firoozi’s spouse, Mahta Bordbar, said that meeting with political prisoners to provide medical assistance while they were on approved leave did not constitute “hiding” them.

They have appealed the court verdict, Mrs. Bordbar said, but “the decision has been made in advance and nothing can apparently change it.” (For the full report and interview in Persian, click here)… ادامه خواندن

An EU-Turkish Initiative In The Middle East

By Abbas Djavadi – In the Middle East, Turkey could play a leading role in resolving political conflicts; boosting economic cooperation and investment within the region; and supporting political, economic, and social reforms. As the most democratic Muslim country in the Middle East, one with rich experience dealing with and adapting to Western institutions, Turkey is the best-suited Middle Eastern country to lead the effort to advance regional stability and development. The European Union and the international community should support Turkey in this role.

Ankara has demonstrated a consistent commitment to good relationships with all countries of the region, regardless of their domestic, regional, or international policies. Except for occasional military actions against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) pockets in northern Iraq that Ankara considers essential for its national security, Turkey has abstained from interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Turkey was one of the first countries to contribute to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. After some years of hesitation, Ankara has begun improving relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, a key factor in improving stability and security in that country.

Turkish efforts over the last two years to mediate between Syria and Israel, the Lebanese groups, and, more recently, Palestinian organizations — as well as its offer to mediate between Iran and the United States — have met with limited success so far. But they have nonetheless underscored Turkey’s capability and potentially suitable positioning to act as a regional leader. While primarily leaning toward the West in the past, the Turkish government (controlled by the Justice and Development, AK, party) has — especially over the last few years — improved its relations and image among the Muslim countries of the region, occasionally at the cost of Western reservations or objections.

Boosting economic relations and investment between Middle Eastern countries would — especially if accompanied by relaxation of travel, residence, and work-permit limitations — gradually contribute to the overall improvement of living standards, education, and social services in the region. The result would be the mitigation of the actual and potential dangers of extremism and ethnic conflict.

With its experience with its own democratic reforms (free and fair elections, media, education, privatization, and modernization), Turkey is in a position to help other Middle Eastern countries implement reforms. Doing so could also help Ankara unblock its own reform process and move ahead with EU-required measures that have been bogged down considerably for the last two years.

If the Middle East were developing economically and socially as a region and countries there had direct and growing interest in cooperation and integration, there would be much less grounds for repression, terrorism, and war.

The modalities of EU involvement in such a regional initiative remain undetermined, but it seems evident that a leading role for Turkey would be one of the best guarantees of success. Many Turkish officials have expressed a desire for greater Turkish engagement in the region. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Ankara has signaled Washington’s support for Turkey’s role in the Middle East, and EU officials have seconded that support. The time seems ripe to build on these initiatives in order to keep the Middle East process active even as the EU and the United States are preoccupied with immediate concerns closer to home.

(Abstract of a speech at the 4th Annual Conference of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Metropolitan University of Prague, March 14,2009; posted on RFE/RL’s website; Turkish Forum; reposted on Acturca)… ادامه خواندن

Roxana Saberi Still In Jail

r-saberiBy Abbas Djavadi – The Committe to Protect Journalists asked Iran to make public the charges against Roxana Saberi, an Iranian-American journalist who was arrested on January 31. Spokesmen of Iranian Foreign Ministry and Justice Authority had confirmed the arrest and added that the 31-old journalist’s accreditation had expired. Saberi is a freelance reporter for NPR and BBC. But official charges against Mrs. Saberi have not been announced. “At a minimum, she is entitled to basic due process,” CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon said in a statement. U.S. Secretary of State Hillay Clinton has also demanded the immediate release of U.S.-born journalist.

An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said Saberi was working “illegally” after her press card was withdrawn two years ago. Saberi’s father, Reza, was quoted by news agencies as saying  she was probably arrested for buying a bottle of wine. But in an interview with  Radio Farda, Mr. Saberi denied those reports and said that his daughter was doing a research after her accreditation was withdrawn.

An official of Tehran’s public prosecutor’s was quoted by ISNA  as saying that she will be released “in the next few days.”… ادامه خواندن

“Free Womens’ Rights Activists!”

zananBy Abbas Djavadi – A month ago, Aliyeh Eqdam-Doost was arrested in her native town of Fooman and transferred to the infamous prison of Evin in Tehran. Why? Because she attended a peaceful demonstration two years ago in Tehran of all those who wanted equal rights for men and women, from divorce to inheritance.

On the occasion of March 8, the International Women’s Day, the Women’s Committee of the Tehran-based Iranian Defenders of Human Rights issued a statement noting that their fight for equal rights remains as difficult and “cost intensive” as ever. “We consistently have to face repression, arrest, and imprisonment of those who fight against discriminatory laws and practices.”

Mrs. Eqdam-Doost was sentenced to three years and four months in prison and 20 strikes of lashes for attending the peaceful demonstration in defense of equal rights for men and women in Iran.  The blog “Taghyeer va Baraabari” (Change and Equality”) writes that the Court of Appeal confirmed her sntence to three years in prison. “She is the first [Iranian] women’s activist who has been sent to jail after a final court decision.”… ادامه خواندن

In Today’s Iran, Anything Else Is “Blasphemy”

“By Abbas Djavadi – In Islamic law, there is a principle of respect for the human being and his or her life and property, irrespective of his or her religion, confession, race, and sex..”

This is a quote from no less an authority than Mohammad Mojtehed (left) Shabestari, a Shi’a Muslim cleric who has spent his life studying and teaching Islam in the Theological Seminary of Qom. He has written for prominent religious publications such as Maktabe Eslam, and and he taught on the Faculty of Religion at the University of Tehran until he was fired from the university last year — together with many other professors who were considered too moderate or too apolitical for the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Last week, Iranian government media launched a campaign against Shabestari. His recent speech in Isfahan was called ”blasphemy. ” In that speech, he has said: “If in a society the three concepts of God, power, and authority are mixed up, a political-religious despotism will find strong roots…  and the people will suffer greatly.”

Ahmad Khatami, the acting chief imam of Tehran and a member of the Experts Council, called Shabestari’s statements “blasphemy,” saying “this individual is opposed to the principle of Velayate Faqih,” the political theory that Iran’s Islamic Republic is based on. Under this system, an unelected Supreme Leader, acting as Valiye Faqih, has supreme authority over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government at all levels of the state, while the elected government merely implements the Supreme Leader’s vision.

Shabestari responded with a written denial of the blasphemy accusations, saying the attacks against him are part of the conservative ruling elite’s preparations for June’s presidential election. He said their strategy is based on “lies, denunciations, and personal terror.”

Anything that does not fit the regime’s application of political Shi’ite Islam as a tool of government is dismissed as “blasphemy,” “infidelity,” and “Western-oriented” thinking that is to be eliminated from Iranian political scene.

The ruling elite’s distaste for any other views of Islam goes back to the first year after the revolution and is a fundamental characteristic of the Iranian system. Here are some of the most prominent examples:

Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, a popular Marja’ (source of inspiration) for millions of Shi’ite Muslims who saved the life of the late Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the Islamic republic’s founder, during the shah’s regime, was arrested and put under house arrest in early 1980s for advocating the idea that Islamic clerics should not actively participate in government.

Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a cofounder of the Islamic republic who Khomeini selected to replace him as Supreme Leader, was put under house arrest in 1989 for saying the Islamic republic’s policies infringed on freedom and violated people’s rights. Still living in Qom under house arrest, Montazeri enjoys considerable popular support, particularly among students and reformists.

In 2002, Hashem Aghajari, a devout Shi’ite and a reformist professor at Tarbiat Modarres University, was imprisoned for a speech he gave in Hamadan on “Islamic Protestantism,” in which he called for a “reformation” of Islam that would decrease the role of the clergy. He was twice sentenced to death for apostasy, but the sentences were commuted and he was released after paying a large fine in July 2004.

Ayatollah Seyed Hossein Kazemini Borujerdi was arrested in October 2006. He is a Shi’ite cleric who advocates the separation of religious and state affairs. He is still in prison and is reportedly suffering from several serious illnesses. The authorities also detained several hundred of Borujerdi’s followers who had gathered to prevent his arrest.

Hadi Ghabel, an outspoken cleric, was imprisoned last April. He was convicted of engaging in propaganda against the state and sentenced to 40 months in prison by the special Clerics Court in Qom. He was also defrocked and remains in prison.

Reacting to the campaign against Shabestari, Saeed Behzad — a devout carpet-shop owner from Tehran — noted that the Ahmadinejad government is not limiting its repression to “non-Shi’a” or to “non-Muslim individuals and groups.”

“Shi’ite or Sunni, Christian or Baha’i or atheist…. It’s not about your faith,” he told me. “You will come under fire if you even remotely question this regime and its practices.”

In the Islamic Republic, it’s not enough to be a Muslim. You have to obey and accept what they define as “real Islam,” a state ideology serving their “Velayate Faqih.” Anything else is “blasphemy.”

(Published also on RFE/RL’s website, Global Security)… ادامه خواندن

Iranian Writers Protest Repression

kanoonBy Abbas Djavadi – The Iranian Writers’ Association has issued a statement protesting repression and persecution against “different groups of the Iranian society” in the recent months.

The report, dated February 23, notes that “in the last few months, along with the deterioration of economic and social conditions in Iran, a new wave of censorship, bans, citations to security offices, detention, arrests, and imprisonments as well as an increasing number of executions was observed in response to the worsening consequences of the social and economic crisis.”

The Association also criticizes the destruction of the Khavaran cemetery in Tehran, with hundreds of mass and individual graves of dissidents executed in the 1980s. The statement says the destruction of the cemetery is aimed at destroying the evidence of the “past crimes” and demands that the cemetery be turned over to the families of the dead and made available for investigation by a “just and fair” court process.… ادامه خواندن

World Concerned About Iranian Baha’i Leaders’ Fate

bahanew1By Abbas Djavadi – In separate statements, German Chansellor Angela Merkel and European Union expressed deep concern about the fate of seven Baha’i leaders who were arrested months ago, facing charges of “acting against Iran’s national security” and “spying for Israel.”

Merkel’s spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm quoted the German chansellor, saying that the detainees have not been informed about their charges and have no access to defense and a fair trial. “This would negatively affect Iran’s relations with the international community.” (For a detailed report in Persian, see Radio Farda’s report).

The Baha’i community categorically denies the allegations. The Baha’i faith, founded in Iran in the 19th century, is considered heresy in Iran and Baha’i faithful are persecuted for their belief. Baha’i faithful refrain from participating in political activities. Human rights organizations are concerned that the seven Baha’i leaders could be executed in the next few days or weeks.… ادامه خواندن

Turkey: An Important Regional Player

By Abbas Djavadi – On February 16, U.S. President Barack Obama called his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to affirm the new U.S. administration’s support for Turkey’s “leading role” in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus. Iraq and Afghanistan will be the two major areas where Turkey could help the Western alliance, as in the past during the Korean crisis in the 1950s and the conflict in former Yugoslavia in 1990s.

As the U.S. prepares to withdraw from Iraq and send more troops to Afghanistan, Turkey could play a welcome role in contributing to Iraq’s further stabilization.

After a relatively long period of hesitation, over the past few months Ankara has started to improve relations with the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, which is headed by Masoud Barzani. Turkey’s biggest concern has been that the emergence of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, just across the Turkish border, would encourage the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has found a safe haven in northern Iraq from which to launch terrorist attacks inside Turkey.… ادامه خواندن

Iranian Sufi Worship House Destroyed

sufi1By Abbas Djavadi – On February 18, Iranian authorities destroyed a house of worship of Gonabadi dervishes. The house was attached to the tomb of the mystic philosopher and poet Nasser Ali at the historical Takht-e Foulad cemetry near Isfahan. The tomb itself, reportedly a UNESCO-protected cultural site, has not been damaged.

The house was a place for dervishes to gather, pray, meditate, and to read mystic poetry. The Sufi dervishes have been facing increasing persecution in Iran in the last few months. Many worship houses have been destroyed and dervishes have faced detention and mistreatment.

Dervishes are members of Sufi Muslim ascetic religious sects, known as Tariqah. There are hundreds of different Tariqah across Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Turkey, the Balkans, and in Arab countries. Gonabadi is one of the dervish groups in Iran. “Unlike mullahs, dervishes take the vow of poverty” (Wikipedia) and have a more tolerant and open understanding and reading of Islam than the official confessions of Sunna and Shi’a. In the West, Jalaliddin Rumi (Balkhi) (13th century) became the most famous Sufi philosopher and thinker. BBC News has decribed him as “the most popular poet in America.”… ادامه خواندن

Afghanistan: A Failed State, But Maybe Not Completely Hopeless

By Abbas Djavadi – At the recent Munich Security Conference, Afghan President Hamid Karzai demonstrated optimism about Afghanistan. Things are improving, he said, and the West should provide more support to crack down Al-Qa’eda and other terrorist groups.  He categorically rejected the view that Afghanistan is a failed state.

What is a “failed state,” after all? If a government can’t physically control its territory, has no or limited monopoly on the legitimate use of force, can’t take and enforce collective decisions for the whole country, is unable to provide basic public services, and can’t represent the whole country in the international community, that state is a failed or failing one, depending on the level of these shortcomings.

Based on these criteria (see Fund for Peace), Afghanistan is a failed state. For years, it has been and still is one of the top ten failed states of the world, along with Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Zimbabwe, and others.

ادامه خواندن

How the World May Look Like in 15 Years…

By Abbas Djavadi – The US will lose its single super power role, but remain the most powerful nation, though less dominant.  A global multipolar system will emerge with the rise of China, India, and others. The power and influence of Russia, Brazil, but also Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran will probably grow.

This and much more could be found in the US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 — A Transformed World, a 120-page comprehensive research pointing to probable (though not certain) trends of the world development in the next 15 or so years. The research is based on information gathered from numerous think tanks, consulting firms, academic institutions and hundreds of experts inside and outside the US.

In the new world order, more countries may be attracted to China’s alternative model rather than Western models of political and economic development. Investment in economic well-being will increase incentives towards geopolitical stability. Countries like Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan will face continued instability and state failure unless employment conditions change considerably.

Terrorism will not disappear from the Middle East by 2025, but its appeal could decrease if economic growth continues and unemployment is reduced.… ادامه خواندن

They Could Be Executed Next Week

bahaBy Abbas Djavadi – Yesterday, deputy Tehran prosecutor Hassan Haddad was quoted by semi-official news agency Isna, saying that Iran’s seven imprisoned Baha’i leaders (see photo) will be going on trial next week on charges of  “acting against the Islamic Republic” and “espionage for Israel,” allegations that may lead to execution.

The Baha’i community categorically denies these charges. No evidence against them has been brought to light and their lawyer, Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi has been prevented from meeting with the imprisoned Baha’i leaders for nearly a year to review their files.

The Baha’i faith, founded in 1863 in Iran, is considered heresy by the Islamic Republic. Followers of the faith have faced persecution since its founding. But the wave of repression has intensified in the last 30 years. There are some 300,000 Baha’is living in Iran. Baha’is refrain from involvement in partisan political activities.… ادامه خواندن

Ahmadinejad vs. Khatami

By Abbas Djavadi – With former President Mohammad Khatami running for presidency on June 12, Iranians will have the choice between him and the incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Do we really need to argue why Ahmadinejad’s reelection would be a continuing catastrophe for both Iran and the world? During his four-year term, he has aggressively led Iran in a course of confrontation and isolation, both domestically and internationally. And he has mismanaged the Iranian economy to an extent that unemployment, inflation, and poverty are the top concerns of the people in this oil-rich country.

And Khatami? Now that he has announced his decision to run, almost all reports are boringly repeating the fact that he failed to deliver on most of his promises of reform during his two terms of presidency 1997-2005 — to the disappointment of many of his initial supporters. It’s all true. Khatami himself said at the end of his second term that his “hands were tied.” In most crucial issues he wanted to make a difference, he was torpedoed or simply ignored by conservative forces in unelected bodies like the judiciary, or directly by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

ادامه خواندن

Thirty Years of Islamic Revolution

I wrote this three years ago, on the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. I’d not say that much has changed in the last three years. Things have maybe gone even worse.

By Abbas Djavadi – Iran’s Islamic Revolution didn’t exactly start 30 years ago on February 1 when the Shah left Iran and exiled Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini returned home from Paris. Nor exactly on February 10, Bahman 22, when the Shah regime was declared overthrown and the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan took over. It started at least a year or two earlier with demonstrations and strikes, speeches by Khomeini taped and distributed in the country and actions, occasionally harsh and brutal, by government forces. With increasing numbers of social and labor groups striking, pouring into streets and chanting anti-Shah slogans, millions, women, elderly people, youths, kids, workers, bazaris, unemployed, and finally soldiers and officers just demanding one thing: the Shah must go!

ادامه خواندن

Distributing Iran’s Oil Wealth?

CV1_TNY_2_9_16_09.inddBy Abbas Djavadi – In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected Iran’s president on the promise to distribute the country’s oil wealth among the poor. After his election, he approved grants and subsidies, disregarded advice by state budget office, and ordered the central bank to print more and more money. In one year, liquidity increased by 40%. Lacking incentives to invest, Iranians used the cheap cash to buy imports. This paralyzed domestic industries and caused skyrocketing prices. Within one year, the inflation rate was the fourth highest worldwide after Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, and Burma. Currently Iran has an annual inflation rate of 17% (official) or 25-28% (experts) and an unemployment rate of 12% (official) or 25% (experts).

Iran’s economy relies almost entirely on oil revenues that make up 85% of the total government income. With the international price of crude reaching record highs in the last few years, Tehran could afford keeping the country afloat.  The dramatic fall in oil prices in the last few months, however, has  caused deep concerns among most Iranian economists that a serious crisis is looming.

The New Yorker speaks to prominent Iranian economist Mohammad Tabibian who says that in Iran, the spectrum of economic thought runs “from left to left.”… ادامه خواندن

“We Are Ashamed!”

By Abbas Djavadi – A group of Iranian writers, academics, artists, journalists, and activists from around the world signed an open letter to the Baha’i community, apologizing for the persecution of the Baha’i faithful in Iran in the last century and half.

Here is part of that open letter:  “… From the very inception of the Baha’i Faith, the followers of this religion in Iran have been deprived of many provisions of human rights solely on account of their religious convictions.

According to historical documents and evidence, from the commencement of the Babi Movement followed by the appearance of the Baha’i Faith, thousands of our countrymen have been slain by the sword of bigotry and superstition only for their religious beliefs. Just in the first decades of its establishment, some twenty thousand of those who stood identified with this faith community were savagely killed throughout various regions of Iran. “

In the letter, the undersigned Iranians (so far 42 individuals) ask Baha’is to “forgive us for the wrongs committed to the Baha’i community in Iran” and add that they will no longer be silent when “injustice is visited upon you.”

For the full text of the letter and the list of the open letter’s signatories, please click here.… ادامه خواندن

Turkey Doesn’t Deserve This

By Abbas Djavadi – Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s fiery exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres on January 29 at the World Economic Forum in Davos may earn him votes in Turkey’s next municipal elections in March this year or sympathy on Arab streets. But it is hard to expect that it would not harm Turkey’s role as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world, a would-be mediator between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Ankara’s relations with Washington, and its bid for EU membership.

Peres, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, passionately defended his country’s assault on Gaza last month and, raising his voice and pointing finger at Erdogan, asked him what Turkey would do if rockets were fired at Istanbul every night. Israel’s Gaza offensive, directed against the ruling Hamas group, has caused 1,300 Palestinian deaths, two-third of them children and other civilians, and a huge destruction of nonmilitary infrastructure.

The culmination of Erdogan’s emotional response that bordered on a scandal didn’t wait too long: “Mr. Peres” he said, “you are older than me and your voice is very loud. The reason for you raising your voice is probably the psychology of guilt.” That was to the address of the Israeli president personally. But using the Turkish informal word of “sen” (“you”) as opposed to the formal and respectful word of “siz” (“you”), the Turkish prime minister adopted the same way of talking in Turkey’s parliament, especially in addressing the opposition, a language with an undertone of bossiness that is understood in the West as arrogance.

ادامه خواندن

Iraq, Turkey, Iran Vulnerable To Ethnic Conflict

Occasionally, I have heated discussions with my Turkish and Kurdish friends. Most of those from Iraq’s Kurdistan region, emboldened by the region’s semi-independence from Baghdad and its current relative stability, warn that it would declare independence if things fall apart in Iraq.

At this juncture, we have serious disagreements over whether the resulting small, landlocked country encircled by hostile neighbors (Arab Iraq, Iran, and Turkey) would be viable.

Even a “Greater Kurdistan,” although seemingly an impossible project that would lead to decades of bloodshed and destruction, would not drastically change the geostrategic environment of that new independent state.

The Turks are certainly very strongly opposed to any manifestations of separatism and, no doubt, Turkey’s strong and popular army would do its utmost to suppress any independent Kurdish state proclaimed on Turkish territory. Its reaction would be much harsher than the current efforts to contain the PKK.

The International Crisis Group recently published a report titled “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?” which I strongly recommend to all those with an interest in this region.

“At a time when Arab-Kurdish tensions still threaten Iraq’s stability,” the report says, “neighboring Turkey’s approach toward Iraqi Kurdistan has been a study in contrasts: Turkish jets periodically bomb suspected hideouts of the banned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, and Ankara expresses alarm at the prospect of Kurdish independence, yet at the same time has significantly deepened its ties to the Iraqi Kurdish region.

“Both Turkey and Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government would be well served by keeping ultranationalism at bay and continuing to invest in a relationship that, though fragile and buffeted by the many uncertainties surrounding Iraq, has proved remarkably pragmatic and fruitful.”

Heavy Shadow

I am not sure what percent of Turkey’s estimated 10 million to 15 million Kurds would really favor Kurdish independence from Turkey. Probably not many. But I believe most of those who look beyond today’s low-level conflicts and problems ask themselves how wise it would be to sever relations with a modern, Westernizing Turkey and join their ethnic brethren in a united but uncertain, if not dangerous, future.

Iran’s Kurds are in a somewhat different situation.

Most Iranian Kurds are Sunnis, while the Iranians are Shi’a, and the heavy shadow of Shi’a Islam pervades state ideology and practice. But despite their high ethnic awareness and strong feelings of kinship with the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, with whom they want to enjoy close contact and trade relations, they do not seem to have strong aspirations to secede from Iran.

But although Iran’s Kurds identify more closely with the state than do their co-ethnics in Turkey, the two groups share the same wishes and demands: to be able to use their own language in all spheres of public life, including education and courts of law; support for their ethnic and regional culture, which has been not only ignored but also suppressed in both countries; and some degree of local or provincial/regional autonomy.

Iran’s Azeris, who live mainly in the provinces of eastern and western Azerbaijan and Iran’s Ardabil and Zanjan, have been and still are a large and influential ethnic group with a strong commitment to the country’s unity and territorial integrity. They are Shi’a, like most other Iranians. They speak a slightly different dialect of Azeri Turkish (as opposed to Persian, Iran’s official national language) than that of the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan to the north. The Turkish spoken in Turkey is also quite similar to Azeri Turkish.

Since the establishment of a unified and central education system in the 1920s, Iran has not permitted the official use of the non-Persian languages of other Muslim ethnic groups such as the Azeris, Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, and Baluchis. This reflects both the drive to build a unitary and modern country, as well as the fear of potential separatism. But the use of the languages of some non-Muslim groups, notably the Armenians, has been tolerated.

Both under the late Shah and in the Islamic republic, Armenians have had their own schools in which subjects such as language, history, and religion are taught in Armenian. The main reasons for this discrepancy have been the perception that the relatively small Armenian community does not pose a separatist threat, and the historical understanding, which also holds good for Turkey, that all Muslims are one nation and that members of each nation need only one official, national language — Persian in Iran and Turkish in Turkey.

Stronger Commitment

Although deprived of the right to use their mother tongue in education and state bodies, Iran’s Azeris have demonstrated a stronger commitment to national Iranian affairs (politics, labor, economic activity, and trade) than to local or ethnic issues such as language and culture. Over the past three decades, the Republic of Azerbaijan has transformed itself into an independent country with a dominant Azeri language and culture, and Turkey has evolved into a modernizing republic with free media, elections, a liberal and Western-style government system, and a prospering economy — a NATO member that aspires to join the European Union.

These developments in the immediate neighborhood and the international isolation of Iran have not given rise to much sense of pan-Turkic or separatist tendencies among Iranian Azeris, who still consider themselves strongly Iranian in the first place, and Azeri only second. Additionally, the national memory of a one-year (1945-46) pro-Soviet autonomous republic in Iranian Azerbaijan that aspired to become part of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan (and ultimately the Soviet Union) has created fears and strong reservations among Iranians (and most Iranian Azeris) that any demands by the latter for ethnic and cultural rights would ultimately be directed against Iran’s territorial integrity.

Still, especially after the fall of the Shah, there have been individual or collective calls for linguistic and cultural rights for Iranian Azeris launched by social movements that have increasingly enjoyed popular understanding or even sympathy among the Iranian Azeri public. The Islamic regime, however, views all such demands as ultimately harmful to the country’s territorial integrity, and has suppressed them harshly. Even the implementation of a constitutional article granting the right to use non-Persian languages has been delayed since the establishment of the Islamic republic.

The Kurdish issue is currently a source of serious tension and danger for Turkey and, to some extent, for Iran, too. If Iraq disintegrates and Iraqi Kurds declare independence, neighboring Turkey and Iran may also be drawn into the resulting chaos and violence.

Although currently not an urgent threat, in the event that Iraq implodes, the Azeri ethnic issue in Iran has the potential to become a major source of regional instability that would affect not just Iran, but also the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia.

(First published on RFE/RL’s website)… ادامه خواندن

Leave the Dead in Peace!

By Abbas Djavadi – South of Tehran, there is a cemetery called Khavaran with hundreds of individual and mass, unmarked graves. In the past, it was used as a graveyard for religious minorities such as Hindus, Christians, and recently Baha’is. Between August 1988 and February 1989, Iranian authorities buried here thousands of regime opponents who were executed in a wave of persecution that was the most massive after the executions in the first two years of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 4,500 to 10,000 prisoners are believed to have been killed in this wave (see: Amnesty International).

Most of the graves are not marked by cemetery authorities. Flat earth covered by individual markings made by the families of those executed indicate mass graves of hundreds.

Last week, alarming reports from Tehran reached the West that Iranian authorities have started to destroy dozens of the ad hoc grave markings by bulldozer. The site has been partially covered by soil and trees were planted.

ادامه خواندن

“Banu, Our Lady…”

By Abbas Djavadi – Simin Behbahani, prominent Iranian poetess and women’s rights activist, received the “Simone de Beauvoir Prize for Women’s Freedom” in Paris on January 21.

The prize recognizes the work and actions of individuals who contribute to the freedom of women around the world.

At the Paris gathering, Mrs. Behbahani was representing Iran’s “One Million Signatures-Campaign” that aims at gathering wide public support against Iranian laws discriminating against women (information video on YouTube). Many of the signatories of the campaign have been detained or summoned to court.

French Minister of Culture Christine Albanel told the gathering that Iran’s One Million Signatures-Campaign started after a big meeting of Iranian women on June 12, 2006, in Tehran was cracked down. Mrs. Albanel added that the message going out with the Simone de Beauvoir Award is one to Iranian women that “You are not forgotten or abandoned…”… ادامه خواندن

The Specter of “Soft Overthrow”

By Abbas Djavadi – A specter is haunting the Islamic Republic of Iran — the specter of “soft overthrow.”

A week ago Iranian authorities announced that four individuals were soon to face a court process for plotting a “US-backed soft overthrow” attempt. Soon it was announced that two of them are well-known Iranian AIDS specialists, brothers Arash and Kamyar Alaei, who were arrested last June. The names of other two have not been yet disclosed.

Three days ago the two were sentenced to six and three years in prison, respectively. They were running HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programs in Iran, travelling back and forth, and participating at international conferences on AIDS. Arash Alaei was also a post-graduate student at the Albany School of Public Health of New York.

No reason enough for being sentenced to prison under the Article 508 of Iran’s Criminal Code? It states: “Any individual or group cooperating in any form with hostile foreign countries against the Islamic Republic will be, if convicted, sentenced to one to 10 years in prison.”

ادامه خواندن

Thank You, America!

By Abbas Djavadi – Could you imagine a Saudi Arabia where you have a parliament with elected representatives of the people elected by the people who select a government to run the country… with a king who just represents the country and keeps it together, but a head of government negotiating with foreign leaders oil production and the Middle East policy?

Or an Iran where Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could be unelected in a free election and replaced by a liberal democrat.. and a Supreme Leader who congratulates the winner and resigns and retires and returns to the city of Ghom to perform his purely religious duties as late Ayatollah Khomeini promised in Paris before his victorious return to Tehran?

ادامه خواندن

Past And Future And Our Region

By Abbas Djavadi – “The Gaza conflict is a fitting end to the Bush presidency,” said Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History, to Financial Times. “Israel is applying the original Bush doctrine in Gaza, which says that politics can be changed on the ground through military means.”

Military action may (or may not) change regimes on the ground at a very high price (Afghanistan, Iraq) but if a stable improvement is sought both for that nation and US national interests, both on security as well as hearts and minds of the civilian population, policies cannot be formulated and applied by ignoring legitimate desires and needs of that population, but by embracing and guiding them to a reconciliation of interests that would ultimately serve both.

The situation in Iraq has relatively stabilized while it is getting worse in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, however, most experts agree that these countries would fall into chaos, violence and disintegration would US troops withdraw tomorrow. Hope is now that the new US administration under President-elect Barack Obama would change the concept of “military can change politics on the ground” without addressing legitimate needs of the population in these countries.

ادامه خواندن

Baha’is Persecuted in Iran

By Abbas Djavadi – This is actually “no news” for today’s Iran. Iranian human rights organizations report that last Wednesday security forces raided the homes of 10 Baha’i families in Tehran, confiscated religious books, documents, and computers; and arrested six people. One of them was Ginus Sobhani, a former secretary of the Iranian Association of Human Rights’ Defenders led by Iranian Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, until its office was closed two weeks ago.

The Baha’i faith is a religious community that was founded in 19th century in Iran. It is a monotheistic religion that believes in underlying unity of all religions with Baha’ullah, the founder of this faith, being the last messenger after Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad. The faith is considered heresy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. While other religious minorities such as Christians and Jews are recognized as “believers in the holy books” but still discriminated against, the Baha’is are harshly persecuted, and banned from education and state employment. Most recently, nine students of the University of Kerman were expelled from college for being Baha’is. Although not legally sanctioned, admitting to be a Baha’i is often reason enough for imprisonment, mistreatment, and occasionally execution.

ادامه خواندن